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PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, DOMESTIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
AND PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITIES 
John Mukum Mbaku∗ 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Africans redoubled 
their efforts to fight impunity and violations of human 
rights. This renewed effort, however, was part of the 
struggle that started during the colonial period by Africans 
to free themselves from European domination and 
exploitation. Unfortunately, most post-independence 
African States failed to fully transform the critical domains 
and provide themselves with institutional arrangements 
capable of adequately constraining their civil servants and 
political elites. As a consequence, these countries came to 
be pervaded by high levels of government impunity, 
particularly the violation of human rights. During the last 
several decades, however, grassroots efforts to fight 
human rights abuses, presidential abuse of power, and 
government impunity, have increased throughout most 
African countries. These domestic efforts, coupled with 
those of the international community, have made it much 
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more difficult for Africa’s political elites, including 
presidents, to abuse their powers and engage in behaviors 
that violate the rights of their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, 
Africans still have a long way to go in order to eliminate 
government impunity and create an environment in which 
human rights are fully recognized and protected. Africans 
must put in place institutional and legal structures that 
effectively minimize the chances that government officials 
will engage in activities that violate human rights and 
threaten peace and security. In doing so, Africans can 
benefit significantly from international law, particularly 
international human rights law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the protection of human rights in Africa is the primary 
responsibility of each African country, African courts, institutions, 
and citizens, in conjunction with the international community, can 
play a very important role in fostering an environment that is 
conducive to the recognition of, respect for, and protection of human 
rights. Within Africa, the African Union (AU) and regional 
organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS)1 and the Southern African Development 
 
 
1 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is 
a regional economic union of fifteen countries, which are located in West 
Africa. ECOWAS has its headquarters in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. In 
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Community (SADC),2 are responsible for ensuring the recognition 
and protection of human rights in the continent. Additionally, these 
responsibilities apply to domestic and international 
nongovernmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and 
national human rights organizations. The AU and these regional 
organizations have a very important role to play in the protection of 
human rights in the continent, especially in cases where national 
governments are either unable or unwilling to assume the 
responsibility to protect citizens, or where the violators of human 
rights are state actors, other agents of the state, or non-state actors 
with significant connections to the state. The Darfur Genocide is an 
example of a situation in which the perpetrators of human rights 
abuses are state actors and civil society organizations working on 
behalf of the government. Unfortunately, the AU has not been very 
successful in protecting the people of the Darfur region of Sudan.3 
Since 1945, the international community, working through the 
United Nations (UN) and other multilateral organizations, has 
provided a strong legal foundation for the recognition and protection 
of human rights. For example, the UN General Assembly on 
December 10, 1948, through Resolution 217, adopted the historic 
 
 
2015, ECOWAS had a population of over 349 million. Since it was founded 
on May 28, 1975, ECOWAS has played a significant part in maintaining 
peace and security, as well as protecting human rights, in West Africa. See 
generally ADEKEYE ADEBAYO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, 
SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU (2002) (examining the activities of 
ECOWAS’ mechanism for managing conflicts and ensuring security and 
peace called ECOMOG). 
2 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an 
inter-governmental organization that consists of sixteen Member States 
with its headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. It was established in its 
present form on August 17, 1992, and currently has a population of 277 
million. See generally LAURIE NATHAN, COMMUNITY OF INSECURITY: 
SADC’S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (2012) 
(examining, inter alia, the evolution of the SADC’s effectiveness as a 
regional security organization). 
3 See generally JUDE COCODIA, PEACEKEEPING AND THE AFRICAN 
UNION: BUILDING NEGATIVE PEACE (2018) (assessing the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping operations of the AU). 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).4 The UN and 
other multilateral organizations have provided many of the 
international legal instruments that formed the foundation for human 
rights laws in many countries, including those in Africa. For 
example, provisions of the UDHR have either been incorporated 
into the constitutions of many African countries or reference has 
been made to the UDHR in the constitutions of these countries.5 For 
example, Bénin Republic’s constitutional designers have directly 
incorporated provisions of various international human rights 
instruments into their national constitution.6 In the Preamble to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Bénin, one can find the following: 
WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE . . . Reaffirm our 
attachment to the principles of democracy and human 
rights as they have been defined by the Charter of the 
United Nations of 1945 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the Organization 
of African Unity and ratified by Bénin on January 20, 1986 
and whose provisions make up an integral part of this 
present Constitution and of Béninese law and have a value 
superior to the internal law.7 
In Article 7 of the constitution of Bénin, it is stated that “[t]he 
rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed by the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the Organization 
of African Unity . . . shall be an integral part of the . . . Constitution 
[of Bénin] and of Béninese law.”8 Finally, the Béninese constitution 
imposes a duty on the government to make certain that citizens are 
fully educated about the national constitution, the UDHR, the 
 
 
4 See THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 3 (Gudmudur Alfredsson & Asbjorn 
Eide eds. 1999) (presenting a series of essays that examine the UDHR since 
its inception in 1948). 
5 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN Dec. 2, 1990, 
pmbl. 
6 See generally id. 
7 Id. at pmbl. (emphasis added). 
8 Id. at art. 7. 
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African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and other 
international human rights instruments.9 
Angola’s constitution makes specific reference to the 
applicability of international law when courts interpret and apply the 
country’s constitution.10 For example, Article 26’s title, Scope of 
Fundamental Rights, is quite telling and reads as follows: 
1. The fundamental rights established in this Constitution 
shall not exclude others contained in the laws and 
applicable rules of international law. 
2. Constitutional and legal precepts relating to fundamental 
rights must be interpreted and incorporated in accordance 
with the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the 
African Charter on the Rights of Man and Peoples and 
international treaties on the subject ratified by the Republic 
of Angola. 
3. In any consideration by the Angolan courts of disputes 
concerning fundamental rights, the international 
instruments referred to in the previous point shall be 
applied, even if not invoked by the parties concerned.11 
Additional support to the applicability of international law in 
Angola is provided in Article 27, which states that “[t]he principles 
set out in this chapter shall apply to the rights, freedoms and 
guarantees and to fundamental rights of a similar nature that are 
established in the constitution or are enshrined in law or 
international conventions.”12 
In 2010, Kenya provided itself with a new constitution, which 
introduced the concept of separation of powers with checks and 
balances.13 The new constitution created an independent judiciary 
 
 
9 See id. at art. 40. 
10 See generally CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan. 
21, 2010. 
11 Id. at art. 26(1)–(3) (emphasis added). 
12 Id. at art. 27. 
13 See generally CONSTITUTION (2010) (Kenya). 
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and spoke directly to the applicability of international law within the 
country.14 For example, Article (2)(5) of the constitution states that 
“[t]he general rules of international law shall form part of the law of 
Kenya,”15 effectively making “the rules of international law” 
justiciable in the courts of Kenya. In addition, the 2010 Kenyan 
constitution also states that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by 
Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this 
Constitution.”16 
Many other African countries, however, do not make 
international law—whether it is international human rights or 
humanitarian law—directly justiciable in their domestic or national 
courts.17 For example, while the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa acknowledges and makes reference to international 
law, it does not make any provision for the latter to be directly 
justiciable in the courts of South Africa.18 Nevertheless, the South 
African constitution imposes on national courts an obligation to 
“consider international law” when interpreting the Bill of Rights.19 
In Cabo Verde, the constitution states that “[c]onstitutional and legal 
rules with respect to fundamental rights must be interpreted and 
integrated in conformance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.”20 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana imposes an 
obligation on the government to “promote respect for international 
law.”21 However, Ghana’s constitution does not make any 




14 See generally id. at art. 10. 
15 See id. at art. 2(5). 
16 Id. at art. 2(6). 
17 See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
18 See generally id. 
19 Id. at art. 39(1) (stating “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum . . . must consider international law; and may 
consider foreign law”) (emphasis added). 
20 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CABO VERDE (1992) 
(amended in 1995 & 1999), art. 17(3). 
21 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (1992) (amended 
1996), art. 40(c). 
22 See generally id. 
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In the struggle to protect human rights in Africa, international 
law, particularly international human rights and humanitarian law, 
is very important. International legal instruments, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),23 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),24 and the UDHR, are very important to the struggle to 
recognize and protect human rights in Africa. In fact, the ICCPR, 
with two optional protocols; the ICESCR, with one optional 
protocol; and the UDHR were given the name International Bill of 
Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 217.25 
In Africa, the AU has also engaged in efforts to promote the 
recognition and protection of human rights within the continent. At 
the 1979 Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU),26 a resolution was adopted 
that called for experts to draft a continent-wide human rights 
instrument. The committee was subsequently set up and produced a 
draft that was unanimously approved at the 18th Assembly of the 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in June 1981, in 
 
 
23 The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty that was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly with resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 
1966 and entered into force on March 23, 1976. See International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R 
(Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ 
ccpr.aspx. 
24 The ICESCR is a multilateral treaty that was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on December 16, 1966 and came into force on January 
3, 1976. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, U.N. HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Dec. 16, 1966), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
25 See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III), International Bill of Human 
Rights (Dec. 8, 1948). The International Bill of Human Rights also includes 
two other treaties that were established by the UN; these are the ICCPR 
(1966), with its two Optional Protocols, and the ICESCR (1966). 
26 The OAU was succeeded by the AU, which was founded on May 
26, 2001, in Addis Ababa, and officially launched on July 9, 2002 in South 
Africa. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, AFR. UNION (July 11, 
2000), https://au.int/en/constitutive-act [hereinafter Constitutive Act of the 
African Union]. 
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Nairobi, Kenya.27 The instrument, which was referred to as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter) 
entered into force on October 21, 1986.28 The task of oversight and 
interpretation of the Banjul Charter was placed in the hands of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) that was set up on November 2, 1987, in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the African Commission is presently 
headquartered in Banjul, The Gambia.29 
Other relevant human rights instruments produced by the AU 
include: the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance;30 Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Rights of 
Women in Africa;31 Constitutive Act of the African Union;32 
Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Establishment of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court);33 African 
 
 
27 The Banjul Charter, CLAIMING HUM. RIGHTS: GUIDE TO INT’L 
PREVENTION OF HUM. RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFR. (Dec. 14, 2009, 4:56 PM) 
http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/au_charter.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2021) [hereinafter Claiming Human Rights]. 
28 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. 
COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/. 
29 See Claiming Human Rights, supra note 27. 
30 See generally AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS 
AND GOVERNANCE (Jan. 30, 2007), http://archive.ipu.org/idd-
E/afr_charter.pdf. 
31 See generally PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA, 
https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/protocol_rights_women_africa_
2003.pdf. 
32 See generally Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 
26. 
33 See generally PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AFRICAN COURT ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/ 
36393-treaty-0019_-_protocol_to_the_african_charter_on_human_and_ 
peoplesrights_on_the_establishment_of_an_african_court_on_human_and
_peoples_rights_e.pdf [hereinafter AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL]. 
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Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;34 and African Union 
Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa.35 
This article examines how the international community, 
through its various legal instruments and institutions, can help 
promote the recognition and protection of human rights in Africa. In 
addition to looking at various international human rights instruments 
and how they can inform and impact the protection of human rights 
in the African countries, this article pays particular attention to the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The R2P was developed by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) to serve as a framework for dealing with emerging threats 
to international peace and security. The R2P is supposed to address 
both the “root causes and the direct causes of international conflict 
and other man-made crises putting populations at risk,” which 
include threats to human rights.36 
In Section II, this article examines the various ways in which 
international law, particularly international human rights law, can 
help improve the protection of human rights in Africa. Specifically, 
this section examines international human rights law and its 
moderating impact on national legal systems, with specific emphasis 
on Africa’s progressive independent judiciaries and their 
interpretive powers, which they can use to interpret national laws, 
including the constitution, and bring them into conformity with 
international human rights norms. Reference in this section is made 
 
 
34 See generally AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE 
OF THE CHILD, OAU DOC. CAB/LEGS/24.9/49 (1990), 
https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/afr_charter_rights_welfare_child
_africa_1990.pdf. 
35 See generally OAU CONVENTION GOVERNING SPECIFIC ASPECTS 




36 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, UN (Dec. 2001), 
http://www.julianhermida.com/justiceresptoprotect.htm [hereinafter 
Responsibility to Protect]. 
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to two important cases, one from Zimbabwe and the other from 
South Africa. These two cases show how international law, 
particularly international human rights law, can help in the 
determination of the scope of fundamental rights in Africa. 
Section III is devoted to examining other tools that can be used 
by the international community to enhance the protection of human 
rights in Africa. In this section, particular attention will be paid to 
the responsibility to protect and the role that this principle plays in 
the protection of human rights in Africa. 
In Section IV, this article examines the failure of the erstwhile 
OAU to deal effectively and fully with the violation of human rights 
and other threats to peace and security. It is noted that the Rwandan 
Genocide, which took place in early spring 1994 resulted in the 
massacre of nearly a million Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers.37 
This represents the OAU’s most important failure at maintaining 
continental peace and security. The OAU’s failure to act to prevent 
genocide in Rwanda was due to its decision to adhere strictly to its 
operating principles, particularly that of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of Member States. 
The AU, founded on May 26, 2001, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
and launched on July 9, 2002, in South Africa, was established to 
replace the OAU.38 Section V is devoted to an examination of the 
AU and its role in the protection of human rights in the continent. 
Mention is made of the AU’s non-indifference policy and its relation 
to the protection of human rights in the continent. In addition, this 
section examines continental judicial institutions and the role that 
they play in the protection of human rights. 
In Section VI, the article examines the African Commission and 
the role that it has played in the promotion and protection of human 
rights in the continent. Section VII examines the Banjul Charter to 
determine the extent to which it has contributed to improving the 
environment for the protection of human rights in Africa. Section 
 
 
37 See generally LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE 
RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006) (examining, inter alia, the events leading to the 
Rwandan Genocide and the genocide itself). 
38 See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 26. 
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VIII is devoted to an examination of presidential immunities and 
how they have contributed to the violation of human rights in the 
continent. In Section IX, the article provides policy 
recommendations and suggestions for a way forward for the 
promotion and protection of human rights in the African countries. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND  
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One can view the demands of international law, including 
international human rights law, on African countries as an 
infringement on the right of these countries to govern themselves as 
they see fit. In each African country, as is the case in other sovereign 
states, the government is expected to be based on the constitution, 
where the latter is generally “perceived as essentially a state-
centered notion which is linked to the concept of statehood and the 
idea of a state exercising its sovereign power.”39 Sovereignty is 
defined as “the supreme, undivided, absolute and exclusive power 
attributed to the state within a demarcated territory.”40 Although 
sovereignty grants each African country the right to govern itself 
without interference from external actors, each African government 
is not expected to act without constraints.41 Citizens of a country 
impose constraints on their government in an effort to prevent civil 
servants and political elites from acting opportunistically and 
engaging in activities (e.g., self-dealing, corruption, and rent 
seeking) that negatively affect wealth creation and economic 
growth, as well as activities that violate human rights (e.g., denial of 
a right to a fair trial or education, or failure to protect children 
against sexual abuse and enslavement).42 International law, 
particularly international human rights law, also imposes constraints 
 
 
39 Charles Manga Fombad, Internationalization of Constitutional 
Law and Constitutionalism in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 439, 441 (2012). 
40 Id. 
41 See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
111–12, 129–32 (2018). 
42 See id. at 111–12, 128–30. 
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on national governments in an effort to prevent them from violating 
the rights of their citizens.43 
In each African country, the people form and empower their 
governments through a constitution to govern and perform certain 
well-defined activities on their behalf.44 Specifically, the 
constitution defines the powers surrendered by the people to the 
government; imposes constraints on the exercise of these powers in 
order to minimize self-dealing and other forms of criminal activities; 
mandates that the government derive all its power to govern from 
the people; and regulates the allocation of “powers, functions and 
duties among the various agencies and officers of government as 
well as defining their relationship with the governed.”45 
As in other countries, the African people are at the center of 
government and, thus, serve as an important constraint on the 
exercise of government power. In each country, there are two 
distinct centers of power, the State and the people.46 Granted, the 
government is empowered through the constitution to govern. 
Nevertheless, it must derive its legitimacy to act from the people, 
and as a consequence, the consent of the people is a critical 
requirement for constitutional government. For the government to 
be effective, it must be accountable, not just to the constitution, but 
also to the people. 
Another important constraint on the ability of each African 
government to exercise its constitutionally granted powers is 
international law. For example, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 
recognizes the right of States to govern themselves.47 Specifically, 
the UN is prohibited by its Charter from intervening in or interfering 
with “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state.”48 Nevertheless, Article 2(7) cautions that “this 
 
 
43 See Fombad, supra note 39, at 445. 
44 Some of these activities include maintaining law and order and 
providing public goods and services. See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 41 
(examining, inter alia, why people form governments). 
45 Fombad, supra note 39, at 441–42. 
46 See MBAKU, supra note at 41, at 85. 
47 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
48 Id. 
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principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII”49 of this Charter. Hence, international 
law has a significant role to play in the recognition and protection of 
human rights in Africa. 
Over the years, questions have arisen as to whether 
international law can infringe on the sovereignty of States, including 
those in Africa. If so, then to what extent can such intervention be 
undertaken? In 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) was called upon to provide an advisory opinion on whether a 
dispute between France and Great Britain was, by international law, 
solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction.50 The dispute in question 
concerned “Nationality Decrees” issued in Tunis and Morocco—
French territory—on November 8, 1921, and whether these decrees 
applied to British subjects who resided in these territories.51 The 
PCIJ, in its advisory opinion, stated that “[t]he question whether a 
certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is 
an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of 
international relations.”52 
The approach embodied in the PCIJ’s advisory opinion has 
been criticized as being too broad53 because it essentially “defines 
the scope of domestic jurisdiction as what is left over after the rules 
of international law have claimed their jurisdiction.”54 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which was established in 1945 
by the Charter of the UN and is the United Nations’ principal 
 
 
49 Id. Article 2, ¶ 7 of the UN Charter deals with the various actions 
that must be taken by the United Nations in order to deal generally with 
threats to international peace and security, and, in particular, breaches of the 
peace, and acts of aggression. 
50 League of Nations Covenant art. 15. 
51 See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French 
Zone), Advisory Opinion, 1921 P.C.I.J (ser. B) No. 4, at 143 (Feb. 7). 
52 Id. ¶ 40. 
53 See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Domestic Jurisdiction, in 
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., 1091 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1992). 
54 Fombad, supra note 39, at 442. 
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judicial institution,55 provided what is considered “a more 
authoritative position” in the Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Around Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. The 
United States of America).56 In its judgment, the ICJ held that as a 
consequence of the principle of sovereignty, each State has the 
“choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system and the 
formulation of foreign policy.”57 However, as the evidence has since 
shown, “[a] purposive interpretation of the proviso to Article 2(7) of 
the Charter [of the UN] and the practice of the UN over the decades 
has shown that the organization could in fact intervene in 
constitutional matters, which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state if international peace and security were said 
to be threatened.”58 
Many of today’s international legal experts argue that the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been granted the 
power by the UN to intervene in domestic constitutional law, and in 
the process, limit, for example, the jurisdiction of domestic courts, 
if international peace and security are threatened.59 Thus, in 
situations where international peace and security are threatened, the 
UNSC can infringe on a state’s sovereign right to govern itself and 
determine the content of its constitutional law.60 
Countries that enter into international treaties, including those 
in Africa, can impose constraints on themselves that limit their 
sovereign right to determine the content of their constitutional 
 
 
55 In addition to serving as the UN’s principal judicial institution, 
the ICJ also gives advisory opinions to authorized UN organs and 
specialized agencies. For more on the ICJ, see generally FIFTY YEARS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SIR ROBERT 
JENNINGS (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds. 1996) and HUGH 
THIRLWAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2016). 
56 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. United States), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J 14 (June 27) (citing 
Merits). 
57 Id. ¶ 205. 
58 Fombad, supra note 39, at 443; see also A. A. Conçado Trindale, 
The Domestic Jurisdiction of States in the Practice of the United Nations 
and Regional Organizations, 25 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 715, 751 (1976). 
59 See Trindale, supra note 58, at 751. 
60 See Fombad, supra note 39, at 443. 
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matters.61 For example, the ICCPR imposes certain obligations on 
States Parties that have ratified the treaty. This treaty, which is part 
of international human rights law, “limit[s] states’ sovereign right to 
exclusively determine the content of their domestic constitutional 
law.”62 While the ICCPR states that “[a]ll peoples have the 
right . . . [to] freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social[,] and cultural development,”63 the ICCPR 
also imposes various obligations on State Parties. For example, the 
ICCPR requires that each State Party must “respect and . . . ensure 
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth[,] or other 
status.”64  
The ICCPR, with its two optional protocols, is one of three 
instruments that constitute the International Bill of Human Rights. 
The binding obligations that it imposes on States Parties represent 
one way in which international law impacts the recognition and 
protection of human rights in Africa and other parts of the world.65 
One way to improve the protection of human rights in Africa is for 
each country’s government to sign and ratify all the international 
human rights instruments and then meet its obligations under these 
instruments, even if doing so infringes on each state’s sovereign 
right to govern itself and determine the content of its domestic 
constitutional law.66 
The infringement on a state’s sovereign right to determine the 
content of its constitutional law by international human rights law 
must not be viewed negatively—these commitments to uphold 
provisions of the various international human rights instruments can 
significantly minimize impunity, improve governance, and promote 





63 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
64 Id. at art. 2. 
65 See Fombad, supra note 39, at 443. 
66 See generally id. 
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African countries, the need for each of these countries to design and 
adopt constitutions that conform with the provisions of international 
human rights instruments should significantly reduce the ability of 
national governments to act with impunity and abuse the human and 
fundamental rights of citizens. 
There are at least six ways to make certain that human rights are 
protected in Africa. First, national courts can be empowered and 
provided with the capacity to enforce existing laws and protect 
citizen’s rights.67 More importantly, domestic courts can make 
certain that domestic laws conform with international human rights 
laws and norms; and the interpretation of domestic laws takes into 
consideration international human rights instruments.68 Second, 
legislators can make certain that national laws, including the 
constitution, comply with or reflect the provisions of international 
human rights instruments.69 Third, the government can make sure 
that the appropriate officials sign and ratify all international human 
rights instruments and, if possible, make the provisions of these 
instruments directly justiciable in domestic courts.70 Fourth, civil 
society and its organizations can help develop a human rights 
culture—one in which citizens voluntarily accept and respect the 
laws designed to protect human rights.71 Fifth, each country’s 
institutional arrangements should adequately constrain civil 
servants and political elites, including the president, so as to 
minimize impunity and enhance the protection of human rights.72 
Finally, each African country must provide itself with a governing 
process that is characterized by separation of powers with checks 
 
 
67 See Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and 
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights 
Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 103, 125 (2002). 
68 See generally Adjami, supra note 67. 
69 See generally id. 
70 See id. at 109. 
71 See generally id. 
72 See John M. Mbaku, Constitutional Coups as a Threat to 
Democratic Governance in Africa, 2 INT’L COMP., POL’Y, & ETHICS L. REV. 
77, 98 (2018) [hereinafter Constitutional Coups]. 
2019 PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 19 
 
and balances.73 Checks on the exercise of government power must 
include, but are not limited to, an independent judiciary; a robust 
and politically active civil society; and an independent and viable 
press. 
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S MODERATING 
IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 
How international law, and international human rights law in 
particular, affects legal systems in African countries is explained by 
two alternative theories: monism and dualism.74 Within the monist 
framework, international law and municipal law make up one single 
legal order “within a national legal system, with international law 
superior to national law.”75 Within such a legal system, national 
courts are obligated to “give effect to principles of international law 
over superseding or conflicting rules of domestic law.”76 Umozurike 
argues, however, that although monists generally believe that 
international law has primacy over conflicting domestic law, there 
is a small school of “inverted monists” who believe and argue that 
municipal law takes precedence over international law.77 
Dualist theorists, on the other hand, argue that international law 
and municipal law make up two separate, distinct, and independent 
 
 
73 See John M. Mbaku, International Law and the Fight Against 
Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 661, 761 
(2016). 
74 See Adjami, supra note 67, at 108–09. See also IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31–33, 41–51 (5th ed. 1998) 
(examining, inter alia, monist and dualist approaches to international law); 
Tijanyana Maluwa, The Incorporation of International Law and Its 
Interpretational Role in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Explanatory 
Survey, 23 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 45 (1998) (examining, inter alia, the 
interpretive role of international law in municipal legal systems in Africa) 
& U. OJI UMOZURIKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 29–36 (1993) 
(noting, inter alia, the concept of “inverted monism”). 
75 See Adjami, supra note 67, at 109; see also UMOZURIKE, supra 
note 74, at 29–33. 
76 Adjami, supra note 67, at 109. 
77 UMOZURIKE, supra note 74, at 30–31. 
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legal systems.78 While municipal law takes precedence and enjoys 
primacy in the governing and regulation of national legal systems, 
international law is directed exclusively at regulating the relations 
between “sovereign States in the international system.”79 According 
to the dualist theory, a municipal legal system can only give effect 
to international law when the country’s lawmakers use legislation to 
incorporate international law into domestic law, and by doing so, 
create rights that are justiciable in domestic courts.80 
In examining international law’s “binding status in domestic 
legal systems,”81 international legal scholars and jurists distinguish 
between the different types and sources of international law. Under 
both the monist and dualist theories, all international norms that 
have achieved or attained the status of “international customary 
law”82 are considered part of domestic or municipal law. In order 
for an international law principle to attain the status of customary 
international law, it must meet the definition of Article 38(1)(b) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which refers to 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”83 If treaties or conventions have not yet attained the status of 
international customary law, their status in municipal legal systems 
depends on whether the State in question follows the dualist or 
monist model.84  
Most of today’s African states inherited their legal systems and 
international law frameworks85 from the countries that colonized 
 
 





83 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. 
84 Adjami, supra note 67, at 109. 
85 Most Francophone countries in Africa have legal systems based 
on the French Civil law, while Britain’s former colonies base their legal 
systems on the Common law of England and Wales. Nevertheless, South 
Africa, which at one time was colonized by Great Britain, has a mixed legal 
system, consisting of the English common law and Roman-Dutch law 
model. Id. 
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them. The continent’s Francophone countries, which were colonized 
by France and Belgium, adopted the monist approach to 
international law while those states under British colonial rule 
inherited the dualist theory.86 
It is also important to note that the “properties of international 
law instruments themselves”87 determine how and the extent to 
which international law affects a national legal system. For example, 
the UDHR is “hortatory and aspirational, recommendatory rather 
than, in a formal case, binding.”88 Nevertheless, international legal 
scholars have argued that “the years have further blurred the 
threshold contrast between ‘binding’ and ‘hortatory’ instruments.”89 
While the UDHR does not have the legal status of a treaty, its 
position in international law has changed significantly, and it has 
received favorable treatment in many domestic legal systems since 
it was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 
1948.90 Perhaps more important is the fact that over the years 
arguments have developed which favor viewing “all or parts of [the 
UDHR] as legally binding, either as a matter of customary 
international law or as an authoritative interpretation of the UN 
Charter.”91 
What is usually referred to as the International Bill of Human 
Rights consists of the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR—the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR, however, are binding treaties.92 Africa-
specific human rights treaties include the Banjul Charter, which 
 
 
86 Id. at 109–110. 
87 Id. at 110. 
88 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 152 (2008). 
89 Id. at 152. 
90 See id. at 152, 160–61. 
91 Id. at 152. 
92 A treaty, of course, is only binding on States Parties to the treaty. 
The international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is codified in 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is the basis for 
the binding effect of treaties. Article 26, which is titled “Pacta Sunt 
Servanda,” reads as follows: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
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entered into force on October 21, 1982.93 Article 1 of the Banjul 
Charter obligates States Parties to incorporate provisions of the 
Charter in their domestic laws.94 According to Article 1, “[t]he 
Member States . . . to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, 
duties[,] and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake 
to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.”95 
Given the binding nature of treaties, any African country that is a 
State Party to the Charter who fails to give effect to the provisions 
of the Charter in its domestic law is in breach of the Charter. The 
nature of Article 1 of the Banjul Charter implies that the treaty is 
binding on States Parties regardless of whether they are monist or 
dualist States.96 
The OAU, and its successor, the AU, considered the need to 
give effect to the Charter’s provisions in States Parties’ municipal 
law so important that, besides the obligations created by Article 1, 
they found it necessary to impose additional requirements on States 
Parties through Article 62.97 The latter states as follows: “Each State 
Party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the 
present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other 
measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and 
freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter.”98 
As mentioned earlier, several African countries, such as Bénin 
and Angola, have specific provisions in their constitutions that 
directly define the role of international law in their municipal legal 
systems.99 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
imposes an obligation on national courts to consider international 
 
 
93 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. 
94 Id. at art. 1. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at art. 1, 62. 
98 Id. at art. 62. 
99 See supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text. 
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law when they interpret the country’s Bill of Rights.100 Since the 
post-apartheid constitution went into effect, South Africa’s judiciary 
has developed a significant body of human rights jurisprudence that 
has gained international attention.101 According to Article 39, 
“[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal[,] or forum 
. . . must consider international law; and may consider foreign 
law.”102 Article 233 deals with the application of international law 
and states that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.”103 Together, these two 
provisions in South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution have 
significantly “broadened the scope of the courts’ power to employ 
international law as an interpretive guidance when adjudicating 
domestic Bill of Rights provisions.”104 
Unlike South Africa and a few other countries, most African 
countries do not explicitly approve the use of international law as an 
interpretive tool for the adjudication of cases in domestic courts. The 
failure of many African countries to incorporate the provisions of 
various international human rights instruments into their domestic 
law has created a “technical obstacle” to the “use of international 
human rights instruments as persuasive authority in national court 
decisions.”105 Nevertheless, many African judiciaries have found 
ways to overcome this technicality. For example, in New Patriotic 
 
 
100 See generally Richard Cameron Blake, The World’s Law in One 
Country: The South African Constitutional Court’s Use of Public 
International Law, 115 S. AFR. L. J. 668 (1999) (noting, inter alia, the use 
of international law by South Africa’s Constitutional Court); Hoyt Webb, 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205 (1998) 
(providing more insight on the above referenced jurisprudence). 
101 Id. 
102 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, at art. 39(1)(b)–(c) (emphasis added). 
103 Id. at art. 233. 
104 Adjami, supra note 67, at 109; see also Andre Stemmet, The 
Influence of the Recent Constitutional Development in South Africa on the 
Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 33 INT’L L. 
47 (1999). 
105 Adjami, supra note 67, at 112. 
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Party v. Inspector-General of Police (1993), the Chief Justice of 
Ghana declared as follows: 
Ghana is a signatory to this African Charter and Member 
States of the [OAU] and parties to the Charter are expected 
to recognize the rights, duties, and freedoms enshrined in 
the Charter and to undertake to adopt legislative and other 
measures to give effect to the rights and duties. I do not 
think the fact that Ghana has not passed specific legislation 
to give effect to the Charter means that the Charter cannot 
be relied upon.106 
This approach to the incorporation of international law into the 
domestic legal system has been referred to as “transjudicial”107 and 
“accounts for the actual use of international law and comparative 
case law in domestic courts, regardless of the binding or nonbinding 
status of their sources.”108 Some international legal scholars argue 
that this leads to the “cross-fertilization of international law and 
comparative case law in domestic courts in continents around the 
globe”109 and “evidences the dawn of an era of ‘judicial dialogue’ 
and ‘judicial comity.’”110 
1. An Introduction to Human Rights Protections in Post-
independence African Countries 
Some African constitutions contain bills of rights that were 
either inserted into their constitutions upon independence or were 
later incorporated through constitutional amendments during post-
independence periods.111 Various international human rights 
 
 
106 New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police, Accra 
[Ghana 1993] 1 N.L.P.R. 73, suit 3/93. 
107 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial 
Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (examining and explaining 
the transjudicial model). 
108 Adjami, supra note 67, at 112–113. 
109 Id. at 113. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 114. 
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instruments inspired these bills of rights,112 which are considered 
important parts of constitutionalism, a process concerned with “the 
protection of individual rights and freedom from governmental 
encroachment.”113 Bills of rights are designed to provide for the 
legal protection of the rights of citizens. Municipal judiciaries are 
granted the right by the constitution to guarantee these rights and to 
hold other branches of the government accountable regarding 
recognition and protection of these rights—this, it is argued, is the 
“foundation for human rights constitutionalism.”114 
Although many African countries have been committed to 
constitutionalism and protection of human rights since the 1990s, 
significant resistance against the practice of constitutional 
government in many regions of the continent still remains.115 This 
resistance has led to the widespread abuse of human rights in 
countries such as Cameroon,116 Burundi,117 Central African 
 
 
112 Id. at 113. 
113 Id. at 114. See also Carla M. Zoethout & Piet J. Boon, Defining 
Constitutionalism and Democracy: An Introduction, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: A QUEST FOR AUTOCHTHONOUS PRINCIPLES 
1, 5 (Carla M. Zoethnout & Marlies E. Pietermaat-Kros eds., 1996) 
(examining, inter alia, constitutionalism and its relation to democracy). 
114 Adjami, supra note 67, at 114. 
115 Fombad argues, for example, that “[w]hile the quality of human 
rights protection in most African countries increased somewhat after 
1990, . . . there has been a steady decline in the quantum of human rights 
protection enjoyed in the last six years.” Charles Manga Fombad, 
Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on 
Some Current Challenges and Future Prospects, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1007, 
1016 (2011). 
116 Amnesty International has documented human rights violations 
in Cameroon, “including unlawful killings, destruction of private property, 
arbitrary arrests, and torture committed by the Cameroonian security forces 
during military operations conducted in the Anglophone regions.” 
Cameroon: A Turn for the Worse: Violence and Human Rights Violations 
in Anglophone Cameroon, AMNESTY INT’L (June 12, 2018). 
117 See Burundi: Events of 2017, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/burundi (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021) (recounting, inter alia, the political and human rights 
crisis that began in Burundi in April 2015 following the announcement by 
President Pierre Nkurunziza that he would run for a disputed third term). 
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Republic,118 Democratic Republic of Congo,119 South Sudan,120 
Uganda,121 the Republic of Sudan,122 and several other countries in 
the continent.123 While ruling elites in these countries have at one 
time or the other openly acknowledged the importance of 
constitutional limits on the government, they have, nevertheless, 
been unwilling to acknowledge the inviolability or sacredness of 
their national constitutions. Instead, they have proceeded to change 
them at will to meet their political ambitions. In Cameroon, for 
 
 
118 Central African Republic, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/africa/central-african-republic (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021) (presenting a series of reports that detail the abuse of human rights in 
the Central African Republic). 
119 Democratic Republic of Congo, UN HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE 
HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africaregion/pages/ 
cdindex.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (presenting a series of reports that 
shows that the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
has continued to deteriorate with increases in arbitrary executions; rape; 
torture; and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, all of which are 
committed primarily by the army, police, and intelligence services). 
120 See Elise Keppler, UN Report Details Abuses and War Crimes in 
South Sudan: Trials Needed to Bring Justice for these Atrocities, HUM. 
RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 27, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2018/02/27/un-report-details-abuses-and-war-crimes-south-sudan 
(stating that the UN has determined that fighters in South Sudan’s civil war, 
which started in 2013, have committed many atrocities against civilians, 
targeting them primarily on the basis of their ethnic identity). 
121 Maria Burnett, Addressing Torture in Uganda: Five Actions 
Police Can Take, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2018, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/addressing-torture-uganda 
(revealing, inter alia, the extent to which Ugandan police torture and 
mistreat suspects and suggests ways to reform the police and improve 
respect for human rights). 
122 Sudan, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/ 
sudan/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2021) (detailing, inter alia, human rights 
violations in Sudan with an emphasis on the Darfur region). 
123 See BONNY IBHAWOH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (2018) 
(providing a historical overview of the struggle to protect human rights in 
Africa); see also CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND ROLES OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
(1995) (examining strategies for the protection of human rights in Africa 
with emphasis on the role played by nongovernmental organizations). 
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example, while the country’s president, Paul Biya, talks about 
“consolidating the rule of law [and opening] a new page in [the 
country’s] democratic process,” he is unwilling to engage in 
dialogue with Anglophone citizens who have been protesting 
against his government’s efforts to politically and economically 
marginalize them.124 Instead, he has sent security forces to brutalize 
and kill peaceful Anglophone protesters, as well as burn down their 
villages.125 In 2008, he changed the constitution to grant himself 
another term in office, as well as exempt himself from all crimes 
that he may have committed while in office.126 In 2018, he and his 
political party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, 
engaged in election malpractices in order to secure a win and a 
seventh term in office.127 Thus, while he asks other Cameroonians 
to obey the law, he considers himself above the law.128 
Some scholars argue that “the lack of autochthonous principles 
of . . . constitutions [in Africa] presents an obstacle for their societal 
legitimacy.”129 Others argue that “because of the inherited nature of 
constitutionalism in postcolonial Africa, resistance to 
constitutionalism is not only inevitable, but also indispensable to the 
internalization of viable mechanisms for constraining power.”130 
Many scholars cite this argument contending that democratic and 
constitutional governments did not exist in precolonial Africa and 
that democracy was an alien institution brought to the continent by 
the European invaders. Some politicians have gone as far as calling 
 
 




128 See Adjami, supra note 67, at 114. See also Moki Edwin 
Kindzeka, Cameroon President Vows to ‘Deal’ with Separatists, VOA 
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018, 7:06 AM) https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-
president-vows-to-deal-with-separatist/4187305.html. 
129 Adjami, supra note 67, at 114. 
130 Id. 
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democracy an “imperialist dogma.”131 It was this belief in the alien 
origins of democracy in Africa that gave impetus to many of the 
military coups that swept the continent in the first few decades of 
independence.132 Professor George Ayittey, an expert on indigenous 
African institutions, argues that scholars’ and policymakers’ claims 
that democracy is alien to Africa portray “a rather shameful 
ignorance of indigenous African heritage.”133 Professor Eme Awa, 
a former chairman of the Nigerian National Electoral Commission, 
agreed with Professor Ayittey when he proclaimed: “I do not agree 
that the idea of democracy is alien in Africa because we had 
democracy of the total type—the type we had in the city-states 
where everybody came out in the market square and expressed their 
views, either by raising their hands or something like that.”134 
With respect to constitutions and the practice of constitutional 
government, many researchers have concluded that there did exist, 
in many precolonial African societies, what has been described as 
“indigenous African constitutions” which, like the Constitution of 
the United Kingdom, were unwritten and based on customs and 
traditional practices.135 These were, as argued by several scholars, 
 
 
131 For example, Ayittey states that “after independence, African 
leaders dismissed democracy as an imperialist dogma, denounced markets 
as capitalist institutions, and set out to destroy Western institutions. In so 
doing, these leaders destroyed their own native institutions.” KWAME BADU 
ANTWI-BOASIAKO & OKYERE BONNA, TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN DEMOCRATIC AFRICA at 147–48 (2009). 
132 See generally A. B. ASSENSOH & YVETTE ALEX-ASSENSOH, 
AFRICAN MILITARY HISTORY AND POLITICS: COUPS AND IDEOLOGICAL 
INCURSIONS, 1900–PRESENT (2001) (presenting a rigorous examination of 
military incursions into African politics and their consequences on peaceful 
coexistence and development). 
133 GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 469 
(2d ed. 2006). 
134 Quoted in AYITTEY, supra note 133, at 469–470. See also West 
Africa, Feb. 22, 1988, at 310. 
135 See Fatou K. Camara (Faculty of Law, Cheik Anta Diop 
University, Dakar, Senegal), The Three Most Important Features of 
Senegal’s Legal System that Others Should Understand 187–92, 
Presentation at the International Association of Law Schools Conference: 
Learning from Each Other: Enriching the Law School Curriculum in an 
Interrelated World (May 30, 2008). 
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quite effective in regulating sociopolitical interaction in various 
subcultures in the continent.136 
While the discussion of whether democracy and 
constitutionalism are alien to African societies might be of interest 
to academics and could greatly inform the discourse on human rights 
in the continent, it is unlikely to appeal to the many Africans who, 
today, live in extreme poverty and are subjected to various forms of 
tyranny directed at them by their governments. Individuals and 
groups that have been forced by the policies of their governments to 
remain trapped on the economic and political margins indefinitely 
are not likely to be interested in the historical development of 
democracy and constitutionalism in Africa.137 Their interest lies in 
the type of institutional reforms that would provide their societies 
with institutional arrangements that safeguard their rights, enhance 
their ability to participate fully and effectively in political and 
economic markets, and significantly enhance peaceful 
coexistence.138 For example, the establishment of national 
judiciaries capable of safeguarding the rights of citizens must be a 
policy imperative for each and every African country. This will 
allow each African country to develop a “more entrenched human 
rights constitutionalism.”139 Thus, regardless of the nature of 
constitutionalism and democracy in precolonial Africa, the public 
policy imperative in the continent today is the recognition and 
protection of human rights, which invariably calls for the 
 
 
136 AYITTEY, supra note 133, at 295–297. See also SALIBA G. SARSAR 
& JULIUS ADEKUNLE, DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: POLITICAL CHANGES AND 
CHALLENGES (Toyin Falola et al. eds., 2012) (arguing, inter alia, that 
elements of democracy existed in pre-colonial African societies). 
137 See Venessa Humpries, Democracy Is Not Necessarily Good for 
the Poor, Research Finds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2012, 10:04 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/africa-democary-
poverty-relief (noting, inter alia, that democracy may not necessarily lead 
to good outcomes for the poor). 
138 See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, What Should Africans Expect 
from Their Constitutions?, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 149 (2013) 
(arguing, inter alia, that at independence, most Africans wanted 
constitutions that would protect their fundamental rights from being 
violated by both state- and non-state actors). 
139 Adjami, supra note 67, at 115. 
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institutionalization of human rights constitutionalism in each and 
every African country.140 
The institutionalization of human rights constitutionalism 
stresses, at the minimum, three important issues: (1) the centrality 
of human rights in the structure of each country’s constitution—
each constitution must have a bill of rights which recognizes and 
provides effective protections for the rights of citizens and 
incorporates provisions of international human rights instruments; 
(2) the constitution must provide for a truly independent judiciary 
empowered to enforce the bill of rights; and (3) the creation of a 
culture of respect for human rights. Scholars and human rights 
activists recognize the significant influence that international human 
rights instruments have on the design of bills of rights for African 
countries and see this as a positive development in the struggle to 
improve the human condition on the continent.141 
2. Should International Human Rights Instruments Be Used 
for Adjudication in Africa? 
Some scholars have argued that Africa’s present state structures 
trace their origins to the colonial era.142 Given the fact that the 
Europeans did not come to Africa to practice constitutionalism and 
democratic government, colonial institutional frameworks did not 
facilitate the practice of constitutionalism or democracy.143 Instead, 
colonial laws and institutions were designed to enhance the ability 
of the European colonizers to dominate and impose their will on 
Africans and, as a consequence, the protection of the rights of 
Africans was hardly of interest to the colonial state.144 Consider, for 
 
 
140 See, e.g., Franck Moderne, Human Rights and Postcolonial 
Constitutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 315, 323 
(Louis Henkin and Albert Rosenthal eds. 1990); Adjami, supra note 67, at 
115. 
141 See, e.g., Moderne, supra note 140, at 322–27; Adjami, supra 
note 67, at 113. 
142 See, e.g., Moderne, supra note 140. 
143 See generally id. 
144 See RICHARD M. BRACE, MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA 48 
(Prentice-Hall 1964). 
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example, the attitudes of French colonial officers in Algeria 
regarding the acquisition of land by French farmers.145 In 1841, the 
French Governor of the colony of Algeria, General Thomas Robert 
Bugeaud, declared that “[w]henever the water supply is good and 
the land fertile, there we must place colonists without worrying 
about previous owners. We must distribute the lands [with] full title 
to the colonists.”146 It is obvious that, in this statement, the French 
Governor of Algeria and his administration had no interest in 
protecting and upholding the property rights of native Algerian 
landowners.147 
Of course, the French were not the only European colonialists 
who ignored the rights of African residents in the territories they 
colonized.148 Even the United Kingdom, which in 1953 rendered the 
provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
and Fundamental Rights (European Convention) applicable to its 
African colonies, was comparably disrespectful of Africans’ 
rights.149 For example, Edward Lugard, the brother of Lord Lugard 
who at the turn of the twentieth century was the British High 
Commissioner in the Northern Nigerian colony, was bewildered and 
embarrassed by the level of brutality visited on defenseless peoples 
in the colony.150 On May 21, 1908, he wrote a letter to his brother 
in which he stated that “they [colonial soldiers, military police, and 
regular police units] killed every living thing before them”151 and 
 
 
145 See id. at 48–50. 
146 Id. at 48. 
147 See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku & Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Rent 
Seeking and Policing in Colonial Africa, 8 INDIAN J. SOC. SCI. 277 (1995) 
(arguing, inter alia, that, as a colonial institution, the police were used 
effectively not to simply maintain law and order, but to help maximize 
British interests in the colony of Nigeria). 
148 See, e.g., Michael Crowder, Whose Dream Was It Anyway? 
Twenty-Five Years of African Independence, 86 AFR. AFF. 7 (1987). 
149 European Convention, infra note 161. For examples of British 
brutality towards citizens of their colonies in Africa, see Crowder, supra 
note 148. 
150 See Crowder, supra note 148, at 12. 
151 Quoted in id. 
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that “[w]omen’s breasts had been cut off and the leader spitted on a 
stake.”152 
In some European colonies, brutality against Africans and the 
violation of their rights were considered an important requirement 
of the job for soldiers and other paramilitary groups.153 This type of 
colonial brutality is aptly illustrated by King Leopold II’s Force 
publique154 in the Congo Free State. A junior officer of the Force 
publique provided an eyewitness account of the level of colonial 
brutality in the Congo Free State, stating: 
We were a party of thirty . . . [sent to] a village to ascertain 
if the natives were collecting rubber, and, if not, to murder 
all, men, women, and children. We found the natives sitting 
peacefully. We asked what they were doing. They were 
unable to reply, thereupon we fell upon them and killed 
them all without mercy.155 
Professor Michael Crowder,156 an expert on European 
colonialism in Africa, provided an overview of the extent and level 
of the brutality visited on Africans by the Europeans during the 
colonial period. Crowder argues that any “form of resistance” by 
Africans to colonial rule was “visited by punitive expeditions that 
were often quite unrestrained by any of the norms of warfare in 
Europe.”157 He goes on to cite as an example “the bloody 




153 See, e.g., Force publique, infra note 154. 
154 The Force publique was the main military force in King 
Leopold’s Congo Free State as well as in the Belgian Congo. For more on 
the Force publique, see generally BRYANT P. SHAW, FORCE PUBLIQUE, 
FORCE UNIQUE: THE MILITARY IN BELGIAN CONGO, 1914–1939 (1984) 
[hereinafter Force publique]. After Belgian Congo gained independence in 
1960, the Force publique was converted into the Congolese National Army 
(L’Armée nationale congolaise). 
155 HENRY RICHARD FOX BOURNE, CIVILIZATION IN CONGOLAND: A 
STORY OF INTERNATIONAL WRONG-DOING 253 (P. S. King & Son, 1903). 
156 See generally Crowder, supra note 148. 
157 Id. at 12. 
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and South West Africa,”158 and several atrocities associated with the 
British-sponsored “suppression of the Satiru revolt in Northern 
Nigeria.”159 As a consequence, one was not likely to find a bill of 
rights in colonial constitutions nor did many colonies practice 
constitutionalism and constitutional government.160 
Some scholars have argued that the European Convention161 
“had a particularly powerful impact on the creation of . . . national 
rights instruments”162 in post-independence Africa. There are at 
least two reasons why the European Convention is seen as a major 
influence on the construction of bills of rights in the African 
countries. First, the rights found in the European Convention, it is 
argued, “are more explicitly defined than those in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”163 Second, the European Convention 
contains a clause that empowered any State Party to the Convention 
to extend the protections of the Convention to its colonies.164 
According to Article 56(1), “[a]ny State may at the time of its 
ratification or at any time thereafter declare by notification 
addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that the 
present Convention shall . . . extend to all or any of the territories 
for whose international relations it is responsible.”165 In 1953, the 
United Kingdom rendered the Convention applicable to its colonies 
in Africa until they gained their independence.166 
While the European Convention is said to not have had a major 
impact on the advancement of human rights in the African colonies 
through Article 56(1), it nevertheless “is credited with inspiring the 





160 See id. 
161 See generally European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter European Convention]. 
162 Adjami, supra note 67, at 116. 
163 Id. 
164 See generally id. 
165 Id. 
166 Christof Heyns, African Human Rights Law and the European 
Convention, 11 S. AFR. J. HUM. RIGHTS 252, 255 (1995). 
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influence of unprecedented scale and geographic scope.”167 Other 
influences on the development of human rights protections in the 
African countries include the struggle for civil rights in the United 
States and the rights jurisprudence developed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.168 
Several authors have examined issues about the applicability 
and legitimacy of international human rights norms in Africa.169 In 
this article, we do not plan to revisit that subject. Instead, we argue 
that international human rights instruments, regardless of their 
origins, are critical to the struggle to recognize and protect human 
rights in African countries. Thus, any African country that seeks to 
create a domestic environment and culture of respect for human 
rights must begin by: (1) incorporating the provisions of 
international human rights instruments into its national constitution, 
as well as its national legislation, and making these rights justiciable 
in national courts; and (2) providing a constitutional role for its 
judiciaries in enforcing human rights. 
C. AFRICAN JUDICIARIES AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Since many African countries have not incorporated provisions 
of major international human rights instruments into their national 
constitutions, there is a limitation on the ability of international law 
to positively impact the protection of human rights. This is 
 
 
167 Adjami, supra note 67, at 117. See also Anthony Lester, The 
Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 541 
(1988). 
168 See, e.g., C. R. M. DLAMINI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: WHICH 
WAY SOUTH AFRICA? (1995) (arguing, inter alia, that the bill of rights 
contributed significantly to the elimination of racial injustices in the United 
States and could function similarly in South Africa); MARK S. KENDE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED 
STATES (showing, inter alia, the progressive nature of human rights 
jurisprudence of post-apartheid South African courts compared to the more 
conservative decisions of U.S. courts). 
169 See Adjami, supra note 67 (providing an overview of the 
applicability and legitimacy of human rights norms in the African 
countries). 
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especially critical, not only when national legislation conflicts with 
international human rights norms, but also when customary law and 
practices offend provisions of international human rights 
instruments or universal human rights norms. Nevertheless, this 
deficiency in national constitutions and national legislation can be 
cured by the judiciary, especially if a system of separation of powers 
allows for a truly independent judiciary. This would allow the 
judiciary to use its interpretive powers to interpret national laws in 
light of international human rights norms. Independent and 
progressive judiciaries in some African countries are already taking 
advantage of their ability and right to interpret the constitution and 
determine the constitutionality of all the country’s laws, including 
customary laws, to strike down laws that they determine are not in 
line with the national constitution or international human rights 
norms. For example, in Ephrahim v. Pastory, a case that involved 
conflict between customary law and the Bill of Rights in Tanzania’s 
constitution, the Tanzanian High Court, after establishing the 
country’s commitment to international human rights norms, 
concluded as follows: “The [international human rights] principles 
enunciated in the above-named documents are a standard below 
which any civilized nation will be ashamed to fall. It is clear from 
what I have discussed that the customary law under discussion flies 
in the face of our Bill of Rights as well as international conventions 
to which we are signatories.”170 
By using their interpretive power this way, the courts can give 
effect to international human rights norms even if these norms are 
not incorporated into national constitutions and/or national 
legislation. Thus, in the effort to protect human rights in Africa, 
lawyers and judges have an important role to play—they can help 
bring “life to the rights guarantees enshrined in national 
constitutions.”171 
Unfortunately, many African judiciaries have not always been 
eager to take a leadership role in promoting adherence to the rule of 
 
 
170 Ephrahim v. Pastory, 87 I.L.R. 106, 110 (Tanz. High Ct. 1990). 
The Court went on to rule that when there exists a conflict between 
customary law and fundamental rights, the international standard of the 
fundamental rights must prevail over the customary or traditional rules. 
171 Adjami, supra note 67, at 124. 
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law and the protection of human rights. In fact, many critics have 
argued that in many African countries, national judiciaries are 
actually actively involved in helping incumbent governments 
undermine the rule of law and commit atrocities against some 
subcultures, notably religious and ethnic minorities.172 For example, 
as argued by noted Abuja, Nigeria-based human rights lawyer and 
activist, Chidi Odinkalu: 
[T]he judiciaries in Common Law African countries must 
take substantial responsibility for the collapse of 
constitutional government . . . . [T]he judiciary in many of 
these countries deliberately and knowingly abdicated its 
constitutional role to protect human rights and, in many 
cases, actively connived in the subversion of constitutional 
rule and constitutional rights by the executive arm of 
government.173 
Judiciaries, such as those in Cameroon, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Tunisia, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Zambia, and Angola, failed to take action while their presidents 
manipulated their constitutions to extend their mandates and punish 
their political opponents.174 In fact, in countries such as Cameroon, 
 
 
172 Professor Makau Mutua has argued that many newly-independent 
African countries failed to fully transform the critical domains and that 
efforts to indigenize and Africanize the judiciary “failed to transform the 
justice sector from a colonially racist, anti-people, and oppressive 
instrumentality.” Makau Mutua, Africa and the Rule of Law, 13 INT’L J. 
HUM. RIGHTS 159, 161 (2016). In addition, argues Professor Mutua, 
“[j]udges became extensions of the executive and served at its whim. 
Instead of becoming fountains of justice, courts were used to instill fear in 
the populace at the behest of the executive. The courts were used to crush 
political dissent and curtail civil society.” Id. 
173 Quoted in Adjami, supra note at 67, at 124. 
174 See, e.g., Isaac Mufumba, Presidents Who Amended Constitution 
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the judiciary evolved into a legal tool used by the president to punish 
his opponents, impose his will on citizens, and ensure his continued 
monopolization of political power.175 The judiciary has a very 
important role to play in national elections in Cameroon—judges 
perform a supervisory function over the counting of votes and the 
determination of who is the winner.176 Fombad notes that in 
“preparations for the 1996 and 1997 elections, a presidential decree 
doubled [judicial] salaries, and in the case of Supreme Court judges, 
the increase of almost 200 percent came with numerous perks and 
privileges.177 There was nothing fortuitous in this. Judges preside 
over the divisional election supervisory and vote-counting 
commissions that tabulate election results, which are then sent to the 
national vote-counting commission.”178 This was designed, of 
course, to ensure electoral victory for the incumbent president. 
Throughout the one-party era in Africa, most judiciaries served 
almost exclusively at the pleasure of the president and not to enforce 
the constitution or enhance adherence to the rule of law or safeguard 
the rights of citizens. In countries whose governments had been 
seized by the military, the courts either did not function or were 




visited on Feb. 23, 2021); Takudzwa Hillary Chiwanza, African Presidents 
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175 See infra note 179. 
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178 Fombad argues, for example, that in Cameroon, the judiciary has 
been “reduced to allies and partners of the executive in enjoying the spoils 
of power.” Charles Manga Fombad, Endemic Corruption in Cameroon: 
Insights on Consequences and Control, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 234, 247–48 (Kempe 
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In the early 1990s, when many African countries began their 
transition to democracy and governance processes undergirded by 
the rule of law, renewed interest emerged in making certain that the 
judiciary was granted enough independence by the constitution to 
enable it to function, not only as an effective check on the exercise 
of government power, but also as a major tool to ensure that 
international human rights law is given effect in the interpretation of 
domestic or national laws.180 At this time, there was also talk in the 
continent of the need to take cognizance of the Bangalore 
Principles,181 which were developed in 1988 at a judicial colloquium 
 
 
Central African Republic/Empire; and Mauritania. See Victor T. LeVine, 
The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa, 35 J. MOD. AFR. 
STUD. 181, 190 (1997). Karen A. Mingst argues that during military rule in 
Nigeria, “when the government claimed it was necessary to refrain from 
implementing issues in the constitution, the courts did not resist the 
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A. Mingst, Judicial Systems of Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Neglect, 
31 AFR. STUD. REV. 135, 140 (1988) (examining, inter alia, judicial and 
legal systems in Africa, including that in Uganda). 
180 Some legal scholars, however, have questioned the so-called 
“global expansion of judicial power.” Specifically, they argue that 
“American-style judicial review” may actually subvert “the democratic 
ideal of government by the people and is therefore deeply problematic.” 
Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for 
the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 637 (2003). It is important to 
note, however, that in the African countries, which have imperial 
presidencies and relatively weak civil societies, the courts may be the only 
effective tool to fight government impunity and safeguard the fundamental 
rights of citizens. Of course, in some African countries, human rights 
activists no longer have faith in national courts to fully and effectively 
prosecute international crimes. As a consequence, these activists are 
looking to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a court of last resort. 
See Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, Africa and the International Criminal 
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in Bangalore, Pakistan and represented a statement by judges from 
several countries regarding the need to incorporate international 
human rights norms into their national constitutions and how to do 
so.182 For example, Principle 7 states: 
[T]here is a growing tendency for national courts to have 
regard to these international norms for the purpose of 
deciding cases where the domestic law—whether 
constitutional, statute or common law—is uncertain or 
incomplete. It is within the proper nature of the judicial 
process and well-established judicial functions for national 
courts to have regard to international obligations which a 
country undertakes—whether or not they have been 
incorporated into domestic law—for the purpose of 
removing ambiguity or uncertainty from national 
constitutions, legislation, or common law.183 
Some international legal scholars argue that, as a result of the 
existence of the Bangalore Principles, judges now have an 
obligation to adopt and follow this interpretive principle.184 It is 
important to note, however, that the Bangalore Principles will not 
apply in the case where the domestic constitution is clear, 
unambiguous, and is not inconsistent with international law.185 The 
Bangalore Principles, argue some legal scholars, “are a statement of 
understanding among judges recognizing the extent of their power 
in interpreting laws in their common law systems and the degree to 
which using this power in the incorporation of international human 




Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG, The Road from Bangalore: The First Ten 
Years of the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/ 
publications/speeches/former-justices/kirbyj/kirbyj_bang11.htm (last visited 
on Mar. 2, 2021). 
182 See The Bangalore Principles, supra note 181. 
183 Id. at art. 7. 
184 Fombad, supra note 39, at 457–58. 
185 Id. at 457. 
186 Adjami, supra note 67, at 126. 
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In Africa, the real challenge to the enforcement of human rights 
is not likely found in countries that have governing processes 
characterized by separation of powers, with a fully independent 
judiciary, even if international human rights law has not been 
incorporated into national constitutions and legislation. Instead, the 
major challenge is posed by “countries in which a legal 
infrastructure exists to enforce rights provisions yet a repressive 
government is in power that would stifle and intimidate efforts to 
enforce rights against the government before the courts.”187 In these 
countries, lawyers and judges represent important gatekeepers who 
can minimize the abuse of human rights, even in countries with 
opportunistic politicians.188 
1. International Law and the Scope of Fundamental 
Rights in Africa: Catholic Commission for Justice 
and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General and 
Others 
The question of interest is: To what extent can international law 
help in the determination of the scope of a fundamental right in 
Africa? An examination of a case from the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe can help us appreciate how making reference to 
“regional and African and international [legal] sources has led to 
progressive decision making” in many African countries.189 
 
 
187 Id. at 129. 
188 See, e.g., Hon. Justice Philip Nnaemeka-Agu, The Role of 
Lawyers in the Protection and Advancement of Human Rights, 18 COMMW. 
L. BULL. 734, 736, 744 (1992) (examining, inter alia, the role of lawyers in 
the protection of human rights in Nigeria). The Hon. Justice Philip 
Nnaemeka-Agu was, at the time, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, 
and this article is part of an address he delivered during the Law Week 
celebrations of the Nigerian Bar Association, Imo State of Nigeria, on 
February 10, 1992. 
189 Adjami, supra note 67, at 146. 
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On March 13, 1993, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Justice, Legal, and 
Parliamentary Affairs announced that four men190 who had been 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death would be hanged within 
a few days.191 In reaction to the Justice Minister’s decision to 
proceed with the execution of the four men, the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (Catholic 
Commission)192 filed a “chamber application” with the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe, seeking the Court to order the respondents—
“the Attorney-General, the Sheriff of Zimbabwe, and the Director 
of Prisons”—to delay the executions.193 Specifically, the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe was being called upon to decide whether to: 
(i) declare that the delay in carrying out the sentence of 
death constitutes a contravention of section 15(1) of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe (the Constitution); and 
(ii) order that such sentences be permanently stayed.194 
Essentially, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, under the 
direction of Chief Justice Gubbay, was called upon to decide 
whether carrying out the sentence of execution by hanging of the 
four men for convictions of murder violates the “inhuman and 
degrading punishment” provision of Article 15(1) of the 
 
 
190 The men were “Martin Bechani Bakaka, Luke Kingsize Chiliko, 
Timothy Mhlanga, and John Chakara Zacharia Marichi.” Catholic Comm’n 
for Justice and Peace in Zim. v. Attorney-General of Zim. and Others (Zim. 
Sup. Ct. 1993), at 5 [hereinafter Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace]. 
191 See John Hatchard, Delay and the Death Sentence: The 
Zimbabwean Approach, 37 J. AFR. L. 185, 1 (School of Oriental & Afr. 
Studies, Univ. of London, 1993) (providing a preliminary analysis of 
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace). 
192 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe 
(CCJPZ) is a non-governmental organization that is dedicated to the 
recognition and protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. It was established 
in 1972 as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia. The 
name of the organization was changed in 1980 when Southern Rhodesia 
gained independence and took the name Zimbabwe. 
193 Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 
5. 
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Constitution of Zimbabwe.195 The four men were actually convicted 
of capital murder in 1988 and they subsequently appealed their 
convictions, but those appeals failed.196 The men remained in prison 
until the Minister of Justice announced their executions on March 
13, 1993.197 In its analysis, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe noted 
the claim by the petitioners that “by March 1993 the executions had 
been rendered unconstitutional due to the dehumanizing factor of 
prolonged delay, viewed in conjunction with the harsh and 
degrading conditions under which prisoners are confined in the 
condemned section at Harare Central Prison.”198 Chief Justice 
Gubbay noted that the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe’s earlier 
judgment “dismissing the appeals of the condemned prisoners 
[could not] be disturbed” and that “the constitutionality of the death 
penalty per se, as well as the mode of its execution by hanging, 
[were] also not susceptible to attack.”199 
In the view of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the main issue 
to be decided was as follows: 
[W]hether, even though the death sentences were the only 
fitting and proper punishments to have imposed, 
supervening events200 establish that their execution on the 
appointed dates would have constituted inhuman or 




195 Section 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1980 is found in 
Chapter III, which is titled The Declaration of Rights, and it states as 
follows: “No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other such treatment.” CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE (1980), 
ch. 3, § 15(1), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5720.html. 
196 Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 
6. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 5. 
199 Id. 
200 The supervening events were the long delays in carrying out the 
executions. Id. at 5–6. 
201 Id. 
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Gubbay then made reference to § 24(1) of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe,202 which “vests in the Supreme Court the power to deal 
with constitutional issues as a court of first instance.”203 
Gubbay began the analysis by examining “the availability of 
constitutional protection to condemned prisoners” in Zimbabwe.204 
Arguing that prisoners “by mere reason of a conviction,”205 are not 
“denuded of all the rights they otherwise possess,”206 he concluded 
that “a prisoner who has been sentenced to death does not, therefore, 
forfeit the protection afforded by § 15(1) [of the constitution of 
Zimbabwe] in respect to his treatment while under confinement.”207 
The structure of the analysis undertaken in the Catholic Commission 
opinion follows the opinion Gubbay provided in State v. Ncube & 
Others.208 In the Ncube opinion, Gubbay “expressed the view that 
section 15(1) is nothing less than the dignity of man. It is a provision 
that embodies broad and idealistic notions of dignity, humanity and 
decency.”209 Chief Justice Gubbay then proceeded to consult 
international jurisdictions, including academics, in order “to 
 
 
202 Section 24(1) of the Constitution states as follows: “If any person 
alleges that the Declaration of Rights has been, is being or is likely to be 
contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of the person detained, if any 
other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained person), 
then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter 
which is lawfully available that person (or that other person) may, subject 
to the provisions of subsection (3), apply to the Supreme Court for redress.” 
CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE (1980), ch. 3, § 24(1), http://www.refworld. 
org/docid/3ae6b5720.html. 





207 Id. (citing Conjwayo v. Minister of Justice, Legal & 
Parliamentary Affairs & Another (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1992)). 
208 Compare State v. Ncube & Others (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1987), with 
Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 9–10. 
209 Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 
9 (citing State v. Ncube & Others (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1987)). 
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establish the factual record of the suffering involved in delayed 
death sentences.”210 
Gubbay then undertook a survey of “judicial attitudes towards 
the constitutionality of executions given a long delay”211 by 
searching for precedents “in Zimbabwe, India, the United States, 
and the West Indies.”212 After examining the attitude of courts to the 
delay in executing a sentence of death in these countries,213 the Chief 
Justice then undertook a detailed examination of the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights (European Court) in Soering v. 
United Kingdom—that decision had blocked the extradition to the 
United States from the United Kingdom of a suspect who was 
wanted by American authorities for trial.214 The suspect, Soering, 
was a German national who was wanted for murder in Bedford 
County, Virginia (USA).215 He fled to Europe but was later arrested 
in England on a charge of check fraud.216 After he was indicted in 
Bedford County on two counts of brutal murders, the United States 
filed an order for his extradition based on a 1972 Extradition Treaty 
with the United Kingdom.217 
A court in the UK subsequently found Soering extraditable to 
the United States.218 Appeals against the decision were unsuccessful 
 
 
210 Adjami, supra note 67, at 147 (citing Catholic Comm’n for 
Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 9). 
211 Id. (citing Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 
1993), at 9, 13–25) 
212 Id. 
213 That is Zimbabwe, India, the United States, and the West Indies. 
See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 13–
14; India at 14–16; United States of America at 16–19; the West Indies at 
19–22. 
214 Id. at 22–24. 
215 See infra note 218. 
216 Id. 
217 See 1972 UK-USA Extradition Treaty, U.K.-U.S., entered into 
force Jan. 21, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 227. 
218 After several UK courts, including the House of Lords (then, the 
country’s highest judicial body), rejected Soering’s petition against 
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and Soering was ordered to be handed over to U.S. authorities.219 
Nevertheless, Soering filed a complaint with the European 
Commission of Human Rights (ECHR), and the ECHR advised the 
UK government to delay the extradition until the ECHR had fully 
investigated the situation.220 The UK government complied. In 
arguments before the ECHR, Soering alleged that should the UK 
extradite him to the United States, the UK would involve itself in a 
violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
because the conditions under which death row prisoners were 
detained at Virginia’s Mecklenburg Correctional Center were 
inhuman and degrading.221 The ECHR ruled, six votes to five, 
against Soering222 but decided to refer the case to the European 
Court, which unanimously held that there existed a real risk that if 
Soering was extradited to the United States, he was likely to be 
found guilty by a Virginia court and sentenced to death, and that the 
suffering Soering would experience on death row would violate 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.223 
 
 
extradition, the UK Secretary of State, on August 3, 1988, signed a warrant 
ordering Soering’s extradition to the United States authorities. 
Nevertheless, Soering was not transferred to U.S. custody because of his 
pending timely appeal to the European Commission of Human Rights. See 
Soering v. United Kingdom (No. 161), 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (ser. A) 444–
48 (1989). 
219 Id. 
220 See generally Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88. 
221 Article 3 states as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Eur. Ct. H.R. (1950), 
Eur. Conv. on H.R., art. 3, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ 
Convention_ENG.pdf. See also Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88, ¶ 90. 
222 The European Commission of Human Rights held “by six votes 
to five, that the extradition of the applicant [Jens Soering] to the United 
States of America in the circumstances of the present case would not 
constitute treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the [European] 
Convention [on Human Rights].” Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88, ¶ 154. 
223 The European Court based its determination on a thorough 
assessment of death row conditions at Virginia’s Mecklenburg Correctional 
Center. Chief Justice Gubbay quotes extensively from the European Court’s 
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Next, Zimbabwean Chief Justice Gubbay referred to the 
decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC)224 and considered the UNHRC’s attitude toward “the 
death row phenomenon,”225 given Member States’ obligations under 
Article 7 of the ICCPR.226 The UNHRC made decisions in several 
cases and in one of them, the majority held: 
In States whose judicial system provides for a review of 
criminal convictions and sentences, an element of delay 
between the lawful imposition of a sentence of death and 
the exhaustion of available remedies is inherent in the 
review of the sentence; thus, even prolonged periods of 
detention under a severe custodial regime on death row 
cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely 
availing himself of appellate remedies. A delay of ten years 
between the judgment of the Court of Appeal and that of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is disturbingly 
long. However, the evidence before the Committee 
 
 
judgment regarding its assessment of conditions at the death row part of the 
Mecklenburg Correctional Center. See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and 
Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 22–24. See also Eur. H.R. Rep. 14038/88, 
¶ 154. In its ruling, the European Court declared that in the event of the 
Secretary of State’s decision to extradite the applicant to the United States 
of America being implemented, there would be a violation of Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
224 Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 
24–25. 
225 That is, “whether the length of detention on death row amounted 
to a violation of the prohibition against ‘torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ under [A]rt[icle] 7 of the 
[International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights].” Catholic Comm’n 
for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 24. 
226 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A., 2 J. INT’L L. & 
PRAC. 603, 622, at 606 (1993). See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace 
(Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 24. 
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indicates that the Court of Appeal rapidly produced its 
written judgment and that the ensuing delay in petitioning 
the Judicial Committee is largely attributable to the 
authors.227 
However, a dissent from one of the members of the UNHRC 
read as follows: 
The conduct of the person concerned with regard to the 
exercise of remedies ought to be measured against the 
States involved. Without being at all cynical, I consider 
that the author cannot be expected to hurry up in making 
appeals so that he can be executed more rapidly. . . . In this 
type of case, the elements involved in determining the time 
factor cannot be assessed in the same way if they are 
attributable to the State [P]arty as if they can be ascribed to 
the condemned person. A very long period on death row, 
even if partially due to the failure of the condemned 
prisoner to exercise a remedy, cannot exonerate the State 
[P]arty from its obligations under art 7 of the Covenant.228 
The Zimbabwe Supreme Court’s survey of international 
sources, nevertheless, was not designed to review the country’s 
compliance with its obligations under international law.229 Instead, 
the Court “viewed its role primarily as one of elevating its national 
human rights jurisprudence to the international or civilized standard 
. . . .”230 The Court’s review of international sources, nevertheless, 
did not provide a consensus on the issue of delayed death sentences. 
Gubbay, however, found foreign and international authorities that 
supported and bolstered “his eventual holding that struck down the 
pending execution of the prisoners as unconstitutional.”231 He relied 
 
 
227 Quoted in Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe 
v. Attorney-General & Others (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), at 25. 
228 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
229 Adjami, supra note 67, at 147. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 148. 
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on majority opinions in several Indian cases,232 dissenting opinions 
in a Jamaican case,233 a dissenter in the UN Human Rights 
Committee decision,234 and a Canadian case.235 The Chief Justice 
also surveyed the death row phenomenon with respect to cases from 
several U.S. states and ordered as follows: 
1. The application is allowed with costs. 
2. The sentence of death passed upon Martin Bechani 
Bakaki, Luke Kingsize Chiliko, Timothy Mhlanga[,] and 
John Chakara Zacharia Marichi is, in each case, set aside 
and substituted with a sentence of imprisonment for life.236 
Thus, in this landmark decision, the Chief Justice set aside the 
death sentences against the four convicts and sentenced them to life 
imprisonment.237 Zimbabwe’s Chief Justice, in rendering the 
decision in the Catholic Commission case, consulted and sought 
guidance from foreign and international law.238 In doing so, the 
Chief Justice remarked that § 15(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
“ . . . is nothing less than the dignity of man.”239 He went on to state 
that § 15(1) “is a provision that embodies broad and idealistic 
notions of dignity, humanity[,] and decency . . .” and “. . . guarantees 
that punishment or treatment of the individual be exercised within 
the ambit of [civilized] standards.”240 Addressing the case before the 
Court, the Chief Justice noted that the determination of “whether a 
form of torture, punishment[,] or treatment, is inhuman or degrading 
is dependent upon the exercise of a value judgment” and 
 
 
232 See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), 
¶¶ 76–77. 
233 Id. ¶¶ 76–77. 
234 Id. ¶ 89. 
235 Id. ¶¶ 86–87. 
236 Id. ¶ 130. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. ¶¶ 13–27, 130. 
239 Id. ¶ 23. 
240 Id. 
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[o]ne that must not only take account of the emerging 
consensus of values in the [civilized] international 
community (of which this country [i.e., Zimbabwe] is a 
part), as evidenced in the decisions of other Courts and the 
writings of leading academics, but of contemporary norms 
operative in Zimbabwe and the sensitivities of its people.241 
In interpreting domestic law, including constitutional 
provisions, regarding human rights in Zimbabwe, argued the Chief 
Justice of Zimbabwe, courts must take cognizance of the “emerging 
consensus of values in the civilized international community”; the 
fact that Zimbabwe is part of that “[civilized] international 
community;” “. . . decisions of other Courts”—that is, courts in other 
countries; “the writings of leading academics;” “contemporary 
norms operative in Zimbabwe;” and “the sensitivities of [the] 
peoples” of Zimbabwe.242 
2. The Use of International and Comparative Sources in 
Domestic Interpretation: State v. Makwanyane (South Africa) 
In the matter of the State v. Makwanyane, the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of South Africa, the country’s highest court, 
was called upon to determine whether the death penalty is 
“consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.”243 This case 
was decided under South Africa’s Interim Constitution. Although 
Chapter Three of South Africa’s Interim Constitution sets out the 
fundamental rights to which every South African is entitled under 
the constitution and “contains provisions dealing with the way in 
which the Chapter is to be interpreted by the Courts,”244 the 
constitution does not deal specifically with the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, § 11(2), prohibits “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment[,] or punishment.”245 Since the constitution does not 
provide a “definition of what is to be regarded as ‘cruel, inhuman or 
 
 
241 Id. (emphasis added). 
242 Id. ¶ 3. 
243 The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, 
Judgment, ¶ 5 (Const. Ct. of the Republic of S. Afr. 1995). 
244 Id. ¶ 8. 
245 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. ACT 200 OF 1993, § 11(2). 
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degrading,’” the Constitutional Court was called upon to “give 
meaning to these words.”246 
The challenge to the death penalty in the Republic of South 
Africa arose under § 11(2) of the Interim Constitution,247 and was 
also examined under §§ 8–10 of the Interim Constitution.248 Our 
interest in this case is in the use, by the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, of international and foreign comparative law in determining 
the constitutionality of the death penalty. In a section titled 
“International and Foreign Comparative Law,”249 the Constitutional 
Court’s president, Chaskalson P, examined capital punishment in 
the United States250 and India.251 Chaskalson P also surveyed 
opinions of the UN Human Rights Committee and the European 
Court that deal specifically with “the treatment of the rights to 
dignity, life, and freedom from cruel, inhuman[,] and degrading 
punishment.”252 The examination of these various opinions on the 
death penalty was designed to help the Constitutional Court “. . . 
contextualize the South African decision with international attitudes 
and to offer comparative views on the scope of rights in national 
views and international forums.”253 In doing so, Chaskalson P stated 
the South African position on the role of international and 
comparative law: “We can derive assistance from public 
international law and foreign case law, but we are in no way bound 
to follow it.”254 
 
 
246 The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, 
Judgment, ¶ 8. 
247 See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. ACT 200 OF 1993, § 11(2). 
248 Id. §§ 8-10. 
249 The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, 
Judgment, at 22. 
250 Id. ¶¶ 40–62. 
251 Id. ¶¶ 70–79. 
252 Adjami, supra note 67, at 151; see also The State v. T. 
Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, Judgment, at 48–73. 
253 Adjami, supra note 67, at 151. 
254 The State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, 
Judgment, ¶ 39. 
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The Constitutional Court held that the death penalty offends the 
South African constitution, and hence is unconstitutional.255 
Chaskalson P, speaking for the Constitutional Court, anchored the 
Court’s opinion on the following principle: 
The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all 
human rights and the source of all other personal rights in 
Chapter Three. By committing ourselves to a society 
founded on the recognition of human rights we are required 
to value these two rights above all others. And this must be 
demonstrated by the State in everything that it does, 
including the way it punishes criminals. This is not 
achieved by objectifying murderers and putting them to 
death to serve as an example to others in the expectation 
that they might possibly be deterred thereby.256 
In addition to relying on international and foreign comparative 
law, the Makwanyane decision also consulted African cases dealing 
with the death penalty; specifically the Catholic Commission 
(Zimbabwe)257 case, which describes the death row phenomenon.258 
In addition, the Makwanyane decision also paid close attention to 
Chief Justice Gubbay’s reasoning in the decision of the Catholic 
Commission case.259 Finally, concurring judgments in Makwanyane 
make references to other African cases, notably Ex parte Attorney-
General, Namibia 260 and Ncube.261 
The cases discussed here reveal that courts in many African 
countries are gradually turning to international sources as “. . . 
interpretive devices and authoritative precedent for determining the 
scope of fundamental rights enshrined in constitutional bills of 
 
 
255 See generally id. 
256 Id. ¶ 144. 
257 See Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993), 
¶ 1. 
258 See, e.g., the State v. T. Makwanyane & M. Mchunu, Case No. 
CCT/3/94, Judgment, ¶ 177. 
259 Id. 
260 Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment 
(3) SA 76 (1991 NmSC). 
261 State v. Ncube (2) SA 702 (Zim. 1988). 
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rights.”262 Judges in the African countries are looking to 
international law, particularly international human rights law, to 
provide them with the necessary tools to help them determine the 
scope of the fundamental rights enshrined in their domestic 
constitutions.263 In doing so, they shy away from invoking 
provisions of international human rights instruments, which have 
not yet been incorporated into their municipal legal orders.264 
Nevertheless, these African judges do not grant any “. . . interpretive 
primacy to these [international human rights instruments] over 
nonbinding instruments or other informal statements of 
principles.”265 
III. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT  
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
authored a report called An Agenda for Peace,266 in which he spelled 
out ways in which he believed intergovernmental organizations 
could respond more effectively and fully to threats to international 
peace and security.267 The report looked specifically at three 
important areas that were suggested by the UN Security Council: 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping.268 The 
 
 
262 Adjami, supra note 67, at 151. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 152. 
266 The document was officially called An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping and was produced 
by the Secretary-General at the request of the UN Security Council. It was 
subsequently presented to the UN Security Council at its summit meeting 
on January 31, 1992. See U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, UN Doc. 
A/47/277 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda for Peace]. 
267 Agenda for Peace, supra note 266. 
268 Id. 
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Secretary-General added one more area, which he believed was a 
“closely-related concept:” post-conflict peace-building.269 
The Secretary-General’s report was released in early 1992 at a 
time when there were tremendous changes in the global system—
both the Soviet Union and socialism in Eastern Europe had 
collapsed and the Cold War was coming to an end.270 In Africa, 
South Africa’s dreaded and racially-based apartheid system was in 
the process of being replaced and the country was about to usher in 
a new nonracial democratic system;271 and many of Africa’s 
dictatorships had fallen or were about to fall.272 Throughout the 
world, previously exploited and marginalized peoples were rising 
up to assert their right to govern themselves, and it was becoming 
quite evident that the recognition and protection of human rights 
were gaining significant importance in the global legal order.273 In 
fact, in his report to the UN Security Council, Boutros-Ghali 
emphasized the need and urgency for the post-Cold War global 
society to “enhance respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”274 The end of the Cold War, the Secretary-General 
believed, had offered “all nations large and small,” the opportunity 
 
 
269 Id. ¶ 5. 
270 NICK BISLEY, THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE CAUSES OF 
SOVIET COLLAPSE (2004) (examining, inter alia, the causes of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War). 
271 See generally THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN 
AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. 
Ihonvbere eds. 2003) (examining, inter alia, changes that were taking place 
in Africa in the early-to-mid-1990s). See also JOHN C. EBY & FRED 
MORTON, THE COLLAPSE OF APARTHEID AND THE DAWN OF DEMOCRACY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA, 1993 (2017) (examining, inter alia, the collapse of South 
Africa’s apartheid system and the emergence of a non-racial democratic 
dispensation); ROBERT HARVEY, THE FALL OF APARTHEID: THE INSIDE 
STORY FROM SMUTS TO MBEKI (2001) (examining, inter alia, events leading 
to the collapse of apartheid in South Africa). 
272 See, e.g., CRAWFORD YOUNG & THOMAS TURNER, THE RISE & 
DECLINE OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE (1985) (examining, inter alia, the rise and 
collapse of the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, dictator of Zaire (now 
Democratic Republic of Congo), who came to power through a military 
coup in 1965 and was ousted by rebel forces in 1997). 
273 See Agenda for Peace, supra note 266. 
274 Id. ¶ 5. 
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to achieve the cherished objectives of the UN Charter, which 
included “a United Nations capable of maintaining international 
peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of 
promoting, in the words of the Charter, ‘social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom.’”275 
The Secretary-General went on to argue that the opportunity, 
made possible by the end of the Cold War, must not be squandered 
by the type of intergovernmental bickering that had characterized 
the global order that followed the end of the Second World War and 
lasted through the Cold War.276 Instead, the UN and its Member 
States must dedicate themselves to improving conditions for 
peaceful coexistence and the recognition and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.277  
For many years, the Security Council, in its capacity as the 
primary UN organ charged with maintaining international peace and 
security, had failed to take an active role in dealing quickly, 
effectively, and fully, with threats to international peace and 
security.278 As a consequence, the international community was 
unable to respond effectively to the pervasive abuse of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in many parts of the world, including 
atrocities committed against citizens in many African countries, for 
 
 
275 Id. ¶ 3. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. ¶¶ 3–5. 
278 Id. 
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example, Nigeria,279 Republic of Sudan,280 and Rwanda.281 In fact, 
the failure of the UN and other regional organizations, such as the 
AU, to develop and implement effective legal mechanisms for 
dealing with threats to peace, security, and human rights has 
produced genocidal wars in Darfur (Sudan), Rwanda, and other 
parts of the continent.282 
 
 
279 During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), the OAU considered 
the conflict an internal affair and one that had to be resolved by Nigerians 
themselves. As a consequence, the OAU made no effort to prevent the 
atrocities committed against civilians, many of them Biafran children. See, 
e.g., JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN 
CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970 (1977) (providing, inter alia, an overview of the 
atrocities committed against civilian populations during the Nigerian Civil 
War). Despite the fact that the OAU’s successor organization, the AU, has 
adopted a more progressive approach to conflicts that involve the violation 
of human rights, it is still slow to respond. For example, since 2016, the 
Francophone-dominated central government in Cameroon has launched a 
genocidal war on the country’s Anglophone Regions—North West and 
South West—which has resulted in the killing of many civilians and the 
destruction of many Anglophone villages. See Peter Zongo, ‘This Is a 
Genocide’: Villages Burn as War Rages in Blood-Soaked Cameroon, 
GUARDIAN (UK), May 30, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophone-crisis. 
Yet, after more than two years of what the international press is calling 
genocide against Anglophones by government security forces, the AU is yet 
to take any action to stop these government-induced atrocities. 
280 See LEVY, infra note 282 (examining, inter alia, atrocities 
committed against the peoples of the Darfur region of Sudan by government 
forces and those of militias affiliated with the government). 
281 See MELVERN, infra note 282 (describing atrocities committed 
against Rwanda’s Tutsi citizens and their Hutu sympathizers by the Hutu-
dominated government and the Interahamwe, a Hutu paramilitary 
organization). 
282 See, e.g., JANEY LEVY, GENOCIDE IN DARFUR (2009) (examining, 
inter alia, the genocide in the Darfur region of the Republic of Sudan); 
LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
(2004) (recounting events leading to and including the Rwandan Genocide); 
PETER BAXTER, BIAFRA: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970 (2014) 
(examining, inter alia, the various atrocities committed during the civil war 
that took place in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970). 
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As the world moved into the twenty-first century, and as 
previously oppressed peoples continued to fight for their rights and 
freedoms, including their right to self-determination, the protection 
of human rights emerged as an important issue in global 
governance.283 Former UN Secretary-General and Ghanaian 
diplomat Kofi Annan284 appealed to the UN General Assembly to 
find ways to deal with threats to international peace and security, 
including, if necessary, “humanitarian intervention” to deal with 
sectarian and other types of violence that violate human rights in 
particular and threaten international peace and security in general.285 
Annan then posed a question to the international community—one 
that dealt directly with whether intervention by the international 
community in the internal affairs of Member States of the UN would 
represent an interference in the sovereignty of these States.286 He 
inquired: “[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable 
assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
affect every precept of our common humanity?”287 
In response to this challenge to the international community 
regarding the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and other threats to international peace and security, the Canadian 
Government, with the help of several foundations, established the 
ICISS and announced the latter’s formation to the UN General 
 
 
283 See OHCHR and Good Governance, UN HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF 
THE HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Good 
Governance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2021). 
284 Kofi Annan served as the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations from January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2006. He passed away on 
August 18, 2018, in Bern, Switzerland. Biography, KOFI ANNAN FOUND. 
(Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/kofi-annan/ 
biography/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2021). 
285 See Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36. 
286 See id. 
287 Id. 
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Assembly in September 2000.288 The ICISS was tasked with 
wrestling with a range of questions, including “legal, moral, 
operational[,] and political” issues, and in doing so, the organization 
was expected to “consult with the widest possible range of opinion 
around the world and to bring back a report that would help the 
Secretary-General and others find some new common ground.”289 
After research and consultation with various stakeholders, the 
ICISS established a new approach to dealing with threats to 
international peace and security, including those involving the abuse 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.290 The ICISS called this 
new approach to dealing with threats to international peace and 
security the R2P. As detailed in the ICISS Report, the R2P 
incorporates three important elements, which are: 
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root 
causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-
made crises putting populations at risk. 
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of 
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which 
may include coercive measures like sanctions and 
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military 
intervention. 
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly 
after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, 
 
 
288 See generally The Responsibility to Protect, DEP’T OF PUB. INFO. 
(2014), https://www.un.org/es/preventgenocide/rwanda/assets/pdf/Back 
grounder%20R2P%202014.pdf (stating, inter alia, that “[f]ollowing the 
tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international 
community began to seriously debate how to react effectively when 
citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematically violated” and that 
“[t]he expression ‘responsibility to protect’ was first presented in the report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), set up by the Canadian Government in December 2001”). 
289 Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36. 
290 See id. 
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reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of 
the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.291 
Since 2005, the R2P has been recognized as global society’s 
unanimous commitment to confront threats to international peace, 
including activities of state and nonstate actors that violate human 
rights, such as genocides, ethnic cleansings, and other mass 
atrocities. In Resolution 60/1 of September 16, 2005, the UN 
General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document (2005WSOD),292 and by doing so, the international 
community formally registered its commitment to combat threats 
against international peace and security, including those that were 
targeted at preventing and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. According to Article 138 of the 2005WSOD, “[e]ach 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing[,] and crimes against 
humanity.293 This responsibility entails the prevention of such 
crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means.”294 Of course, the atrocities listed in Article 138 
of the 2005WSOD represent direct assaults on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; hence, the obligation imposed on Member 
States of the UN to prevent these crimes also represents an 
understanding on their part to protect human rights.295 
But what happens when and if a Member State fails to fulfill its 
R2P obligations and does not protect its citizens from atrocities 
committed by state or nonstate actors? The international 
community, working through and with the help of the UN—
particularly the UN Security Council—“has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means . . . 
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing[,] and crimes against humanity.”296 Implied in this 
statement is that the international community has the responsibility 
 
 
291 Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36. 
292 G.A. Res. 60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
293 Id. at art. 138. 
294 Id. 
295 See id. 
296 Id. at art. 139. 
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to ensure the recognition and protection of human rights. If, 
however, the peaceful approach is not successful in fully and 
effectively resolving various threats to international peace and 
security, including the protection of human rights, the international 
community is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the UN Security Council, in accordance 
with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate.”297 
It is important to recognize the fact that the R2P is a political 
commitment and not a legally binding obligation on the part of 
Member States of the UN.298 Nevertheless, this commitment flows 
directly from binding international norms—specifically norms that 
have either been assumed under or have evolved from various 
international human rights instruments, including, for example, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, as well as various norms of customary international 
law.299 
During his service as Secretary-General, Kofi Annan showed 
significant support for and interest in using the UN and various 
regional organizations, such as the AU, to minimize threats against 
international peace and security, including atrocities committed 
against peoples around the world.300 For example, in 2003, Annan 
convened a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
(High-Level Panel), and the following year, the High-Level Panel 
produced a report titled The Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 




298 See About, UN OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION & THE RESP. TO 
PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-
to-protect.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
299 See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
300 Mr. Annan was particularly concerned about the possibility of 
repeat atrocities, such as those that occurred in Rwanda in 1994. See, e.g., 
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36. 
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Our Shared Responsibility (High-Level Panel Report).301 In the 
High-Level Panel Report, the UN endorsed the “emerging norm that 
there is a collective international responsibility to protect, 
exercisable by the [UN] Security Council authorizing military 
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-
scale killing, ethnic cleansing[,] or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved 
powerless or unwilling to prevent.”302 In 2005, Annan presented a 
report titled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security 
and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General, which 
made clear that “the primary responsibility for implementing human 
rights lies with governments.”303 
In 2006 the UNSC formally and officially recognized the R2P 
through Resolution 1674304 and affirmed “the provisions of 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing[,] and crimes against 
humanity.”305 Ban Ki-moon, who took over from Kofi Annan as the 
UN Secretary-General on January 1, 2007, also fully supported the 
R2P.306 In early 2008, Ban Ki-moon appointed Edward C. Luck as 
the UN’s first Special Adviser on the R2P.307 The Secretary-General 
indicated that: “Mr. Luck’s work will include the responsibility to 
 
 
301 U.N. Secretary-General, The Secretary-General’s High-Level 
Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secured World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
302 Id. ¶ 203. 
303 U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.3, ¶ 22 (May 26, 2005). 
304 S.C. Res. 1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
305 Id. ¶ 4. 
306 See UN Press Release: Secretary-General Appoints Edward C. 
Luck of United States Special Adviser, U.N. Press Release No. SG/A/1120–
BIO/3963 (Feb. 21, 2008) (noting the appointment, by the UN Secretary-
General, of Edward C. Luck, as the UN’s first Special Adviser on the R2P). 
307 Id. 
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protect, as set out by the General Assembly in paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.”308 
In several reports produced by or under the direction of Ban Ki-
moon, it was made clear that the primary responsibility for 
protecting populations against international crimes (e.g., genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing) 
belonged to each Member State.309 The UN Secretary-General also 
stressed the need for international assistance to help countries build 
the necessary capacity to confront threats to international peace, 
including the abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms.310 
In 2009, Ban Ki-moon presented a report titled Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect to the UN General Assembly.311 In the 
report, the Secretary-General articulated a three-pillar strategy for 
the implementation of the R2P.312 
The first pillar deals with “[t]he protection responsibilities of 
the State”—each State must shoulder the responsibility to protect its 
citizens from international crimes, including making certain that 
human rights are respected and protected.313 The second pillar deals 
with the need for the international community to help each country 
develop the capacity to confront international crimes.314 This pillar 
emphasizes the cooperation of Member States, regional and sub-
regional organizations, civil society, and the private sector in 
dealing with international crimes, including the creation of a culture 
of respect for human rights.315 The third pillar addresses the 
 
 
308 Id. Paragraphs 138 and 139 deal with the “responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.” See G.A. Res. 60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), at art. 138–39. 
309 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
310 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 309, at 
summary. 
311 Id. 
312 See id. ¶ 11. 
313 International crimes include: genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. All these crimes represent major 
threats to human rights and fundamental freedoms in Africa. See id. ¶ 11(a). 
314 See id. ¶ 11(b). 
315 See id. 
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contributions316 of the international community and advises the 
latter to respond “collectively in a timely and decisive manner when 




316 These are the contributions of the international community to the 
protection of all global citizens from international crimes; the development 
of necessary capacity within each country and within regions of the globe 
to respond fully and effectively to international crimes (e.g., genocide); and 
the creation, within each country and region, of a culture that recognizes, 
promotes, and defends human rights. In Africa, there have been significant 
achievements in the area of human rights, many of them inspired by events 
taking place in the international community (e.g., the end of the Cold War 
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union). For example, Africans have 
adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, which makes the protections and 
promotion of human rights an explicit and important part of the AU’s 
mandate; and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See, e.g., 
THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN AFRICA: 
INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Danwood Mzikenge 
Chirwa & Lilian Chenwi eds. 2016) (presenting a series of essays that argue, 
inter alia, that the movement to recognize, promote, and defend human 
rights in Africa has benefited significantly from the international 
community, but unlike Europe and the United States, Africa has given 
recognition, not just to civil and political rights, but also to economic, social, 
and cultural rights as well). 
317 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 309, 
¶ 11(c). 
318 Pillar number three, which calls for the international community 
to act in a “timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing 
to” protect its citizens, is especially important given the genocides in 
Rwanda and Darfur (Sudan). Id. In addition to the fact that both the 
Rwandan and Sudanese states failed to protect their peoples from 
international crimes, the governments themselves were the actual source of 
the atrocities committed against citizens of both countries. Furthermore, the 
international community failed to act (i.e., intervene) in a “timely and 
decisive manner.” Id; See, e.g., ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE 
DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004) (examining, inter 
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In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the 
R2P through Resolution 63/308 of October 7, 2009.319 The United 
Nations General Assembly indicated that it would “continue [its] 
consideration of the responsibility to protect,”320 and that it would 
engage in several interactive dialogues to deal with different aspects 
of the R2P and its implementation.321 One of the dialogues, the one 
held in 2012, focused exclusively on “timely and decisive responses 
and the 2013 dialogue was devoted to state responsibility and 
prevention.”322 
In 2011, then UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, presented 
a report titled The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements 
in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,323 to the UN General 
Assembly and the UN Security Council. In the report, he addressed 
the role that can be played by regional and sub-regional 
organizations in protecting populations against international 
 
 
alia, the failure of the international community to intervene to prevent the 
massacre of Tutsis and their Hutu sympathizers in Rwanda in the spring of 
1994); FRANCIS DENG, ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (2010) (arguing, inter alia, that sovereignty can no 
longer be seen or used as protection against international intervention to end 
the abuse of human rights when national governments are either unwilling 
or unable to prevent the perpetuation of atrocities against citizens); 
RICHARD BARLTROP, DARFUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE 
CHALLENGES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUDAN (2011) (detailing the 
challenges faced by the international community as it has sought to deal 
with the atrocities committed against the peoples of Darfur by the 
government of Sudan and its affiliated militias). 
319 G.A. Res. 63/308, The Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. (Oct. 
7, 2009). 
320 Id. ¶ 2. 
321 See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 309, 
¶¶ 51, 72. 
322 From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The African Union 
and the Responsibility to Protect, at 8, INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE 
(Sept. 2017), http://refugee-rights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/AU-
R2P-final.pdf [hereinafter INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE]. 
323 U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional 
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. 
A/65/877–S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011). 
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crimes.324 He went on to declare that “[o]ver the last three years, [the 
UN had] applied principles of the responsibility to protect in [its] 
strategies for addressing threats to populations in about a dozen 
specific situations,” and “[i]n every case, regional and/or sub-
regional arrangements have made important contributions, often as 
full partners with the United Nations.”325 
The R2P represents an important mechanism through which the 
international community can participate in and contribute to the 
prevention of atrocities, such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity, that violate human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Africa. However, in order for the international community to 
contribute positively to the fight against international crimes and the 
improvement of the environment for the protection of human rights 
in Africa, regional, sub-regional, and national organizations in the 
continent must grant their cooperation. For example, the AU, as well 
as sub-regional organizations, such as the ECOWAS, working in 
cooperation with the UNSC, are more likely to deal successfully 
with threats to international peace and security in Africa than any of 
these organizations working alone.326 
 
 
324 See id. ¶ 1. 
325 Id. ¶ 4. 
326 Such cooperation was critical in forcing Yahya Jammeh, former 
president of The Gambia, out of power. Jammeh, who came to power 
through a military coup in 1994, had lost his re-election bid in a December 
2016 presidential election. Nevertheless, after first acknowledging and 
conceding his defeat to opposition leader, Adama Barrow, he later refused 
to leave office. ECOWAS, with the support of the UN Security Council and 
the AU, finally pushed him out, clearing the way for the president-elect, 
Barrow, to take the oath of office. See, e.g., Colin Freeman, Gambia’s 
Ousted Dictator Is Living the Good Life in a Palace in Equatorial Guinea, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 3, 2017, 11:05 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/ 
04/03/gambias-ousted-dictator-is-living-the-good-life-in-a-palace-in-
equatorial-guinea/; Dionne Searcey & Jaime Yaya Barry, Yahya Jammeh, 
Gambian President, Now Refuses to Accept Election Defeat, THE N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/africa/ 
yahya-jammeh-gambia-rejects-vote-defeat-adama-barrow.html. 
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IV. THE FAILURE OF THE OAU TO DEAL FULLY WITH 
THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA 
On May 25, 1963, African countries met at Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia where they founded the OAU and granted it the power to 
undertake certain activities on their behalf.327 In addition to making 
sure that all remaining colonies and non-self-governing territories in 
the continent were liberated and granted their independence, the 
OAU was directed to promote regional cooperation among the new 
countries in order to promote peace and security as well as rapid 
economic growth and development.328 
Given the fact that the OAU was not granted the power to enact 
legislation that was binding on its Member States, it was expected 
to undertake its objectives through the harmonization of its Member 
States’ policies.329 Within the OAU, the highest governing organ 
was the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and its main 
function was to “discuss matters of common concern to Africa with 
a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the 
Organization.”330 The Council of Ministers, which consisted of 
foreign ministers of the Member States, was responsible for the 
operationalization of the work of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government.331 Specifically, the Council of Ministers was 
tasked with implementing “the decision of the Assembly of Heads 
 
 
327 See OAU Charter, art. XVIII(2), May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39. 
328 Id. at arts. II(1)(d), 2(a)–(b). 
329 INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 9. 
330 Article VIII of the OAU Charter states as follows: “The Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the 
Organization. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss 
matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and 
harmonizing the general policy of the Organization. It may in addition 
review the structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized 
agencies which may be created in accordance with the present Charter.” 
OAU Charter, supra note 327, at art. VIII. 
331 The OAU’s Council of Ministers usually held two meetings a year 
and it was subordinate to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
(AHSG). Its principal responsibility was to prepare the AHSG’s agenda and 
implement the latter’s decisions. The CM eventually emerged as the OAU’s 
driving force. OAU Charter, supra note 327, at art. XII(1). 
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of State and Government,” as well as “coordinat[ing] inter-African 
cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly.”332 
In addition to the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government, the OAU was also armed with two other 
institutions or organs, namely, the General Secretariat333 and the 
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
(CMCA).334 The CMCA was designed to function as the OAU’s 
dispute resolution mechanism.335 In addition to the fact that the 
CMCA could only deal with disputes between Member States, 
disputes could be referred to the CMCA only with the prior consent 
or approval of the Member States.336 The CMCA was a judicial 
dispute resolution mechanism,337 but it was “stillborn and has never 
worked”338 because “. . . member states have shown a strong 
preference for political processes of conflict resolution rather than 
for judicial means of settlement.”339 
Africa experienced many challenges to peace and security 
during most of the OAU’s existence.340 In addition to struggles of 
the many colonies that had yet to gain independence by 1963 when 
the OAU came into existence, there were several civil wars and 
interstate conflicts that required urgent action from the continental 
organization.341 There were also struggles for independence in the 
Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and 
 
 
332 Id. at art. XIII(2). 
333 Id. at arts. XVI–XVIII. 
334 Id. at art. XIX. 
335 See id. 
336 See generally id. 
337 See INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 9. 
338 Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, AFR. UNION (July 2000), 
¶ 11.4, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d1da8752.html. 
339 Id. 
340 See MONDE MUYANGWA & MARGARET A. VOGT, AN ASSESSMENT 
OF THE OAU MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND 
RESOLUTION, 1993–2000, at 5 (2000). 
341 Id. at 5. 
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Cape Verde,342 as well as efforts to liberate Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe),343 South West Africa (Namibia),344 and apartheid 
South Africa from white supremacist regimes.345 During the period 
 
 
342 See generally AL VENTER, PORTUGAL’S GUERRILLA WARS IN 
AFRICA: LISBON’S THREE WARS IN ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND 
PORTUGUESE GUINEA 1961–74 (2013) (detailing the struggle for 
independence in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-
Bissau (Guiné-Bissau), and Cape Verde (Cabo Verde)). Note that during 
the colonial period, Guinea-Bissau was referred to as Portuguese Guinea. 
343 See generally ELIAKIM M. SIBANDA, THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN 
PEOPLE’S UNION, 1961–87: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF INSURGENCY IN 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA (2005) (presenting a detailed analysis of the struggle 
for independence in Southern Rhodesia); LOUISE WHITE, SOVEREIGNTY: 
RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE AND AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION (2015) 
(examining the struggle for independence and democracy in Southern 
Rhodesia with special emphasis on white and African perspectives). 
344 See generally RICHARD DALE, THE NAMIBIAN WAR OF 
INDEPENDENCE, 1966–1989: DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY 
CAMPAIGNS (2014) (detailing the struggle for independence in the former 
German colony of South West Africa, which gained independence in 1990 
and took the name Namibia). 
345 See generally DAVID MERMELSTEIN, THE ANTI-APARTHEID 
READER: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST WHITE RACIST RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(1987) (detailing the struggle against the racist apartheid regime in South 
Africa); SHERIDAN JOHNS & R. HUNT DAVIS, MANDELA, TAMBO, AND THE 
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1948–
1990: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY (1991) (examining the struggle for 
independence in South Africa, beginning with the formal establishment of 
the apartheid regime in 1948 to the release of Nelson Mandela from prison 
in 1991). 
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lasting from 1963 to 1993, there were civil wars or major conflicts 
in Nigeria,346 Chad,347 Liberia,348 Sierra Leone,349 and Somalia.350 
In its first thirty years of existence, the OAU was quite 
successful in managing some conflicts—notably those dealing with 
“colonially-inherited borders.”351 Nevertheless, the OAU played its 
most significant role in the struggle to end European colonialism in 
Africa, including the elimination of the dreaded apartheid system in 
South Africa.352 It worked cooperatively with various international 
actors, including the UN and the Frontline States,353 to support 
 
 
346 See generally PETER BAXTER, BIAFRA: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 
1967–1970 (providing a critical overview of the Nigerian civil war). 
347 See generally MARIELLE DEBOS, LIVING BY THE GUN IN CHAD: 
COMBATANTS, IMPUNITY AND STATE FORMATION (Andrew Brown trans., 
Zed Books Ltd. 2016) (examining the pervasiveness of sectarian violence 
in Chad, as well as state-sponsored repression of citizens). 
348 See generally MARK HUBAND, THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR (1998) 
(providing an overview of the civil war that began in Liberia in 1989). 
349 See generally LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA: 
THE RUF AND THE DESTRUCTION OF SIERRA LEONE (2005) (providing a first-
person account of the civil war in Sierra Leone); KIERAN MITTON, REBELS 
IN A ROTTEN STATE: UNDERSTANDING ATROCITY IN SIERRA LEONE (2015) 
(detailing the transformation of ordinary people into sadistic killers during 
the civil war in Sierra Leone). 
350 MARY HARPER, GETTING SOMALIA WRONG?: FAITH, WAR AND 
HOPE IN A SHATTERED STATE (2012) (examining the transformation of 
Somalia into a failed state). 
351 See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 5. (the OAU was 
successful, for example, in managing border disputes between Algeria and 
Morocco; Mali and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso); Somalia and Kenya; and 
Ethiopia and Somalia). 
352 See infra note 353 and accompanying text. 
353 The Frontline States (FLS) were a loose coalition of countries in 
southern Africa, which, from the 1960s to the 1990s, committed significant 
resources to ending the apartheid system and white minority rule in South 
Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The FLS included Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See generally STUDIES IN 
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE FRONT-LINE STATES 
(Zbigniew A. Konczacki et al. 1990) (examining, inter alia, economic 
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liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.354 
The OAU, however, was not successful in fully resolving the 
question of the independence of the Western Sahara.355 Aside from 
these few successes, the OAU failed miserably in its efforts to 
confront threats to peace and security in the continent.356 
Researchers have identified several factors that they believe explain 
why the OAU had a disappointing record in dealing with challenges 
to peace and security in Africa from its founding in 1963 to the early 
1990s.357 These include limitations imposed on the OAU by its 
founding document; the inadequacies of its conflict management 
institutions; the lack of political will among Member States’ leaders; 
the lack of capacity, experience, and financial resources; and the 
constraints imposed on the OAU by external actors, many of which 
intervened in the continent’s affairs.358 
 
 
developments in the Frontline States); CAROL B. THOMPSON, CHALLENGE 
TO IMPERIALISM: THE FRONTLINE STATES IN THE LIBERATION OF ZIMBABWE 
(1985) (examining the contributions of the Frontline States to the liberation 
of Zimbabwe); GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA, ALLIES IN ADVERSITY: THE 
FRONTLINE STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECURITY, 1975–1993 (2007) 
(providing a comprehensive examination of the founding of the Frontline 
States alliance and its contributions to liberation movements in Southern 
Africa). 
354 See generally SAUL DUBOW, APARTHEID, 1948–1994 (2014) 
(examining, inter alia, the contributions of the Frontline States to the end of 
apartheid in South Africa and the coming into place of a non-racial 
democratic system). 
355 See generally PERSPECTIVES ON WESTERN SAHARA: MYTHS, 
NATIONALISMS, AND GEOPOLITICS (Anouar Boukhars & Jacques Roussellier 
eds. 2014) (examining, inter alia, the struggle for independence in the 
Western Sahara and the failure of the OAU to resolve the Morocco’s claims 
over most of the territory). 
356 See Abu Alhassan (Ghana Army), The African Peace and 
Security Architecture: Myth or Reality, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 
Barracks, PA 17013, Strategy Research Project (March 2013), at 4–5, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a588906.pdf (noting, inter alia, that 
the “OAU’s overall record of providing peace and security in Africa from 
1963 to 1993 was a fiasco”). 
357 See id. 
358 See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 6. 
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One of the most important limitations on the OAU’s ability to 
deal with threats to peace and security in the continent was its 
founding document’s Article III, which set forth the principles under 
which the organization was to operate.359 One of those principles 
was “[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of [Member] 
States.”360 The non-interference principle and the requirement that 
Member States of the OAU dutifully exercise “[r]espect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence,”361 effectively 
“hampered the OAU’s role in resolving intra-state conflicts.”362 This 
is illustrated by the civil war, which raged in Nigeria from 1967 to 
1970; this conflict was, perhaps, the greatest challenge to the OAU 
during the period 1963–1993.363 
The OAU saw the position taken by Biafra to secede as a threat 
to the territorial integrity of the Nigerian Federation.364 
Nevertheless, the OAU considered the conflict an internal matter 
and one that the Nigerians needed to resolve without external 
interference.365 The conflict also caused a schism within the 
organization, demonstrated by the fact that four countries—Gabon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Zambia—“challenged the [OAU] 
[C]harter’s stipulations on territorial integrity and non-interference 
by pledging their support for the Biafran secessionist cause.”366 The 
civil war ended in 1970 after Biafra surrendered, but the OAU had 
 
 
359 OAU Charter, supra note 327, at art. III(2). 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at art. III(3). 
362 See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 6. 
363 See generally JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970 (Princeton Univ. Press 1977) 
(examining, inter alia, the OAU’s failed efforts to act to stop the bloody 
confrontation between the Republic of Biafra and the government of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria). 
364 See Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, Secession and the Right of Self-
Determination: An O.A.U. Dilemma, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUD., 355, 364, 373–
74 (1974) (discussing OAU action during Biafran secession conflict). 
365 See id. at 372. 
366 See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 6. 
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contributed virtually nothing to bring an end to the conflict and 
avoid the atrocities committed against civilians.367 
Given the OAU’s inherent weaknesses, Member States usually 
preferred to take their cases to other multilateral institutions, 
including the International Court of Justice.368 Even in cases where 
Member States decided to seek assistance from the OAU in 
resolving their conflicts, they often chose to bypass the 
organization’s Commission on Mediation, Arbitration, and 
Reconciliation, and instead opt for “ad hoc mediation and 
consultation committees and delegations, diplomacy, and good 
offices.”369 
The OAU’s failure in resolving the civil war in Chad revealed 
its lack of capacity and experience with confronting threats to peace 
and security in the continent.370 Although the OAU did eventually 
intervene militarily in Chad, the effort was a total failure because it 
“was late, poorly planned and financed, [and] lacked a clear mandate 
and the resources necessary to accomplish the mission.371 The 
mission, which had been approved in 1980, failed to arrive in Chad 
until 1981 by which time the cease-fire had broken down.”372 The 
OAU’s poorly equipped peacekeeping force was eventually forced 
to leave Chad in 1981 while the civil war raged and political and 
economic conditions continued to deteriorate.373 
The lack of financial resources significantly contributed to the 
OAU’s failure to undertake humanitarian intervention.374 Some 
observers argue that this lack of resources was due to the fact that 
 
 
367 See 1ANTHONY KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: 
A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK, 1966–1970 (1971) (examining military 
intervention in the First Republic and its aftermath, the civil war, and efforts 
to bring about peace in Nigeria). 
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(providing an overview of the OAU’s intervention efforts in Chad). 
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Member States did not have faith in the organization and were not 
willing to pay their dues.375 Since the OAU’s main source of 
financing was contributions from Member States, the failure of these 
countries to fulfil their financial obligations to the organization had 
a significant negative impact on its performance.376  
The persistent interest of external actors in Africa and their 
determined efforts to exploit Africa and Africans represented an 
important constraint on the ability of the OAU to engage in 
humanitarian intervention in the continent.377 During the Cold War, 
Africa became “a battleground for the United States and the Soviet 
Union as the two superpowers competed for ideological and 
strategic dominance.”378 In the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, 
superpower intervention, which included the supply of military 
equipment and financial resources to both sides in each conflict, 
prolonged these conflicts and intensified the “devastation caused” 
by these interventions.379 
In 1993, the OAU moved to establish the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR) with 
the objective of managing and resolving conflicts throughout the 
continent.380 The MCPMR emerged at a time when the continent 
was overwhelmed by refugees and internally displaced persons.381 
Nevertheless, the OAU was unable to move quickly and work 




376 Id. See generally ISIAKA A. BADMUS, THE AFRICAN UNION’S ROLE 
IN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECURITY 
OPERATIONS (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) (describing, inter alia, the failure 
of Member States to meet their financial obligations to the OAU/AU). 
377 See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 7. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
380 Larry Benjamin et al., Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1 S. AFR. 
J. INT’L AFF. 126 (1993). 
381 It has been estimated that at this time, there were as many as 5.2 
million refugees and 13 million internally displaced persons in the 
continent. See MUYANGWA & VOGT, supra note 340, at 11. 
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that were pervading the continent.382 This is evidenced by the 
conflict that emerged in Rwanda in the Spring of 1994 when the 
Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was killed after a plane he 
was flying in was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali on April 
6, 1994.383 In just 100 days, members of the Hutu paramilitary 
organization, Interahamwe, killed over 800,000 Tutsi and their Hutu 
sympathizers.384 The Rwandan Genocide represented the OAU’s 
most significant failure in maintaining continental peace and 
security in the post-Cold War period. It was this failure that gave 
impetus to the founding of the AU.385 
The decision of the OAU to strictly adhere to its operating 
principles, particularly that of “non-intervention,” as well as the 
failure of the organization to secure the necessary financial 
resources to finance its various intervention missions effectively 
prevented the organization from coordinating efforts to deal fully 
with threats against peace and security in the continent.386 
V. THE AFRICAN UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although there are many reasons why Africans had decided to 




383 See LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: THE RWANDAN 
GENOCIDE (Verso 2004). 
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385 See generally JOHN ILIFFE, OBASANJO, NIGERIA & THE WORLD 
220 (James Currey 2011) (arguing, inter alia, that the creation of the AU 
came from three directions, including widespread dissatisfaction with the 
OAU, which was ill-equipped to deal with the continent’s economic decline 
and to intervene in the internal affairs of Member States to prevent 
atrocities, such as the Rwandan Genocide). 
386 See GABRIEL S. NDUGULILE, THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN 
UNITY (OAU), ITS SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE: 
A CASE STUDY OF ZIMBABWE (Centre for Foreign Relations 1981) 
(examining the OAU’s successes and failures in Africa’s liberation 
movements using Zimbabwe as a case study). 
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(AU), the most important one concerns the failure of the OAU to 
deal fully and effectively with many of the continent’s conflicts, 
including especially the Rwandan Genocide, which had been 
responsible for the deaths of thousands of people.387 In addition to 
causing the deaths of many people, these conflicts also destroyed the 
productive capacities of many of the continent’s already fragile 
economies.388 
The release of the 1990 Declaration on the Political and Socio-
Economic Situation in Africa indicated that the OAU had outlived 
its usefulness.389 The declaration emphasized the belief that Africa 
was entering a new era in its political and economic transformation 
in which less emphasis would be placed on liberation from 
colonialism in favor of economic growth and development and 
regional integration.390 Specifically, the declaration stated that 
Member States of the OAU were determined to “work assiduously 
towards economic integration through regional cooperation” and 
were also “determined to take urgent measures to rationalize the 
existing economic groupings in our continent in order to increase 
their effectiveness in promoting economic integration and 
establishing an African Economic Community.”391 
In 1991, African countries, in keeping with the post-Cold War 
emphasis on economic development and regional integration, 
 
 
387 For example, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone caused 
significant damage to their infrastructures and significantly reduced their 
productive capacities. See FELIX GERDES, CIVIL WAR AND STATE 
FORMATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR AND PEACE IN LIBERIA 
(Campus Verlag 2013) (examining, inter alia, the impact of war on state 
formation, economic development, and peace-making in Liberia); see also 
LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA: THE RUF AND THE 
DESTRUCTION OF SIERRA LEONE (Indiana University Press 2005) 
(examining, inter alia, the impact of the civil war on the economic and 
political systems in Sierra Leone). 
388 See generally GERDES, supra note 387. 
389 Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in 
Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, ORG. OF 
AFR. UNITY, AHG/Decl. 1 (XXVI) (1990), https://archives.au.int/handle/ 
123456789/715. 
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adopted a treaty establishing the African Economic Community 
(Abuja Treaty).392 The main objective of the Abuja Treaty was “to 
promote economic, social and cultural development and the 
integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-
reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained 
development.”393 This important objective was to be accomplished 
through “the strengthening of existing regional economic 
communities and the establishment of other communities where 
they do not exist.”394 
In 1999, at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government summit in Sirte,395 Libya, African leaders, under the 
leadership of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, announced their 
intention to create a new continental organization they believed 
would “fast track the creation and implementation of the institutions 
contemplated by the Abuja Treaty.”396 The new institution was the 
AU, which took over the duties of the OAU and incorporated the 
African Economic Community.397 The AU has been described as 
“essentially a merger of the largely political ambitions of the OAU 
and the mainly economically minded African Economic 
Community, with the addition of some organs and with an 
acceleration of pace in economic integration, as stipulated in the 
Sirte Declaration.”398 The AU is said to have “supplanted the OAU 
largely out of a sense of frustration among African leaders about the 
 
 
392 The treaty was officially referred to as The Treaty Establishing 
the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty), adopted on June 3, 1991, 
and entered into force on May 12, 1994. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE 
AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, ORG. OF AFR. UNITY (June 3, 1991). 
393 Id. at art. 4(1)(a). 
394 Id. at art. 4(2)(a). 
395 Robert Nolan, The African Union After Gaddafi, J. DIPL. & INT’L 
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slow pace of economic integration and awareness that the many 
problems on the continent necessitated a new way of doing 
things.”399 
When African leaders created the AU, they modified the 
principles of the OAU.400 In doing so, they were fully “[c]onscious 
of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major 
impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and 
of the need to promote peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite 
for the implementation of our development and integration 
agenda.”401 The Constitutive Act of the African Union,402 like its 
predecessor, the OAU Charter, continues a prohibition on “the use 
of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union”403 
and retains the OAU’s principle of “non-interference by any 
Member State in the internal affairs of another.”404 However, unlike 
the OAU, the AU reserves the right to intervene in “a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly [of Heads of State and 
Government] in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”405 The Constitutive 
Act of the African Union grants each Member State the right “to 
request intervention from the [African] Union in order to restore 
peace and security.”406 
The designers of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, like 
those who developed the R2P, were concerned about inaction on the 
part of Member States and consequences for peace and security in 
the continent.407 For example, in 1994, inaction by the UN, the 
global community, and the AU, resulted in the Rwandan 
 
 
399 INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 322, at 10. 
400 See generally Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 
26. 
401 Id. at pmbl. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. at art. 4(f). 
404 Id. at art. 4(g). 
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407 See id.; see also Responsibility to Protect, supra note 36. 
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Genocide.408 In the introduction to the R2P document, the ICCIS 
states: 
The United Nations (UN) Secretariat and some permanent 
members of the Security Council knew that [Rwandan] 
officials connected to the then government were planning 
genocide; UN forces were present, though not in sufficient 
number at the outset; and credible strategies were available 
to prevent, or at least mitigate, the slaughter which 
followed. But the Security Council refused to take the 
necessary action. That was a failure of international will—
of civic courage—at the highest level. Its consequence was 
not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for Rwanda: the 
genocide destabilized the entire Great Lakes region and 
continues to do so.409 
Although the Constitutive Act of the African Union does not 
specifically mention the Rwandan Genocide, like the R2P 
document, it nevertheless indicates that the Heads of State and 
Government of the Member States were quite aware of the inaction 
that had led to genocide and other types of atrocities in various parts 
of the continent.410 It has been argued that the “inclusion of . . . R2P-
like provisions [in the Constitutive Act of the African Union] arose 
from concern about the OAU’s failure to stop internal conflicts, as 
well as widespread human rights violations occurring within states, 
including those instigated by the regimes of Idi Amin in Uganda and 
Jean-Bédel Bokassa in the Central African Republic.”411 Although 
the OAU mitigated and minimized some types of conflicts, 
particularly those involving “trans-boundary claims”412 and those 
“fueled by irredentism,”413 it greatly intensified others by 
“legitimizing the preservation of the status quo and delegitimizing 
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the grievances of disaffected groups.”414 In fact, the failure of public 
policy in many African countries to grant a hearing to the grievances 
of many excluded and marginalized groups (e.g., religious and 
ethnic minorities) gave rise to violent and destructive mobilization 
as groups fought to improve their levels of political and economic 
participation. Examples of ethnocultural groups that have engaged 
in violent and destructive mobilization in an effort to minimize their 
political and economic marginalization include the Igbos of Nigeria, 
several indigenous ethnic groups in Liberia, and the Anglophones of 
Cameroon.415 The Igbos of Nigeria, together with other minority 
groups from the then Eastern Region of Nigeria, fought a brutal civil 
war that lasted from 1967 to 1970 in an attempt to secede from the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria.416 Several indigenous ethnic groups in 
Liberia, under the leadership of Sargent Samuel K. Doe of the Krahn 
ethnic group, engaged in violent activities to dismantle the more 
than 100-year old minority Americo-Liberian hegemony and 
replace it with a governing process that was supposed to improve 
political and economic participation for indigenous groups.417 The 
Anglophones of Cameroon took up arms in 2018 to fight what they 
argue is domination and exploitation by the Francophone-dominated 
central government.418 
By the early-to-mid-1990s, as grassroots pro-democracy 
movements continued to dismantle dictatorships and authoritarian 
governments throughout the continent, there emerged new emphasis 
on the recognition and protection of human rights, including 
especially those of heretofore marginalized groups (e.g., women, 
children, the poor, ethnic and religious minorities, and other 
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in the governance architectures of many countries on the continent, 
the violation of human rights remained a major problem.420 
This lack of progress in minimizing impunity and enhancing the 
protection of human rights on the continent came from the failure of 
many African countries to provide themselves with effective 
institutional arrangements—that is, those capable of adequately 
constraining the State and minimizing the ability of state custodians 
(i.e., civil servants and political elites) to engage in activities that 
violate the rights of citizens. For example, after the dictatorship of 
Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was 
ousted in 1997, subsequent governments were either unable or 
unwilling to engage the country’s various subcultures in robust 
institutional reforms to create effective governance structures.421 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who ruled the country from 1997 until his 
assassination in 2001, never made any effort to engage the people of 
the DRC in necessary institutional reforms.422 Instead, he chose to 
retain the dysfunctional governance architecture that had allowed 
impunity to become pervasive throughout Mobutu’s more than 30-
year rule.423 When Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001, 
his son, Joseph, took over as president of the DRC, and like his 
father, Joseph Kabila did not undertake the necessary reforms to 
improve governance in the DRC.424 As a consequence, state and 
non-state agents continued to violate human rights with impunity.425 
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It was within this type of institutional environment, one 
characterized by dysfunctional economic and political institutions, 
that African leaders began the effort to transform the OAU into the 
AU. Of course, there were exceptions. Countries such as Ghana and 
post-apartheid South Africa had managed to provide themselves 
with progressive constitutions and governing processes undergirded 
by separation of powers with effective checks and balances. Of 
particular interest in these countries was the fact that fair, free, and 
credible elections were producing change in government without 
any resort, by losing political groups, to violent mobilization, as was 
occurring in other African countries.426 The post-apartheid 
constitution of the Republic of South Africa, for example, created 
the position of president and limited the president’s mandate to a 
maximum of two terms.427 Nelson Mandela was elected post-
apartheid South Africa’s first president and took office on May 10, 
1994.428 He chose not to compete for a second term and left office 
peacefully after the end of his term in 1999.429 On April 28, 1992, 
Ghana approved a new constitution and ushered in the Fourth 
Republic.430 Since then, there has been peaceful change of 
government; for example, in the 2016 presidential election that took 
place on December 7, 2016, the incumbent president John Dramani 
Mahama lost to opposition candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo.431 
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The AU is governed by sixteen principles,433 and of these, six 
of them make explicit or implicit reference to human rights, 
including “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule 
of law and good governance,”434 and “respect for the sanctity of 
human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political 
assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities.”435 The 
AU’s “objectives” also reference human rights—the AU pledged to 
“promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other 
relevant human rights instruments.”436 Finally, the AU pledged to 
work closely and cooperatively with its Member States to promote 
peace, security, stability, democracy, and good governance.437 
It is argued that “[t]he legal and policy documents of the 
African Union (AU) are founded on a human security paradigm that 
obliges the continental body to maintain a non-indifference stance 
on human rights abuses.”438 The AU’s non-indifference policy is 
significantly different from the “state-centric security principle of 
the Organization of African Unity, which gave excessive privileges 
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to state elites.”439 To implement its non-indifference principle, 
minimize threats to peace and security, and promote good 
governance in all its Member States, the AU created “a dedicated . . 
. machinery”440 which “supports the [AU’s] commitment to 
intervene in respect of war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.”441 This new machinery, which was dedicated to fighting 
threats to peace and security, consisted of the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC)442 and subsidiary organs, namely, the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development;443 the Banjul Charter;444 the 
African Court;445 the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on 
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the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights;446 and 
the Ezulwini Consensus.447 
 
B. THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF  
THE AFRICAN UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE R2P 
On July 9, 2002, the AU adopted the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union (PSC Protocol)448 and established the PSC.449 The PSC was 
established specifically to serve as a “collective security and early-
warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to 
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Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: 
“The Ezulwini Consensus,” AFR. UNION, at 1, AU Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2(VII) 
(Mar. 7–8, 2005). 
448 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union, art 22, AFR. UNION, adopted July 9, 2002, 
https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-relating-establishment-peace-and-
security-council-african-union [hereinafter PSC Protocol]. 
449 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1. According to Article 2(1) of the PSC Protocol, 
“[t]here is hereby established, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitute Act 
[of the African Union], a Peace and Security Council within the [African] 
Union, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts.” Id. 
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 




conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”450 In addition, it was also 
designed to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order 
to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the 
well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as 
the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development.”451 
With respect to human rights, the PSC was empowered to “promote 
and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule 
of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for 
the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part 
of efforts for preventing conflicts.”452 
The PSC is made up of fifteen Member States elected on the 
basis of equal rights—ten countries are elected to serve a term of 
two years and five are elected to serve a term of three years.453 The 
PSC adopted a voting rule allowing decisions to be made by 
consensus.454 However, if consensus cannot be reached, a simple 
majority may decide procedural matters. Nevertheless, decisions on 
all other matters must be made by a two-thirds majority of “its 
Members voting.”455 
The PSC is assisted by the African Union Commission, the 
PSC’s Peace and Security Department, and four dedicated 




451 Id. at art. 3, ¶ a. 
452 Id. at art. 3, ¶ f. 
453 Id. at art. 5, ¶ 1. 
454 Id. at art. 8, ¶ 13. 
455 Id. 
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the Panel of the Wise;456 the Continental Early Warning System;457 
the African Standby Force;458 and the Peace Fund.459 The AU’s 
“overall security architecture . . . has the primary responsibility for 
promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.”460 The AU’s 
relationship with “the Regional Economic Communities/Regional 
Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
 
 
456 Panel of the Wise (PoW), AFR. UNION PEACE & SEC. (Apr. 24, 
2018), http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/29-panel-of-the-wise-pow. The 
Panel of the Wise is “one of the critical pillars of the Peace and Security 
Architecture of the (APSA). Article 11 of the [PSC Protocol] . . . sets up a 
five-person panel of ‘highly respected African personalities from various 
segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause 
of peace, security and development on the continent’ with a task ‘to support 
the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, 
particularly in the area of conflict prevention.” Id. 
457 The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), AFR. UNION 
PEACE & SEC. (May 15, 2018) http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28-
continental-early-warning. The CEWS is “one of five pillars of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture” it collects and analyzes the data and 
provides the PSC and institutions with interest in peace and security in 
Africa with important advice. Id. 
458 The African Standby Force (ASF), AFR. UNION PEACE & SEC. 
(Feb. 26, 2019), http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-
asf-amani-africa-1. The Constitutive Act of the African Union grants the 
AU the right to intervene in a Member State in grave circumstances (war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity). Id. The PSC Protocol’s 
Article 13 establishes an African Standby Force and indicates that “[s]uch 
Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with 
civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for 
rapid deployment at appropriate notice.” PSC Protocol, supra 448, at art. 
13, ¶ 1. The ASF functions under the direction of the AU and supports the 
AU’s right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states as prescribed 
by article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The African 
Standby Force (ASF), supra note 458. 
459 Peace Fund, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/peace-fund (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2021). The African Union Peace Fund was established 
under Art. 21 of the PSC Protocol and charged with financing the AU’s 
peace and security operations. Id. In July 2016, the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the AU “decided that the Peace Fund would be 
endowed with $325m in 2017, rising to a total of $400m by 2020 from the 
0.2% levy.” Id. 
460 PSC Protocol, supra note 448, at art. 16, ¶ 1. 
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is [considered] a key APSA component.”461 The PSC also 
cooperates and works with other AU organs such as the Pan-African 
Parliament, the African Commission, and civil society 
organizations, all of which are important to minimizing threats to 
peace and security, as well as protecting human rights.462 Such 
cooperation is very important if the PSC is to succeed in preventing 
impunity and enhancing the protection of human rights in the 
African countries.463 
C. CONTINENTAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
The AU’s institutional architecture includes judicial and other 
legal institutions tasked with promoting the protection of human 
rights and minimizing threats to peace and security.464 The Banjul 
Charter is the continent’s main instrument for the promotion and 
protection of human rights.465 The Banjul Charter is “an 
international human rights instrument that is intended to promote 
and protect human rights and basic freedoms in the African 
continent.”466 Oversight and interpretation of the Banjul Charter is 
placed in the hands of the African Commission—the African 
Commission was established in 1987 and currently has its 
headquarters in Banjul, The Gambia.467 In 1998, the AU adopted a 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
 
 
461 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), AFR. 




464 AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/au-nutshell (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
465 Banjul Charter, supra note 93. 
466 Id. 
467 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. 
COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, https://www.achpr.org/home (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
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Rights (African Court Protocol)468—the Protocol provided for the 
establishment of an African Court. 
The African Court was “established by virtue of Article 1 of the 
[African Court Protocol]”469 and, as of the writing of this article, 
“only nine (9) of the thirty (30) States Parties to the [African Court 
Protocol] had made the declaration recognizing the competence of 
the Court to receive cases from NGOs and individuals.”470 The 
African Court has “jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted 
to it concerning the interpretation and application of the [Banjul 
Charter, the African Court Protocol] and any other relevant human 
rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.”471 
The African Court Protocol mandates that “[t]he Court shall 
consist of eleven judges, nationals of Member States of the OAU, 
elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of high moral 
character and of recognized practical, judicial or academic 
competence and experience in the field of human and peoples’ 
rights.”472 In addition to the requirement that judges must be 
personally qualified and have experience in the field of human and 
peoples’ rights, the judges chosen to serve on this continental 
tribunal must represent the continent’s five major regions, “the 
various African legal systems of Islamic law, Common and Civil 
law, African customary law and South African Roman-Dutch law, 
as well as ensuring that African traditions are taken into account.”473 
In addition to the requirement that “there is adequate gender 
representation,”474 only “States Parties to the Protocol may each 
propose up to three candidates, at least two of whom shall be 
 
 
468 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
AFR. UNION (June 10, 1998). 
469 Welcome to the African Court, supra note 445. 
470 Id. 
471 Id. 
472 AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 11. 
473 Andreas Zimmermann & Jelena Bäumler, Current Challenges 
Facing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 7 KAS INT’L REP. 
38, 41 (2010). 
474 AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 14(3). 
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nationals of that State.”475 It is quite likely, then, that judges from 
States that are not party to the African Court Protocol can be 
nominated to serve on the African Court.476 
The African Court’s first eleven judges were selected in 2006. 
While they represented various regions and legal systems, the 
selection was criticized because some of the judges lacked expertise 
and experience in the field of human rights law. The selection also 
received criticism for its lack of gender representation—only two 
women were nominated.477 
Whether one is submitting a case to the African Commission or 
the African Court, a very important and fundamental question of law 
(that includes human rights law) “is whether a given mechanism 
(commission, committee or court) has jurisdiction to preside over a 
given case.”478 A question that deals with the issue of the jurisdiction 
of the African Court, can be “broken down into three 
components,”479 viz: “jurisdiction over the subject matter 
(competence ratione materiae); jurisdiction over the person 
(competence ratione personae); and jurisdiction to render the 
particular judgment sought.”480 The African Commission and the 
African Court have jurisdiction over subject matter or persons “to 
the extent granted to [them] by [their] enabling act or legislation.”481 
 
 
475 Id. at art. 12(1). 
476 See Zimmermann & Bäumler, supra note 473, at 41. 
477 See generally VILJOEN, supra note 398 (examining, inter alia, the 
failure of the selection process for judges to serve on the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights to provide for adequate gender representation). 
478 Robert Wundeh Eno, The Jurisdiction of the African Court on 
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1.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The African Court Protocol482 defines the jurisdiction of the 
African Court and provides for “three heads of jurisdiction”483—the 
“contentious (adjudicatory), advisory and conciliatory” 
jurisdictions.484 With respect to the adjudicatory (contentious) 
jurisdiction, the African Court deals with “subject matter 
jurisdiction” and “personal jurisdiction.”485 According to Article 
3(1) of the African Court Protocol, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court 
shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any 
other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the State 
concerned.”486 
Article 3(1) should be read together with Article 7—the latter 
provides: “[t]he Court shall apply the provision of the Charter and 
any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States 
concerned.”487 Such a reading allows the reader to recognize that the 
jurisdiction of the African Court is significantly wider than that of 
other regional instruments.488 For example, unlike the European and 
 
 
482 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
AFR. UNION, June 10, 1998. The African Court Protocol came into force on 
January 25, 2004. The African Court Protocol was replaced by the Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights on July 1, 
2008. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights Protocol merged the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights with the Court of Justice of 
the African Union. See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, AFR. UNION (July 1, 2008), at ch. I. 
483 Eno, supra note 478. 
484 Id. at 225. See also AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 
arts. 3, 4, 9. 
485 Personal jurisdiction deals with who can file a complaint with the 
African Court. See, e.g., Eno, supra note 478, at 225. 
486 AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 3(1). 
487 Id. at art. 7. 
488 For example, the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
American Convention on Human Rights. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR 
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American Conventions on Human Rights, the Banjul Charter 
provides for the protection of “not only civil and political rights but 
also economic, social and cultural rights.”489 
Although the African Charter can “be interpreted drawing 
inspiration from other international human rights instruments,”490 
any case brought before the African Court “must be decided with 
reference to the African Charter.”491 According to Article 45(2) of 
the African Charter, the African Commission must “[e]nsure the 
protection of human and peoples’ rights under conditions laid down 
by the [African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights].”492 As 
mandated by the African Court Protocol, the African Court “will 
exercise direct jurisdiction over all human rights instruments 
‘ratified by the states concerned.’”493 This provision has been 
interpreted to imply that the African Court’s jurisdiction extends to 
“all regional, sub-regional, bilateral, multilateral, and international 
treaties.”494 The African Court, then, must not “limit itself to the 
African Charter, but can refer to other treaties ratified by [African 
 
 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND 
PROTOCOL, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Nov. 4, 1950), https://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c=; American Convention on Human 
Rights, INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RIGHTS (Nov. 22, 1969), 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.
htm. 
489 PRACTICAL GUIDE: THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: TOWARDS THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, INT’L FEDERATION FOR HUM. RIGHTS (Apr. 2010), 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/african_court_guide.pdf, at 55. For 
example, article 22 of the Banjul Charter states that “[a]ll peoples shall have 
the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard 
to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common 
heritage of mankind.” See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 22. 
490 Eno, supra note 478, at 226. 
491 Id. 
492 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(2). 
493 Eno, supra note 478, at 226; see also AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, 
supra note 33, at art. 7. 
494 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RIGHTS & DEV. 
L.J. 45, 90 (2000). 
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States], including UN treaties, bilateral and multilateral treaties at 
regional and sub-regional level.”495 
Such wide jurisdiction for the African Court is critical to the 
protection of human rights because it provides additional protections 
for individuals “whose rights are not adequately protected in the 
African Charter.”496 Such persons can “easily hold the state 
concerned accountable by invoking another treaty to which that state 
is a party—either at UN level or sub-regional level.”497 It has been 
argued, for example, that the African Charter does not provide 
adequate protections to women’s rights.498 As argued by Odombana, 
“[r]ather than rely on the Charter then, an aggrieved woman or group 
of women could bring a case to the African Court under another 
international treaty that better protected her [their] rights.”499 
In addition, if a State were to invoke a “clawback clause” in an 
effort to “justify a breach of internationally protected rights: the 
victim could simply invoke a treaty protecting the same rights, such 
as the ICCPR, that did not include a similar clawback clause.”500 
Some scholars have argued that if this interpretation is accepted and 
utilized by the African Court, that could imply that “all human rights 
treaties ratified by a [S]tate [P]arty to the [African Court] Protocol 
in the past will become justiciable, and future ratifications will have 
the same consequence.”501 Within such a framework, it is further 
argued, African States “might be deterred not only from ratification 




495 See Eno, supra note 478, at 226–227. 
496 Id. at 227. 
497 Id. 
498 See The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: An 
Instrument for Advancing Reproductive and Sexual Rights, CTR. FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (2006), at 2–3 (arguing that in response to 
widespread activism, subsequent protocols were enacted to supplement the 
African Charter in an effort to protect women’s rights). 
499 Udombana, supra note 494, at 91. 
500 Id. 
501 See Eno, supra note 478, at 227. 
502 See Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: 
In Need of Reform?, 2 AFR. HUM. RIGHTS L. J. 155, 167 (2001). 
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Human rights law professor and expert on human rights in 
Africa, Professor Christof Heyns, has argued that “[i]n one fell 
swoop, Africa will have jumped from a region without a court, to a 
region where all human rights treaties, whether they are of UN, 
OAU or other origin, are enforced by a regional court, even though 
the UN itself does not enforce them through a court of law. It would 
be highly unusual for an institution from one system (AU) to enforce 
the treaties of another system (UN).”503 
Udombana, however, argues that these fears are totally 
unfounded and that “the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction over 
cases filed by individuals and NGOs will limit the number of cases 
that actually reach the Court to a manageable number, ensuring that 
those with the greatest merit are heard.”504 Nevertheless, despite 
arguments to the effect that a “broad interpretation would open a 
Pandora’s box and may flood the African Court with a lot of 
cases,”505 it is important and critical that the Court have wide 
jurisdiction so that it can more effectively carry out its functions to 
safeguard the rights of the citizens of African countries.506 
Regarding the argument that granting broad jurisdiction to the 
African Court could negatively affect the willingness of some 
countries to ratify a particular human rights instrument, it should be 
noted that any country that would use the excuse of “broad 
jurisdiction for the Court” to decline to sign and ratify human rights 
instruments is a State that “is not committed to the promotion and 
protection of human rights.”507 In addition to the fact that granting 
broad jurisdiction to the African Court would significantly frustrate 
those African countries which have devised “sophisticated 
strategies” to avoid being held accountable for their violation of 
human rights, it will also “expose those states that took ratification 
as [merely] a public relations exercise.”508 
 
 
503 Heyns, supra note 502, at 167. 
504 Udombana, supra note 494, at 91. 
505 Eno, supra note 478, at 227. 
506 See id. at 228. 
507 See id. 
508 See id. 
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2. Personal Jurisdiction 
Article 5 of the African Court Protocol defines the African 
Court’s competence with respect to persons who can appear before 
the Court or who can submit matters to the Court.509 Article 5 
divides jurisdiction into (i) compulsory (automatic); and (ii) optional 
jurisdictions.510 With respect to compulsory jurisdiction, Article 5 
(1) provides that the following have the right to submit cases and/or 
matters to the African Court: 
(a) The Commission 
(b) The State Party which had lodged a complaint to the 
Commission 
(c) The State Party against which the complaint has been 
lodged at the Commission 
(d) The State Party whose citizen is a victim of human 
rights violation 
(e) African Intergovernmental Organizations.511 
A State Party that “has an interest in a case . . . may submit a 
request to the Court to be permitted to join.”512 Article 5(3) deals 
with other claimants and includes individuals and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs): “The Court may entitle relevant Non 
Governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the 
Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in 
accordance with [A]rticle 34(6) of this Protocol.”513 Article 34(6) 
states that “[a]t the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any 
time thereafter, the State shall make a declaration accepting the 
competence of the Court to receive cases under [A]rticle 5(3) of this 
 
 
509 AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 5. 
510 See id. 
511 Id. at art. 5(1). 
512 Id. at art. 5(2). 
513 Id. at art. 5(3). 
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Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under [A]rticle 
5(3) involving a State Party which has not made such a 
declaration.”514 
It is important to note that the discretion to allow individuals 
and NGOs to have direct access to the African Court “lies jointly 
with the target state and the Court.”515 If an individual or NGO files 
a case with the African Court, the latter can only proceed with the 
case if the State has already “made an express declaration accepting 
the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.”516 In addition, “the Court 
has a discretion to grant or deny access at will.”517 It has been argued 
that the requirement that States make a separate declaration “in the 
case of individual and NGO communications is in line with the 
procedural law of other human rights systems.”518 
Since, in the African human rights system, “no special 
declaration is required to access the Commissions,” the latter “could 
 
 
514 Id. at art. 34(6). 
515 Eno, supra note 478, at 230. 
516 Id. See also AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 
34(6). 
517 Eno, supra note 478, at 230. 
518 Id. For example, Article 41(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights states that “[a] State Party to the present Covenant 
may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence 
of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that 
a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations 
under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be 
received and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made 
a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the 
Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.” See 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN HUM. RIGHTS 
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (December 16, 1966), 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; Article 21 
of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, makes a similar declaration; see Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, UN HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85 (Dec. 10, 1984), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/ 
pages/cat.aspx. 
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therefore be seen as a necessary barrier to weed out frivolous and 
unnecessary communications that might find their way to the courts 
if direct access were allowed.”519 It is argued that “[w]hile [the] 
limitation [under Article 5(3) of the African Court Protocol] may 
have been necessary to get states on board [to ratify the Protocol], it 
is nevertheless disappointing and a terrible blow to the standing and 
reputation of the [African Court] in the eyes of most Africans.”520 
Mutua goes on to argue that “it is individuals and NGOs, and not the 
African Commission, regional intergovernmental organizations, or 
states parties, who would be the primary beneficiaries and users of 
the court.”521 In addition, argues Mutua, “[t]he court is not an 
institution for the protection of the rights of states or OAU [AU] 
organs”; instead, “[a] human rights court is primarily a forum for 
protecting citizens against the state and other governmental 
agencies” and hence, the “limitation [to access placed by the 
Protocol on individuals and NGOs] will render the court virtually 
meaningless unless it is interpreted broadly and liberally.”522 
3. The African Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction 
In addition to the African Court’s contentious jurisdiction,523 
the African Court Protocol also empowers the Court to render 
advisory opinions.524 As provided for in Article 4(1) of the Protocol: 
“At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its 
organs, or any African organization recognized by the OAU, the 
Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the 
Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided 
that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being 
examined by the Commission.”525 When compared to other 
international rights tribunals, the African Court exercises relatively 
 
 
519 Eno, supra note 478, at 230. 
520 See Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights System: A Critical 
Evaluation, at 28, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mutua.pdf. 
521 Id. 
522 Id. 
523 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 3. 
524 See id. at art. 4. 
525 See id. at art. 4(1). 
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wider jurisdiction “in terms of who may submit requests for 
advisory opinions on legal matters.”526 
For example, under the American Convention on Human 
Rights, only Member States of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the OAS’ organs are granted the right to seek advisory 
opinions from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.527 
According to Article 64(1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, “[t]he member states of the Organization may consult the 
Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other 
treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American 
states.528 Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in 
Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as 
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner 
consult the Court.”529 
The African Court as designed by the OAU, on the other hand, 
is granted power to exercise “advisory jurisdiction” over the OAU 
(now the AU), Member States of the AU, AU organs, as well as “any 
African organization recognized by the OAU [AU].”530 Scholars, 
such as Udombana, have argued that this relatively wide advisory 
jurisdiction, which has been granted to the African Court, “should 
allow for a more robust and sustained analysis of the meaning of the 
Charter, the Protocol, and the compatibility of domestic legislation 
and regional initiatives with the rights norms contained therein.”531 
It is also argued that the “African Court’s advisory jurisdiction 
is also the broadest of the three regional systems532 in terms of 
subject matter.”533 Within the African system, the African Court is 
 
 
526 Udombana, supra note 494, at 91–92. 
527 See Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 at art. 
64. 
528 Id. at art. 64(1). 
529 Id.; see also Udombana, supra note 494, at 91–92. 
530 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 4(1). 
531 Udombana, supra note 494, at 92. 
532 The three regional systems are the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the African 
Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
533 Udombana, supra note 494, at 92. 
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empowered to “provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to 
the Charter,”534 the Protocol, as well as “any other relevant human 
rights instruments [ratified by the States concerned].”535 Udombana 
states, for example, that according to Article 4(1), the African Court 
“could conceivably issue an advisory opinion on the compatibility 
of domestic legislation affecting land rights, housing availability, or 
food prices with the obligations assumed under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by an African 
State Party thereto.”536 
But, when must the African Court exercise its power to render 
advisory opinions? Unfortunately, the African Court Protocol does 
not provide any guidelines on how the African Court can determine 
when it should or should not exercise its advisory jurisdiction. While 
the African Court has wide discretion as to the situations in which it 
can exercise its advisory jurisdiction, it is required to “give reasons 
for its advisory opinions” and “every judge [of the Court is] entitled 
to deliver a separate or dissenting decision.”537 
Although the African Court’s advisory opinions are not 
“formally binding on any specific party,” they, nevertheless, “derive 
their value as legal authority from the character of the Court as a 
judicial institution.”538 The African Court’s advisory jurisdiction is 
generally considered very critical to the development of “human 
rights jurisprudence”539 in the continent. In addition to the fact that 
the Court’s advisory opinions can have a significant impact on the 
development of human rights jurisprudence in Africa, these 
opinions are likely to also “significantly impact the domestic 
application of the Charter and other international human rights 
principles.”540 As the main legal authority on the Banjul Charter, the 
African Court is the appropriate institution to be called upon to 
 
 
534 AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 4(1). 
535 Id. 
536 Udombana, supra note 494, at 92. 
537 AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 4(2). 
538 Udombana, supra note 494, at 93. 
539 Id. 
540 Id. 
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determine whether a country’s legislation is “inconsistent with the 
Charter” and consequently, is “unlawful.”541 
In Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria,542 a Nigerian non-
governmental organization, the Civil Liberties Organization, filed a 
communication with the African Commission alleging that “the 
military government of Nigeria [had] enacted various decrees in 
violation of the African Charter, specifically the Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, which not 
only suspends the Constitution but also specifies that no decree 
promulgated after December 1983 can be examined in any Nigerian 
Court; and the Political Parties (Dissolution) Decree No. 114 of 
1993, which, in addition to dissolving political parties, ousts the 
jurisdiction of the courts and specifically nullifies any domestic 
effect of the African Charter.”543 
In its ruling, the Commission held that the Nigerian law was 
incompatible with the country’s obligations under the African 
Charter.544 Specifically, the Commission stated that: 
If Nigeria wished to withdraw its ratification, it would have 
to undertake an international process involving notice, 
which it has not done. Nigeria cannot negate the effects of 
its ratification of the Charter through domestic action. 
Nigeria remains under the obligation to guarantee the rights 
of Article 7 to all of its citizens.545 
The African Commission also held that “the Decrees in 
question constitute a breach of Article 7 of the Charter, the right to 
be heard; [that] the ouster of the courts’ jurisdiction constitutes a 




542 Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, Communication 
129/1994, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. 
Comm’n H.P.R.], 17 Ordinary Session, (Mar. 22, 1995), 
https://africanlii.org/afu/judgment/african-commission-human-and-
peoples-rights/1995/4. 
543 Id. at ¶ 1. 
544 Id. at holding. 
545 Id. at ¶ 13. 
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courts; [and that] the act of the Nigerian Government to nullify the 
domestic effect of the Charter constitutes a serious irregularity.”546 
4. Challenges to the Effectiveness of the African Court 
For the African Court to succeed as an instrument for the 
protection of human rights in Africa, it must be able to overcome 
what have been referred to as “potential barriers” to its 
effectiveness.547 It has been noticed that during the last several 
years, the African Commission has suffered from various “structural 
and normative deficiencies that have plagued”548 its ability to 
effectively and fully carry out its functions. But, what have these 
deficiencies been? These include “the non-binding nature of the 
African Commission’s decisions,” “the lack of enforceable 
remedies,” and “the lack of independence and creative vision of the 
Commission.”549 
The African Court was established to adjudicate “all cases and 
disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application 
of the [African Court Protocol] and any other relevant Human 
Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.”550 The African 
Court ensures the protection of human and peoples’ rights in the 
continent. According to the African Court Protocol, the Court is 
empowered to “complement [and reinforce] the protective mandate 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights”551—the 
two institutions, working together and with other organs of the 
AU,552 are expected to ensure the effective protection of human 
rights in the continent.  
Potential challenges to the Court’s effectiveness include, but are 
not limited to: (i) ratification; (ii) access to the Court by individuals 
and NGOs; (iii) funding of the Court’s operations and activities; (iv) 
independence of the judiciary; (v) selection of competent and 
 
 
546 Id. at holding. 
547 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 98. 
548 Id. 
549 Id. 
550 AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 3. 
551 Id. at art. 2. 
552 For example, the AU’s Peace and Security Council. 
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independent judges (i.e., non-partisan judges); (vi) interpretation of 
the Court’s mandate and jurisdiction; (vii) enforcement; and (viii) 
others.553 
a. Ratification 
According to Article 34(3) of the African Court Protocol, “[t]he 
Protocol shall come into force thirty days after fifteen instruments 
of ratification or accession have been deposited . . . with the 
Secretary-General [of the OAU].”554 As of 2018, twenty-four States 
have signed and ratified the African Court Protocol; twenty-five 
States have signed but have not ratified the African Court Protocol; 
and five States have neither signed nor ratified the African Court 
Protocol.555 The African Court Protocol entered into force on 
January 25, 2004.556 Given the fact that enough States have signed 
and ratified the Protocol for it to enter into force, ratification is no 
longer a major constraint to the Court’s effectiveness.557 
b. Declarations by States Under Article 34(6) 
and Direct Access to the Court by Individuals 
and NGOs 
Under Article 34(6), States must affirmatively “make a 
declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases 
 
 
553 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66–73. 
554 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 34(3)–(7). The 
AU, which was founded on May 26, 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and 
launched on July 9, 2002 in Durban, South Africa, replaced and took over 
the activities of the OAU. The Chairperson of the AU is now Depositary. 
555 See Ratification Table: Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/ratification/ (last 
visited on Dec. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Ratification Table]. 
556 See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (July 1, 2008), 
https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-
rights. 
557 See Ratification Table, supra note 555. 
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under Article 5(3)558 of [the] Protocol.”559 Without such a 
declaration or affirmative opt in, individuals and NGOs cannot have 
direct access to the Court. There is fear that this requirement will 
have significant negative impact on individuals and NGOs, the 
parties that have the “greatest incentive and need to use human rights 
institutions such as the Court.”560 On the other hand, States Parties, 
especially those pervaded by government impunity, are unlikely to 
“readily support direct access [to the Court] by these parties.”561 
It has been suggested that although the provision in Article 
34(6) was inserted in the African Court Protocol “to facilitate the 
early ratification of the Protocol, it would perhaps have been more 
effective to include a provision that permitted States Parties to opt 
out of accepting the otherwise automatic jurisdiction of the Court 
over individual and NGO petitions.”562 It is argued further that under 
the opt out option, “States Parties would have retained the power to 
restrict direct access to the courts, but civil society would have had 
a greater rallying point around which to pressure governments to 
withdraw any such declaration.”563 
Another constraint on the ability of NGOs to have direct access 
to the African Court is made possible by Article 5(3), which permits 
direct access to the African Court only to “relevant [NGOs] with 
observer status before the [African] Commission.”564 This provision 
places many human rights NGOs in the continent, especially those 
with limited resources, in a situation in which they are not likely to 
be able to successfully complete the expensive process necessary to 
gain observer status before the African Commission.565 Unlike the 
 
 
558 Article 5(3) states that “[t]he Court may entitle relevant non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the 
Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in 
accordance with article 34(6) of this Protocol.” See AFRICAN COURT 
PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at 5(3). 
559 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 34(6). 
560 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 98. 
561 Id. 
562 Id. at 99. 
563 Id. at 98. 
564 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 5(3). 
565 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 99–100. 
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African human rights system, the Inter-American system provides a 
more welcoming and less restrictive system for access to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.566 According to Article 
44, “Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity 
legally recognized in one or more member states of the 
Organization, may lodge petitions with the [American] Commission 
containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this 
Convention by a State Party.”567 The American Convention’s more 
open-door process provides the opportunity for many NGOs in the 
Americas, including even small ones with limited resources, to gain 
access to and place petitions before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights.568  
c. Financial Independence of the Court 
Securing enough financial resources to fund the African Court’s 
activities remains an important constraint to the Court’s 
effectiveness. Article 32 of the African Court Protocol elaborates 
how the Court’s budget is to be determined and who is responsible 
for providing the necessary financial resources for the Court.569 
According to Article 32, “[e]xpenses of the Court, emoluments and 
allowances for judges and the budget of the registry, shall be 
determined and borne by the OAU, in accordance with criteria laid 
down by the OAU in consultation with the Court.”570 This 
responsibility, of course, has passed to the AU, the successor 
organization to the OAU.571 
 
 
566 See Organization of American States, American Convention on 
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, at 
art. 64. 
567 Id. at art. 44. 
568 See id.  
569 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 32. 
570 Id. 
571 According to art. 33(1) of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, “[t]his Act [i.e., Constitutive Act of the African Union] shall replace 
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.” See Constitutive Act of 
the African Union, supra note 26, at art. 33(1). 
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Like any other court, the African Court must have “financial 
security—security of salary or other remuneration, and, where 
appropriate, security of pension.”572 The Supreme Court of Canada 
has noted that “[t]he essence of such security is that the right to 
salary and pension should be established by law and not subject to 
arbitrary interference by the Executive in a manner that could affect 
judicial independence.”573 According to Article 9(1) of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government is responsible for adopting the budget of the 
Union, which includes the African Court’s budget.574 The budget of 
the AU is provided by contributions from Member States.575 The 
African Court cannot function effectively to protect human rights in 
the continent unless it has financial independence, free of political 
interference from the AU and its Member States. For example, some 
scholars argue the African Commission, which complements the 
activities of the African Court, has, on occasion, been unable to 
fulfill its functions because of “lack of funds.”576 Over the years, the 
African Commission has had to depend on donations, most of them 
 
 
572 Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 676 (Can.). This is 
the Supreme Court of Canada case that set the standards for judicial 
independence in Canada. See also Ian Greene, The Doctrine of Judicial 
Independence Developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, 26 OSGOODE 
HALL L. J. 177, 179 (1988). 
573 Valente, 2 S.C.R. at 676. In the case of the African Court, the 
“Executive” would be Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
AU. 
574 See Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 26, at art. 
9(1). 
575 At the Twenty-Seventh African Union Summit in Kigali, Rwanda 
in July 2016, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a 
decision to impose a “0.2% levy on eligible imports to finance the African 
Union.” See What Is Financing of the Union, AFR. UNION, 
https://au.int/web/en/what-financing-union (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
576 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 100. 
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coming primarily from outside the continent, in order to maintain its 
operations.577 
The recognition and protection of human rights must be 
considered an integral part of the effort to promote peaceful 
coexistence and human and economic development in Africa. 
Hence, it must be an integral part of the mission of the AU and its 
various organs, particularly, the African Court and the African 
Commission. Nevertheless, in order for the African Court and 
African Commission to perform their functions, they must be 
provided the resources that they need.578 This, of course, calls for all 
Member States to ensure the financial independence of both the 
African Court and the African Commission. 
d. Independence of the Court 
In order for the African Court to perform its functions, its 
independence must be guaranteed. As argued by Udombana, “[t]he 
Court must be insulated from all manner of political wrangling by 
Member States, particularly in the appointment of and composition 
of judges, and ensured absolute autonomy in its undertakings.”579 
He adds that “[j]udicial independence is necessary to give the Court 




577 See Chapter Nine Ninth Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (1995–1996), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/ 
123456789/2082/9e%20Rapport%20Annuel_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllow
ed=y (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). As detailed in the Ninth Annual Activity 
Report, the Commission had to suspend several projects because of OAU’s 
financial problems. See id. at XI(b)(i)(31). In addition, the Commission 
received financial subventions from the United Nations Center for Human 
Rights and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute. See id. at XI(b)(iii)(32)–(33). 
578 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66. 
579 Id. at 101. 
580 Id. 
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In order for a trial to be fair, “the judge or judges on the case 
must be independent.”581 In fact, “[a]ll international human rights 
instruments refer to a fair trial by ‘an independent and impartial 
tribunal.’”582 The International Commission of Jurists argues that 
judicial “independence refers both to the individual judge as well as 
the judiciary as a whole.”583 According to the UN Basic Principles 
on the Independence of the Judiciary, “[t]he independence of the 
judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the 
Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all 
governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the 
independence of the judiciary.”584 
The International Commission of Jurists also notes that 
judiciary independence has been specifically recognized in various 
regional contexts, namely, “Africa and Asia-Pacific.”585 The 
African Commission, at its Nineteenth Ordinary Session held from 
March 26, 1996 to April 4, 1996, at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 
adopted a resolution to respect and strengthen the independence of 
the judiciary.586 In this resolution, the African Commission 
specifically calls upon Member States of the AU to: 
• Repeal all their legislation which are inconsistent 
with the principles of respect of the independence 
 
 
581 International Principles on the Independence and Accountability 
of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors: Practitioners Guide No. 1, INT’L 
COMM’N OF JURISTS (2007), at 17, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7837 
af2.pdf [hereinafter INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS]. 
582 Id. 
583 Id. 
584 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, UN HUM. 
RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, art. 1, https://www.ohchr.org/en/ 
professionalinterest/pages/independencejudiciary.aspx. 
585 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 581, at 17. 
586 See 21: Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening on the 
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of the judiciary, especially with regard to the 
appointment and posting of judges; 
• Provide, with the assistance of the international 
community, the judiciary with sufficient 
resources in order to enable the legal system fulfil 
its function; 
• Provide judges with decent living and working 
conditions to enable them maintain their 
independence and realize their full potential; 
• Incorporate in their legal systems, universal 
principles establishing the independence of the 
judiciary, especially with regard to security of 
tenure; 
• Refrain from taking any action which may 
threaten directly or indirectly the independence 
and the security of judges and magistrates.587 
In order for the African Court to succeed in enforcing the 
provisions of the Banjul Charter, as well as advance the protection 
of human rights in the continent, its judges must be granted “security 
of tenure,” “financial security” free from “arbitrary interference by 
the [AU and its Member States] in a manner that could affect judicial 
independence,” and “institutional independence of the tribunal with 
respect to matters of administration bearing directly on the exercise 
of its judicial function.”588 
It is suggested that the independence of the judges of the 
African Court is structurally protected by the African Court 
 
 
587 Id. at 1. 
588 See Valente, 2 S.C.R., at 676. 
2019 PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 107 
 
Protocol’s removal589 and salary provisions.590 Article 17 of the 
Protocol also speaks to the independence of the judges. It states: 
1. The independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in 
accordance with international law. 
2. No judge may hear any case in which the same judge has 
previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for one 
of the parties or as a member of a national or international 
court or a commission of enquiry or in any other capacity. 
Any doubt on this point shall be settled by decision of the 
Court. 
3. The judges of the Court shall enjoy, from the moment of 
their election and throughout their term of office, the 
immunities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance 
with international law. 
4. At no time shall the judges of the Court be held liable for 
any decision or opinion issued in the exercise of their 
functions.591 
Despite these assurances, it is still feared that the independence 
of the African Court and its judges can still be threatened by the 
failure of Member States to pay their dues to the AU.592 In addition 
to making certain that judges and other court staff are paid regularly, 
 
 
589 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 19. Article 
19 states that “[a] judge shall not be suspended or removed from office 
unless, by the unanimous decision of the other judges of the Court, the judge 
concerned has been found to be no longer fulfilling the required conditions 
to be a judge of the Court.” 
590 Id. at art. 32. 
591 Id. at art. 17. 
592 See, e.g., African Union Strengthens Its Sanction Regime for Non-
Payment of Dues, AFR. UNION (Nov. 27, 2018), https://au.int/en/press 
releases/20181127/african-union-strengthens-its-sanction-regime-non-
payment-dues (noting, inter alia, the pervasive non-payment of dues by 
Member States of the AU, a process that hampers the ability of the AU’s 
organs to perform their functions). 
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promptly, and in full, the African Court must be provided with other 
necessary resources; these resources include, but are not limited to, 
a well-equipped law library (including access to necessary law 
reviews and journals, and the decisions of other international human 
rights tribunals), computers, other office materials (e.g., paper, 
writing pens, etc.), and other supplies needed for the effective 
functioning of an international human rights tribunal.593 Hence, 
Member States of the AU must not subject the African Court’s 
funding to political blackmail or manipulations, for, if they do so, 
the Court will be unable to function effectively as a defender of 
human rights in the continent.594 
e. Selection of Judges 
According to Article 14 of the African Court Protocol, “[t]he 
judges of the Court shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly 
from the list referred to in Article 13(2) of the present Protocol.”595 
Article 13 empowers each Member State to nominate individuals for 
“the office of the judge of the Court.”596 Since the effectiveness of 
the Court depends, to a significant extent, on the extent to which its 
judges are skilled in international law generally and international 
human rights law in particular, it is important that the process of 
nomination of judicial candidates by national governments is not 
politicized—national governments must select and send to the 
African Union Commission only individuals who are qualified to 
 
 
593 See, e.g., Udombana, supra note 494, at 101 (noting, inter alia, 
with reference to the African Court, that a “court lacking a library, paper, 
computers, printers, and translators may, by necessity, succumb to political 
pressures in order to receive additional funding necessary for its continued 
function”). 
594 Michael Fleshman, Human Rights Move Up on Africa’s Agenda: 
New African Court to Promote Rule of Law, End Impunity for Rights 
Violators, AFR. RENEWAL (July 2004) (noting, inter alia, the “emergence of 
an independent, effective and adequately financed court” could “bring an 
end to official impunity and ‘stimulate positive changes throughout 
Africa’”). 
595 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 14. 
596 Id. at art. 13. 
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serve as judges on the African Court.597 To make sure that only 
qualified individuals are selected to serve as judges on the African 
Court, each Member State’s government should work with its 
national bar associations/law societies to source qualified candidates 
for the Court.598  
Perhaps more important is the fact that those who are 
successfully elected to serve as judges must function as officers of a 
continental tribunal and not as representatives of their country of 
origin.599 If, in deciding cases, judges favor or give deference to the 
interests of their country of origin, justice can be corrupted and the 
system of protecting human rights in the continent rendered totally 
dysfunctional.600 
f. Interpreting the Court’s Jurisdiction and 
Mandate 
How well the judges of the African Court interpret “the 
[Court’s] mandate and jurisdiction,”601 it is argued, will have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of the Court in protecting 
human and peoples’ rights in Africa.602 If, for example, the Court 
adopts an innovative approach to the interpretation of its mandate 
and jurisdiction that takes cognizance of recent developments in 
international law, especially international human rights law, it could 
emerge as a leader among the various regional and international 
institutions that are dedicated to the protection of human rights.603 
Perhaps, more importantly, the African Court could use its 
interpretive powers to help African States bring their national laws, 
particularly those dealing with or affecting human and peoples’ 
rights, into conformity with the provisions of international human 
 
 
597 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 82–84 (noting, inter alia, the 





601 Id. at 102. 
602 Id. at 86–95 
603 See generally id. at 101. 
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rights instruments.604 Along these lines, the work of the African 
Court could significantly enrich national constitutional and other 
laws and improve human rights on the continent.605 
How the Court interprets, for example, Articles 34(6) and 5(3) 
of the African Court Protocol could determine the extent to which 
members of civil society (i.e., individuals) and their organizations 
(e.g., NGOs) could have effective access to the Court.606 The 
Court’s most important objective should be to work with all relevant 
stakeholders to enhance the protection of human rights on the 
continent. It should not allow itself to be distracted by unnecessary 
formalities and technicalities that can significantly impair and/or 
paralyze its effectiveness as the protector of human rights on the 
continent. In the end, it is critical that a court whose raison d’être is 
to advance the protection of human rights in Africa cannot perform 
that job effectively if it is not accessible to the people it is supposed 
to serve and protect.607 
g. Enforcing the Court’s Judgments 
Article 30 of the African Court Protocol states that “[t]he States 
Parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the 
judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time 
stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution.”608 But, will 
African governments enforce the Court’s judgments, especially if 
they believe that doing so would not be in their best interest? 
Udombana has argued that “[h]istorically, there has been an open 
resistance by African States to complying with binding orders of 
international courts.”609 As evidenced by the African backlash 
 
 
604 See generally id. at 102, 106–107. 
605 Id. 
606 Id. 
607 See generally id. at 108–109. 
608 See AFRICAN COURT PROTOCOL, supra note 33, at art. 30. 
609 In 2016, South Africa and Burundi announced their intention to 
withdraw from the ICC. In making the announcement, South Africa said 
that its decision was based on its belief that the country was “hindered” by 
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against the International Criminal Court (ICC), African 
governments have usually been quite guarded about international 
courts, particularly those that they feel are dominated by the West. 
For example, when The Gambia, under the leadership of President 
Yahya Jammeh, announced its decision to withdraw from the ICC, 
Sheriff Bojang, the country’s information minister stated as follows: 
“The ICC, despite being called international criminal court, is in fact 
an international Caucasian court for the prosecution and humiliation 
of people of [color], especially Africans.”610 In fact, some observers 
in the continent have gone as far as calling the ICC a tool of Western 
 
 
various parts of the Rome Statute, including especially the part that 
“compels South Africa to arrest persons who may enjoy diplomatic 
immunity under customary international law, who are wanted by the ICC 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, to surrender such 
persons to the International Criminal Court.” See Milena Veselinovic & 
Madison Park, South Africa Announces Its Withdrawal from ICC, CNN 
WORLD (Oct. 21, 2016, 8:12 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/21 
/africa/south-africa-withdraws-icc/index.html. See also Press Release by 
the GCB: South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC, DEREBUS  
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.derebus.org.za/press-release-gcb-south-africas-
withdrawal-icc/ (examining the implications, on the protection of human 
rights in Africa, of South Africa’s decision to withdraw from the ICC). 
“GCB” stands for the General Council of the Bar of South Africa. The GCB 
originally issued the press release on October 28, 2016. Nevertheless, after 
a South African court ruled that the decision of the government to withdraw 
from the ICC was unconstitutional because the executive had not first 
obtained the approval of Parliament, the government reversed course and 
revoked the decision to withdraw from the ICC. See Norimitsu Onishi, 
South Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa 
/south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html. 
610 See Simon Allison, African Revolt Threatens International 
Criminal Court’s Legitimacy, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2016, 10:32 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/oct/27/african-revolt-
international-criminal-court-gambia (noting, inter alia, that many Africans 
believe that the ICC is targeting Africans; also mentioning the decision by 
The Gambia, Burundi, and South Africa to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute). 
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imperialism, designed to oppress Africans and subvert governance 
in the continent.611 
Some of this guarded approach to international tribunals, of 
course, can be traced directly to the concerns of opportunistic 
African political elites about being held accountable for their 
misdeeds, which include the massive abuse of human rights.612 For 
example, when Burundi officially withdrew from the ICC, human 
rights NGOs and individuals in the country argued that “[t]he 
decision to withdraw Burundi from the Rome Statute comes at a 
time when the machine continues to kill with impunity in 
Burundi.”613 The machine was a reference to the government of 
President Pierre Nkurunziza, whose decision to change the 
constitution to secure a third term in office unleashed a bloody 
uprising that “claimed between 500 and 2,000 lives”614 and forced 
“more than 400,000 Burundians”615 to flee abroad, creating fears 
 
 
611 See Habeeb Kolabe, Is the ICC a Western Imperialist Tool 
Against Africa?, SWALIAFR (Dec. 29, 2016), http://blog.swaliafrica.com/is-
the-icc-a-western-imperialist-tool-against-africa/; see also Matt 
Killingsworth, International Criminal Court Is Not Just for Hunting 
Africans, CONVERSATION (Sept. 12, 2013, 9:43 AM), https://the 
conversation.com/international-criminal-court-is-not-just-for-hunting-
africans-18072. 
612 Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, 
THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/2014/02/06/africa-attacks-international-criminal-court/ (noting, 
inter alia, that “African leaders, many of whom have their own reasons to 
dislike a precedent of holding heads of state to account for their crimes, 
have been particularly receptive to [the view that the ICC’s] “exclusive 
focus on African crimes is unfair, a modern form of colonialism.” 
613 See Burundi Becomes First Nation to Leave International 
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that the ICC would launch an investigation and possibly hold several 
politicians, including Nkurunziza, accountable for the violence.616 
Since the UDHR in 1948, international law, particularly, 
international human rights law, has assumed a very important place 
in the struggle to protect human rights around the world, including 
in African countries.617 Despite the skepticism expressed by some 
African political elites regarding the role of international courts in 
the protection of human and peoples’ rights, as well as the resolution 
of interstate conflicts, in the continent, international courts, such as 
the ICJ, have, during the last several decades, adjudicated important 
cases involving African States as parties.618 In doing so, 
international courts have contributed significantly to the 
development of “far reaching norms and principles of international 
law.”619 In fact, many African countries have looked up to the ICJ 
as a court of last resort to resolve various conflicts and provide them 
with advisory opinions.620 Through these adjudications, the ICJ has 
contributed significantly to the development of international law and 
has helped many African countries develop an appreciation for the 
 
 
616 See International Criminal Court Probes Burundi “Crimes 
Against Humanity,” BBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-africa-41932291 (noting that Burundi officially withdrew from 
the ICC after “accusing the international court of deliberating targeting 
Africans for prosecution”). 
617 See Hurst Hannum, The UDHR in National and International 
Law, GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 287, 313 (1995) (noting, inter alia, that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the foundation of modern 
international law, particularly international human rights law). 
618 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 104. 
619 Id. 
620 The following African countries have all resorted to the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction to seek resolution of disputes involving them and one or more 
other African States: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, 
Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea (Conakry), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mail, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and 
Western Sahara. See Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 1946–
2018, INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/decisions/ 
all/2015/2018/asc (last visited Dec. 18, 2018). See also T. O. ELIAS, AFRICA 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (Richard Akinjide, 2d 
ed. 1988) (detailing, inter alia, judgments, opinions and orders of the 
International Court of Justice between April 1, 1946 and March 31, 1971). 
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critical role played by international law in the resolution of interstate 
conflicts.621 
As many of them have done with the ICJ decisions, it is hoped 
that African States will “act in good faith with respect to the 
decisions of the African Human Rights Court.”622 The effective 
protection of human rights in Africa requires that (1) African States 
voluntarily accept and respect the authority of the African Court; (2) 
Africans, regardless of their country of citizenship, have confidence 
in the ability of the African Court to deliver justice to victims of 
human rights violations; (3) the authority of the African Court be 
accepted and respected by all Member States and their citizens; and 
(4) Member States use the rulings of the African Court to improve 
their national laws and enhance the protection of human rights. 
VI. THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON  
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The African Commission was created by the Banjul Charter623 
and empowered “to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure 
their protection in Africa.”624 Specifically, the African Commission 
was supposed to “collect documents,” carry out research “on 
African problems in the field of human and peoples’ rights, organize 
seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, 
encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and 
 
 
621 See J. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law 
and the Role of the World Court, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (1989) 
(examining, inter alia, the International Court of Justice (also called the 
World Court) in the development of international law); A. Peter Mutharika, 
The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: An African 
Perspective, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1706, 1713–1714 (1994) (examining, 
inter alia, the influence of the ICJ in Africa). 
622 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 104. 
623 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), 
AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force on October 21, 1986, 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2018). 
624 See id. at art. 30. 
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peoples’ rights,” as well as “[i]nterpret all the provisions of the 
present Charter at the request of a State [P]arty, an institution of the 
OAU or an African Organization recognized by the OAU.”625 
The African Commission was inaugurated on November 2, 
1987626 and consists of “eleven members from amongst African 
personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high 
morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human 
and peoples’ rights; particular consideration being given to persons 
having legal experience.”627 Each member of the African 
Commission is elected to serve a term of six years and is “eligible 
for re-election.”628 Nevertheless, “the term of office of four of the 
members elected at the first election shall terminate after two years 
and the term of office of three others, at the end of four years.”629 
All members of the African Commission are selected by “secret 
ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government,630 from 
a list of persons nominated by the States Parties to the present 
Charter.”631 Individuals nominated to serve on the African 
Commission must be “African personalities of the highest 
 
 
625 See id. at art. 45. 
626 The African Commission’s Rules of Procedure were adopted in 
1988 during its second Ordinary Session, which was held in Dakar, Senegal, 
from February 2 to 13, 1988. The Rules were subsequently amended during 
the African Commission’s eighteenth Ordinary Session, which was held in 
Praia, Cabo Verde, from October 2 to 11, 1995. When the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights was established, the African Commission 
developed and adopted new Rules of Procedure—these were approved by 
the African Commission during its 47th Ordinary Session, which was held 
in Banjul, The Gambia, from May 12 to 26, 2010. These new Rules entered 
into force on August 18, 2010. 
627 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 31. 
628 Id. at art. 36. 
629 Id. 
630 That is, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
Since the demise of the OAU and its replacement by the AU, the job of 
electing Commissioners has passed on to the AU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government. See generally Christof Heyns, The African Regional 
Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 681 
(2004). 
631 See id. Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 33. 
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reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and 
competence in matters of human and peoples’ rights.”632 In 
nominating individuals to serve on the African Commission, States 
Parties are to grant “particular consideration . . . to persons having 
legal experience.”633 Each Commissioner is expected and required 
to “serve in their personal capacity.”634 The African Commission is 
not allowed to have within its ranks at any one time, “more than one 
national of the same [African State].”635 
The African Commission’s functions can be grouped into three 
important categories: (1) to promote human and peoples’ rights;636 
(2) to protect human and peoples’ rights;637 and to interpret all the 
provisions of the Banjul Charter.638 With respect to promotion, the 
African Commission is empowered to “collect documents, 
undertake studies” and carryout research on “African problems in 
the field of human and peoples’ rights, organize seminars, symposia 
and conferences, disseminate information, [and] encourage national 
and local institutions concerned with human and peoples’ rights.”639 
In addition to performing the role of promoting human and peoples’ 
rights, the Banjul Charter is also required “[t]o formulate and lay 
down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating 
to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms upon which 
African Governments may base their legislations.”640 Finally, the 
African Commission is required to “[c]o-operate with other African 
and international institutions concerned with the promotion and 
protection of human and peoples’ rights.”641 
During the last several years, the African Commission, in 
accordance with Article 45(1), has undertaken missions to several 
African countries to “monitor and assess the situation of refugees, 
 
 
632 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 31(1). 
633 Id. 
634 See id. at art. 31(2). 
635 See id. at art. 32. 
636 See id. at art. 45(1). 
637 See id. at art. 45(2). 
638 See id. at art. 45(3). 
639 See id. at art. 45(1)(a). 
640 See id. at art. 45(1)(b). 
641 See id. at art. 45(1)(c). 
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returnees, and displaced persons.”642 The African Commission also 
cooperated with several international organizations, including 
UNESCO, the International Commission of Jurists, the Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and 
the International Observatory of Prisons to cosponsor a number of 
seminars and international conferences.643 For example, the African 
Commission cosponsored conferences/workshops in Lisbon, 
Portugal, November 17–18, 1997 (workshop on the improvement of 
the regional human rights systems); Kadoma, Zimbabwe, November 
24–28, 1997 (International Conference on Community Work)—
with Penal Reform International; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, December 
8–12, 1997 (meeting of government experts on the establishment of 
an African Human and Peoples’ Rights Court); Harare, Zimbabwe, 
January 12–14, 1998 (the African contexts of the rights of the 
child)—with CODESRIA, Redd Barna-Zimbabwe and the Center 
for Family Research of the University of Cambridge; Banjul, The 
Gambia, January 26–28, 1998 (Working Group on additional 
protocol to the African Charter on Women’s Rights)—with the 
African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies and the 
International Commission of Jurists; Dakar, Senegal, February 16–
18, 1998 (International Conference on HIV/AIDS in African 
Prisons)—with the International Observatory of Prisons (OIP); and 
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, March 9–12, 1998 (Regional Seminar on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).644 
The second major function of the African Commission is to 
“[i]nterpret all the provisions of the [Banjul Charter]” anytime a 
 
 
642 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 6; see also O.A.U. Mission to 
Angola, DR Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia, OAU (Apr. 28, 1999), 
https://m.reliefweb.int/report/47578 (detailing the objective of the OAU 
mission to several African countries, which was to “assess the situation on 
the ground and determine to what extent the Organization of African Unity 
can assist these countries, which are affected by [the] exodus of thousands 
of refugees as a result of the on-going war in D.R.C.). 
643 See, e.g., Fatsah Ouguergouz, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 521 (2003) (examining, inter 
alia, some of the conferences sponsored by the African Commission to 
examine ways to improve the human rights situation in Africa). 
644 Id. 
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request is made to the African Commission to do so by “a State 
[P]arty, an institution of the OAU, or an African Organization 
recognized by the OAU.”645 The Banjul Charter provides the 
African Commission specific advice on how to carry out its 
interpretive duties. According to Article 60, “[t]he Commission 
shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ 
rights, particularly from the provisions of various African 
instruments on human and peoples’ rights”646 and other relevant 
international human rights instruments.647 In addition to performing 
its interpretive duties, “in light of international human rights law,”648 
the African Commission must also: 
[T]ake into consideration, as subsidiary measures to 
determine the principles of law, other general or 
specialized international conventions, laying down rules 
expressly recognized by member states of the Organization 
of African Unity, African practices consistent with 
international norms on human and peoples’ rights, customs 
generally accepted as law, general principles of law 
recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and 
doctrine.649 
It is important to note that while the African Commission may 
take into consideration African customary law, it must do so only if 
such law is “consistent with international norms on human and 
peoples’ rights.”650 If the African Commission takes this role 
seriously, it could significantly improve the legal and institutional 
 
 
645 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(3). 
646 See id. at art. 60. 
647 These other international human rights instruments include the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the OAU, the UDHR, as well 
as “other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African 
countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as well as from the 
provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies 
of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are 
members.” See id. 
648 Udombana, supra note 494, at 65–66. 
649 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 61. 
650 Id. 
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environment for the recognition and protection of human rights on 
the continent by making certain that international law, particularly 
international human rights law, serves as an important interpretive 
tool for human rights laws on the continent. 
Finally, the African Commission is empowered with a 
protective mandate to “[e]nsure the protection of human and 
peoples’ rights under the conditions laid down by the [Banjul] 
Charter.”651 The performance of the protective mandate is based on 
communications (i.e., complaints) received from Member States, as 
well as those from other parties, as long as the latter relate “to human 
and peoples’ rights.”652 These other parties that can submit 
communications to the Banjul Charter include individuals and 
NGOs.653 After the African Commission has received a 
communication from a State Party or other source, the Commission 
is required to prepare “a report stating the facts and its findings”654 
and this report is to be transmitted to the “States concerned and 
communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government.”655 At this point, the fate of the report is left entirely 
in the hands and caprices of the Heads of State and Government. 
B. CONSTRAINTS TO THE AFRICAN  
COMMISSION’S EFFECTIVENESS 
Although the Banjul Charter is endowed with broad powers to 
promote and protect human rights, as well as interpret the provisions 
of the Banjul Charter,656 the Commission suffers from several 
structural problems that constrain its ability to perform its functions 
effectively. In addition to the fact that it does not have “any 
enforcement power or remedial authority,”657 the African 
 
 
651 See id. at art. 45(2). 
652 See id. at art. 56. 
653 See id. at arts. 47–51. See also Communications, AFR. COMM’N 
ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/communications/ (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
654 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 52. 
655 See id. 
656 See id. at art. 45(1)–(3). 
657 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66. 
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 




Commission is “handicapped by confidentiality clauses that restrict 
public access to, and awareness of, the Commission’s work.”658 
It has been argued that at the time that the African Commission 
was created, many political elites did not believe that the continent 
was ready for a continental or “supranational judicial institution”659 
and, as a consequence, the African Commission was established, not 
as a full-fledged court but a “quasi-judicial supervisory body.”660 
Kéba Mbaye, who prepared the background notes that were used by 
the experts chosen to work on the draft of the African Charter, stated 
that “[t]he establishment of a Human Rights Court to redress cases 
of violation of human rights [was] not included in the Draft Charter” 
because it was “thought premature to do so at this stage.”661 He went 
on to state that “the idea [was] a good and useful one which could 
be introduced in [the] future by means of an additional protocol to 
the Charter.”662 Hence, the African Commission was never expected 
to function as a judicial body capable of rendering or issuing legally-
binding findings or decisions.663 
There are other issues—the African Commission is unable to 




659 See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the 
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 1994–2004, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2007). 
660 See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 659, at 2. See also the 
introductory notes to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
made by Kéba Mbaye. The notes were prepared by Mbaye for the Meeting 
of Experts in Dakar, Senegal, which took place from November 28 to 
December 8, 1979. The experts were appointed under a decision of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the sixteenth session in 
Monrovia, Liberia. Mbaye’s comments formed part of the background notes 
(“travaux préparatoires”) for the African Charter. The comments are 
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1999, at 65 (Christof Heyns ed., 
2002). 
661 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1999, supra note 660, at 65. 
662 Id. 
663 Id. 
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influence because of its chronic lack of resources.664 And, of course, 
there is the problem of access—that communications must meet 
onerous requirements before they are considered by the African 
Commission makes it extremely difficult for many individuals to 
bring communications before it. 
1. Constraints to Access to the African Commission by 
Individuals 
One of the most important functions of the African Commission 
is to protect “human and peoples’ rights” on the continent and to do 
so “under conditions laid down by the [Banjul] Charter.”665 But, 
what are these “conditions laid down by the [Banjul] Charter”?666 
For example, in order for the African Commission to accept and 
examine communications from private individuals, they (i.e., the 
communications) must fulfill the requirements listed in Article 
56.667 Communications, other than those emanating from States 
Parties, that are sent to the African Commission, will only be 
entertained if (1) the names of the authors are clearly indicated, even 
if the authors “request” or seek “anonymity”;668 (2) the 
communications “[a]re compatible with the Charter of the [OAU] or 
the Banjul [Charter]”;669 (3) the complaints or communications 
“[a]re not written in disparaging or insulting language directed 
against the State concerned and its institutions or to the Organization 
of African Unity”;670 (4) the communications are not based 
exclusively on media reports;671 (5) the communications are 
transmitted to the African Commission only after local remedies 
have been fully exhausted;672 (6) the communications are submitted 
 
 
664 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 66 (noting, inter alia, that the 
lack of resources is contributing to a loss of independence by the African 
Commission). 
665 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(2). 
666 Id. 
667 See id. at art. 56(1)–(7). 
668 See id. at art. 56(1). 
669 See id. at art. 56(2). 
670 See id. at art. 56(3). 
671 See id. at art. 56(4). 
672 See id. at art. 56(5). 
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to the African Commission “within a reasonable period from the 
time local remedies are exhausted”;673 and (7) the communications 
“[d]o not deal with cases which have been settled by these States 
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, or the Charter of the [OAU] or the provisions of the 
[Banjul] Charter.”674 
These requirements, coupled with the fact that the African 
Commission can exclude a communication by a “simple 
majority”675 vote, provide the African Commission with significant 
discretion to determine which communications to accept and 
consider.676 Given the fact that the African Commission is not 
adequately shielded from political manipulation or influence, 
granting it such wide discretion must be considered a major problem 
for the protection of human rights in the continent. 
2. The African Commission Lacks Independent 
Enforcement Power 
It has been argued that the OAU Heads of State and 
Government, afraid that the African Commission could later 
challenge their authority in their respective States, were not eager to 
set up a continental judicial institution that was adequately 
empowered to issue rulings and decisions that could infringe on the 
sovereignty of African States or the ability of national political 
leaders to control what happens within their territorial boundaries. 
Instead, African Heads of State and Government “envisaged” an 
institution whose exclusive function was to promote and not protect 
human rights.677 As argued by Claude E. Welch, Jr., “the OAU 
heads of state were reluctant to grant the [African Commission] a 
significant role in protecting (rather than promoting) human 
 
 
673 See id. at art. 56(6). 
674 See id. at art. 56(7). 
675 See id. at art. 55(2). 
676 See id. 
677 See Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43, 
49 (1992). 
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rights.”678 In fact, the Banjul Charter “does not challenge the basic 
powers of heads of state: governments are only to ‘allow the 
establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions 
entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the [Banjul] Charter.’”679 
In order to ensure that the Banjul Charter was signed and 
ratified by enough States for it to enter into force, only minimal 
obligations were imposed on States Parties.680 For example, the 
Banjul Charter does not explicitly require that each State Party 
submit reports that show the extent to which it is making efforts to 
give effect to the Charter.681 Instead, the Charter merely requires 
that “[e]ach [S]tate [P]arty shall undertake to submit every two 
years, . . . a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a 
view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed by the [Banjul] Charter.”682 In addition, nowhere in the 
Charter is it indicated who or what body or institution is to receive 
the reports, analyze them and take action.683 It has been argued that 
while the Charter “leaves obscure what the African Commission 
should do with petitions [sent to it] and how it should enforce its 
findings,”684 the “vagueness [has] offered the Commission an 
opportunity to define itself.”685 Nevertheless, such vagueness has 
also “placed profound limitations on the range of possible action”686 
that the African Commission can take. 
In addition to the fact that the African Commission’s findings 
“are not legally binding, and the [African] Commission issues 
‘recommendations’ to [S]tate [P]arties rather than ‘orders,’”687 it is 
not empowered to “award damages, restitution or reparations.”688 
 
 
678 See id. 
679 See id. See also Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 26. 
680 See generally Banjul Charter, supra note 93. 
681 Id. 
682 See id. at art. 62. 
683 See generally id. 
684 See Welch, supra note 677, at 49. 
685 Id. 
686 Id. 
687 See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 659, at 2. 
688 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 67. 
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Also, the African Commission does not have the power to 
“condemn” or punish a recalcitrant government or “offending 
State”—it can only “give its views or make recommendations to 
Governments.”689 The African Commission, in its present state, has 
very limited powers and, as a result, there has been a tendency for 
Member States to ignore or totally disregard the African 
Commission’s “recommendations, orders, and pronouncements.”690 
In fact, in its Eleventh Annual Activity Report, the Commission 
noted that the “non-compliance by some States [P]arties with the 
Commission’s recommendations affects its credibility and may 
partly explain that fewer complaints are submitted to it.”691 
It has been argued that after the African Commission has made 
a finding on a communication or complaint, the “African Charter 
and the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission do not deal 
with the fate of [such a communication].”692 As argued by Viljoen 
and Louw, the African Commission “also does not have any follow-
up mechanism or policy in place to monitor state compliance with 
its recommendations.”693 As argued by Eno: 
Unlike other regional and global human rights bodies, the 
[African] Commission has not developed any follow-up 
mechanism to ensure implementation of its 
recommendations. When the OAU(sic) Assembly adopts 
the Commission’s Annual Report, the Commission 
publishes the report and makes no effort to see that the 
recommendations contained therein are implemented. This 
has been very frustrating, especially for the victims who 
have to pursue the execution of the decisions on their own. 
Because there is no pressure from the Commission, states 
 
 
689 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(1)(a). 
690 Udombana, supra note 494, at 67. 
691 Eleventh Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1997–1998, 22nd–23rd Ordinary Session, AFR. 
COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, OAU Doc. DOC/OS/43 (XXIII), 
¶ 38, https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/2048. 
692 Viljoen & Louw, supra note 659, at 3. 
693 Id. 
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have tended to turn a blind eye to the recommendations and 
a deaf ear to the victims’ pleas for compliance.694 
In a 2007 law review article, Frans Viljoen and Lirette Louw 
studied compliance by States Parties to the recommendations of the 
African Commission and concluded that “the most important factors 
predictive of compliance are political, rather than legal” and that 
“[t]he only factor relating to the treaty body itself that shows a 
significant link to improved compliance is its follow-up 
activities.”695 Viljoen and Louw added that the results of their 
investigation provided supporting evidence to “arguments for a fully 
developed and effectively functional follow-up mechanism in the 
secretariat of the Commission, the consistent integration of follow-
up activities into the Commission’s mandate, and the appointment 
of a special rapporteur on follow-up.”696 
On November 29, 2006, at its 40th Ordinary Session in Banjul, 
The Gambia, the African Commission adopted a resolution on the 
importance of the implementation of its recommendations by States 
Parties.697 In that resolution, the African Commission called on all 
States Parties “to respect without delay the recommendations of the 
[African] Commission”698 and to inform the African Commission of 
the “measures taken and/or the obstacles in implementing the 
recommendations of the African Commission within a maximum 
period of ninety (90) days starting from the date of notification of 
the recommendations.”699 
No case better illustrates the fragrant disregard of the 
jurisdiction and recommendations of the African Commission than 
that of the Nigerian environmental and human rights activist and 
 
 
694 See Robert Eno, The Place of the African Commission in the New 
African Dispensation, 11 AFR. SEC. STUD. 63, 67 (2002). 
695 Viljoen & Louw, supra note 659, at 32. 
696 Id. 
697 Resolution on the Importance of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights by States Parties, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, 
ACHPR Res. 97 (XXXX) 06 (Nov. 29, 2006). 
698 Id. ¶ 2. 
699 Id. ¶ 4. 
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leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni Peoples 
(MOSOP), Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his fellow Ogonis.700 Saro-
Wiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights activists were sentenced 
to death by a Special Tribunal for Civil Disturbances, established 
under the Sani Abacha-led military government.701 With regard to 
the case of Saro-Wiwa and his fellow human rights activists, the 
African Commission received communications from several NGOs, 
including International Pen, the Nigerian Constitutional Rights 
Project (CRP),702 Civil Liberties Organization, and Interights.703 
 
 
700 See, e.g., Charles Hoff, Nigeria Executes 9 Activists; World 
Outraged, CNN WORLD NEWS (Nov. 10, 1995), http://www.cnn.com/ 
WORLD/9511/nigeria/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (noting the execution, 
by Nigeria’s military government, of environmental activist and playwright 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, and other Ogoni human rights campaigners, despite 
appeals from various international actors for clemency). 
701 Sani Abacha overthrew the transitional government of Chief 
Ernest Shonekan on November 17, 1993, and ruled Nigeria until his death 
in office in June 1998. See also OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN, NIGERIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY RULE 1966–1999 145 (Praeger 
Publishers 2003) (examining, inter alia, international reactions to the 
hanging, by the Nigerian military government, of human rights activist, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, and his Ogoni compatriots). The tribunal that sentenced Saro-
Wiwa and his fellow Ogoni activists to death was established by the 
September 1994 Special Edit titled “Instrument Constituting the Tribunal 
for the Trial of Offences under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) 
Decree 1987.” See MARY KATE SIMMONS, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND 
PEOPLES ORGANIZATION: YEARBOOK 1995 513 (1996). 
702 The Constitutional Rights Project (Nigeria) is a non-
governmental organization, established in Nigeria to “promote respect for 
human rights and the rule of law in Nigeria.” See Constitutional Rights 
Project Nigeria, SOURCEWATCH, https://www.sourcewatch.org/index. 
php/Constitutional_Rights_Project_Nigeria (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
703 See International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on 
Behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 
Comm. Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998), 
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ACHPR,3ae6b6123.html (last visited Feb. 
18, 2021) [hereinafter International Pen]. The communications (137/94, 
139/94, 154/96, and 161/97) were subsequently joined because they all 
concerned the same subject matter—the arrest, detention, trial, and 
subsequent sentence of Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots to death by a Special 
Tribunal for Civil Disturbances. 
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Communications 137/94 and 139/94 were submitted to the 
African Commission in 1994 before the trial of Saro-Wiwa and the 
other Ogonis began.704 The two communications “alleged that Mr. 
Saro-Wiwa had been detained because of his political work in 
relation to MOSOP.”705 In February 1995, the trial of Saro-Wiwa 
and his fellow Ogoni human rights activists began “before a tribunal 
established under the Civil Disturbances Act”706 and, in June 1995, 
the Constitutional Rights Project sent the African Commission “a 
supplement to its communication, alleging irregularities in the 
conduct of the trial itself: harassment of defense counsel, a military 
officer’s presence at what should have been confidential meetings 
between defendants and their counsel, bribery of witnesses, and 
evidence of bias on the part of the tribunal members themselves.”707 
On October 30 and 31, 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of the 
codefendants were sentenced to death by the Special Tribunal for 
Civil Disturbances.708 Shortly after the death sentences were handed 
down, the Constitutional Rights Project sent the African 
Commission “an emergency supplement to its communication on 
2nd November 1995, asking the African Commission to adopt 
provisional measures to prevent the executions.”709 Subsequently, 
the Secretariat of the African Commission “faxed a Note 
Verbale”710 to the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “invoking 
 
 
704 The communications were sent by the International Pen and the 
Constitutional Rights Project. See International Pen, supra note 703. 
705 See International Pen, supra note 703, ¶ 3. 
706 See id. ¶ 5. The defendants were accused of inciting “members of 
MOSOP to murder four rival Ogoni leaders.” See also id. ¶ 4. 
707 See id. ¶ 6. 
708 See id. ¶ 7. Codefendants Saturday Dobee, Felix Nuate, Nordu 
Eawo, Paul Levura, Daniel Gbokoo, Barinem Kiobel, John Kpunien, and 
Baribor Bera were sentenced to death. The others were acquitted. See id. 
709 See id. 
710 The “note verbale” is “a written official communication used in 
correspondence among States or between States and international 
organizations.” The note verbale is usually “kept in the third person singular 
(‘The Foreign Ministry of . . . presents its compliments to the Embassy 
of . . .”) and is not signed.” The note verbale is used in diplomatic circles to 
 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 




interim measures under revised Rule 111 of the Commission’s Rules 
and Procedures.”711 
In the Note Verbale, the African Commission “pointed out that 
as the case of Mr. Saro-Wiwa and the others was already before the 
Commission, and the government of Nigeria had invited the 
Commission to undertake a mission to the country, during which 
mission the communication would be discussed, the executions 
should be delayed until the Commission had discussed the case with 
the Nigerian authorities.”712 The Government of Nigeria, however, 
did not respond to the African Commission’s correspondences 
before proceeding with the executions.713 
On November 7, 1995, Nigeria’s Provisional Ruling Council 
confirmed the death sentences handed out to Saro-Wiwa and his 
fellow defendants and three days later, on November 10, 1995, all 
the accused persons were executed in secret at a prison in Port 
Harcourt.714 In carrying out the executions, the Nigerian 
government had ignored or disregarded all the correspondences sent 
by the African Commission and the latter’s jurisdiction over this 
important human rights case.715 
On October 31, 1998, the African Commission issued its final 
decision in the case of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his codefendants.716 The 
African Commission held that there had (1) “been a violation of 
Articles 5 and 6 in relation Ken Saro-Wiwa’s detention in 1993 and 
 
 
“raise or field questions or to communicate notification or reply to the note 
verbale sent from the other party.” See Hyun-jin Park, Sovereignty over 
Dokdo as Interpreted and Evaluated from the Korean-Japanese Exchanges 
of Notes Verbales (1952–1965), in CHINESE (TAIWAN) YEARBOOK OF INT’L 
L. & AFFS. 47, 51 (2017). 
711 See International Pen, supra note 703, ¶ 8. The note verbale was 
also sent to the Secretary-General of the OAU, the Special Advisor (Legal) 
to the Head of State, in the Nigerian Ministry of Justice, and the Nigerian 
High Commission in The Gambia, where the African Commission is 
located. 
712 See id. 
713 See id. ¶ 9. 
714 See id. ¶ 10. 
715 See generally id. 
716 See id. 
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his treatment in detention in 1994 and 1995”; (2) “been a violation 
of Article 6 in relation to the detention of all the victims under the 
State Security (Detention of Persons) Act of 1984 and State Security 
(Detention of Persons) Amended Decree No. 14 (1994).”717 The 
African Commission imposed an obligation on the government of 
Nigeria to annul these decrees.718 The African Commission also 
reiterated “its decision on communication 87/93719 that there [had] 
been a violation of Article 7(1)(d)720 and with regard to the 
establishment of the Civil Disturbances Tribunal”721 and that “in 
ignoring this decision, Nigeria [had violated] Article 1722 of the 
[Banjul] Charter.”723 Finally, the African Commission held that the 
Nigerian government had violated Articles 4 and 7(1)(a), (b), (c), 
and (d) in relation to the conduct of the trial and execution of the 
victims”; that there was “a violation of Articles 9(2), 10(1) and 11, 
26, 16”724 and that “ignoring its obligations to institute provisional 
measures, Nigeria [had] violated Article 1” of the Banjul Charter.725 
Another indication of the extent to which African States are 
disregarding their obligations under the Banjul Charter and hence, 
are ignoring the African Commission’s jurisdiction, is their 
lackluster approach to filing the reports required of them under 
 
 
717 See id. at holding. 
718 Id. 
719 87/93 Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lakwot 
and 6 Others) v. Nigeria, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Mar. 
22, 1995), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/comcases/Comm87-93.pdf. 
720 International Pen, supra note 703, at holding; see Banjul Charter, 
supra note 93, at art. 7(1) (article 7(1) of the Banjul Charter states as 
follows: “Every individual has a right to have his cause heard” and this 
includes “(d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial 
court or tribunal.”). 
721 See International Pen, supra note 703, at holding. 
722 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 1 (article 1 of the Banjul 
Charter states that “[t]he Member States of the Organization of African 
Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and 
freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislation 
or other measures to give effect to them.”). 
723 See International Pen, supra note 703, at holding. 
724 See id. 
725 See id. 
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Article 62.726 The reporting system is supposed to keep the African 
Commission informed of the efforts that States Parties are making 
to give effect to the “rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed 
by the [Banjul] Charter.”727 In other words, the reporting system 
under Article 62, if adhered to, can actually enhance the recognition 
and protection of human and peoples’ rights in the continent. 
Unfortunately, over the years, many States Parties have failed to 
provide the African Commission with the necessary reports.728 As 
of 2018, for example, while 12 States “have submitted all their 
Reports (and presented or will present at [the] next Ordinary 
Session),”729 as many as “[twenty] States” are late by at least one 
Report, sixteen States by three or more Reports, and six States have 
not submitted any Reports at all. 
3. The African Commission Lacks Openness and 
Transparency in Its Operations 
Openness and transparency are very important for any 
institution that serves the public. For a continental institution, such 
as the African Commission, openness and transparency in the 
conduct of its business can help (i) minimize actual political 
interference, or the appearance of it, in its activities; (ii) reduce 
corruption and other forms of political manipulation; (iii) help 
stakeholders throughout the continent understand and appreciate 
how the African Commission arrives at its decisions and why; and 
(iv) minimize the distrust that some stakeholders, especially those 
who are likely to get an unfavorable decision from the African 
Commission. Transparency will help these individuals understand 
 
 
726 According to Article 62 of the Banjul Charter, “[e]ach [S]tate 
[P]arty shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the present 
Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken 
with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed by the present Charter.” See Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at 
art. 62. 
727 See id. 
728 See International Pen, supra note 703, at holding. 
729 See State Reports and Concluding Observations, AFR. COMM’N 
ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, https://www.achpr.org/statereportsand 
concludingobservations (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
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how the decisions were made. Free and voluntary acceptance, by the 
people, of the African Commission as part of the collection of 
institutions that safeguards human and peoples’ rights on the 
continent is very important if this institution is to make a significant 
impact on the protection of human and peoples’ rights in Africa. 
While such voluntary acceptance is critical, it is unlikely to take 
place if the African Commission continues to maintain secrecy in its 
operations.  
Openness and transparency, as they relate to the African 
Commission should be understood as “the availability and 
accessibility of relevant information about the functioning of the 
[African Commission].”730 It has been argued that “transparency is 
said to require that ‘holders of public office should be as open as 
possible about all decisions and actions they take.’”731 Regardless 
of how transparency is defined, it is generally agreed that 
“transparent decisions must be clear, integrated into a broader 
context, logical and rational, accessible, truthful and accurate, open 
(involve stakeholders), and accountable.”732 In addition, especially 
for an institution such as the African Commission, “[a] transparent 
decision record should provide enough information to allow an 
interested person to ‘verify claims made’ or otherwise reconstruct 
both the process and rationale for the decision.”733 
Governmental and other national institutions that serve the 
public in African countries are notorious for having extremely high 
levels of corruption, as well as their inability or unwillingness to 
 
 
730 John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and 
Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 295, 316 (2004). 
731 Deidre Curtin & Albert Jacob Meijer, Does Transparency 
Strengthen Legitimacy?, 11 INFO. POLITY 109 (2006) (quoting N. LORD, 
FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, cm 2850, 
HMSO (1995)). 
732 See Christina H. Drew & Timothy L. Nyerges, Transparency of 
Environmental Decision Making: A Case Study of Soil Cleanup Inside the 
Hanford 100 Area, 7 J. RISK RES. 33, 36 (2004). 
733 Id. at 36 (citing LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE 
COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH (2000)). 
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serve the public.734 In fact, in many African countries, civil servants 
are known “to act arbitrarily and capriciously”735 when it comes to 
the distribution or allocation of public services, “favoring those who 
pay them bribes.”736 In these African economies, openness and 
transparency in government communication, for example, can serve 
at the minimum, two important purposes. The first purpose is “to 
ensure that public service providers respect both the positive and 
negative rights of individuals.”737 In addition, “[t]his instrumental 
justification for transparency of public services comes close to 
Bentham’s principle for good governance: ‘The more strictly we are 
watched, the better we behave.’”738 The second purpose “relates 
more directly to democracy theory, which values participation by 
individuals in the decisions that affect them.”739 
Of course, “[t]ransparency is the literal value of accountability, 
the idea that an accountable bureaucrat and organization must 
explain or account for his actions.”740 Perhaps, more importantly, 
especially for the African Commission, “[t]ransparency is most 
important as an instrument for assessing organizational 
performance, a key requirement for all other dimensions of 
accountability.”741 
As mentioned briefly earlier, transparency and openness 
represent an important and critical element of a trustworthy 
government or public institution. Where a public institution 
undertakes its activities in an open and transparent manner, “such an 
 
 
734 See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS 37–80 (2010) (examining, inter alia, the 
pervasiveness of corruption in the African countries). 
735 John Mukum Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth 
Creation and Development in Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 1017 (2013). 
736 Id. 
737 See Lindsay Stirton & Martin Lodge, Transparency Mechanisms: 
Building Publicness into Public Services, 28 J. L. & SOC’Y 471, 476 (2001). 
738 Id. 
739 Id. 
740 See Jonathan G. S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability: 
ICCAN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” 65 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 94, 96 (2005). 
741 Id. 
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approach is likely to garner significant support for [the 
institution].”742 More specifically, benefits from open and 
transparent communication practices by a public institution include 
“increased public support, increased understanding by the public of 
[the institution’s] actions, increased trust, increased compliance 
with [the institution’s] rules and regulations, an increased ability for 
the [institution] to accomplish its [sic] purpose and stronger 
democracy.”743 
In order for the African Commission to achieve transparency 
and openness in its operations, it “must adopt practices that promote 
open information sharing.”744 Such practices should include, at the 
very minimum, efforts to improve and enhance the Commission’s 
relationships with the publics that it serves “through responding to 
public needs, seeking and incorporating feedback and getting 
information out to the public through a variety of channels.”745 Of 
great significance for the African Commission is that openness and 
transparency can minimize the fear that its decisions are the outcome 
of or result from “undue political . . . influence because the [African 
Commission’s decision-making] process is open to the public.”746 
As argued by Fairbanks, Plowman, and Rawlins, openness and 
transparency in communication, especially by public institutions 
and governmental agencies, produces in citizens and other 
stakeholders, “a feeling of trust in [one’s] government [or public 
institution] and the ability to realize a comfort in understanding that 
[one is] being treated equally with others and that the government 
[or public institution] is working in [one’s] best interest.”747 Such 
increased trust in the African Commission can significantly improve 
the chances that victims of human rights violations will seek justice 
at the hands of the African Commission. 
 
 
742 See Mbaku, supra note 735, at 1018. 
743 Jenille Fairbanks et al., Transparency in Government 
Communication, 7 J. PUB. AFF. 23, 33 (2007). 
744 See id. at 33. 
745 See id. Some of these channels include regularly scheduled press 
conferences and press releases, a website on which it provides the public 
with critical and timely information about its operations, etc. 
746 See id. at 28. 
747 See id. at 28–29. 
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For African countries, improving the trust that individuals have 
for their public institutions is very important, especially given the 
fact that since independence, governance in many countries 
throughout the continent has been pervaded by political 
opportunism, opacity in government communication, high levels of 
corruption, and impunity.748 As a consequence, many Africans have 
come to view public institutions, including even those at the regional 
or continental level, as designed primarily to exploit them and 
maximize the interests of politically dominant elites and groups.749 
For the African Commission, then, more openness and transparency 
will enhance the ability of its stakeholders to understand how it 
functions, including how it makes its decisions and why, as well as 
show how relevant the institution is to the protection of their rights. 
That should significantly improve the people’s trust in the institution 
and perhaps, more importantly, enhance the African Commission’s 
legitimacy. 
If the African Commission is interested in significantly 
improving its legitimacy and making itself relevant to the struggle 
against impunity and the protection of human rights in the continent, 
it must consider the following: First, in all its operations, it should 
adopt a policy that values “open, honest and timely” communication 
with all of its relevant stakeholders. The African Commission must 
“avoid the manipulation of information, a process that has become 
part of the survival strategy of many authoritarian regimes 
[including their various agencies] in the continent.”750 Second, all 
persons who communicate or interact with the public on behalf of 
the African Commission must adopt “practices that promote open 
information sharing.”751 Third, the African Commission, while 
taking note of issues of privacy, especially with respect to victims 
of human rights violations, should work closely with its 
commissioners, as well as other staff members, to “create an 
 
 
748 See generally MBAKU, supra note 734 (noting, inter alia, the 
pervasiveness of corruption in post-independence African countries). 
749 See id. 
750 See Fairbanks et al., supra note 743, at 33. 
751 Id. 
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organizational structure that supports [and enhances openness] and 
transparency.”752 
Finally, all individuals who communicate on behalf of the 
African Commission should be provided with enough resources 
(e.g., access to time, staff, and financial resources) so that they can 
perform their functions and carry out their responsibilities fully and 
effectively.753 Of course, it is important to take note of the fact that 
while openness and transparency are important and desirable traits 
of an effective, viable and democratic public institution, the 
organization (here, the African Commission) must be careful not to 
violate the privacy rights of citizens. While it is important that the 
African Commission be empowered and its communicators 
provided with necessary tools to enhance openness and transparency 
in their activities or operations, these individuals should be legally 
constrained in order to make certain that they or their activities do 
not violate the privacy rights of Africans—that is, the people they 
are supposed to serve. 
Unfortunately, the opacity imposed on the African Commission 
by the Banjul Charter has contributed significantly to the 
Commission’s impotence—according to Article 59(1) of the Banjul 
Charter, “[a]ll measures taken within the provisions of the present 
[Chapter] shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide.”754 In 
addition to the fact that the Banjul Charter imposes opacity on the 
African Commission’s activities and operations, it also grants a 
highly political and historically opportunistic group—the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government—the discretion to determine 
“whether to publicize a human rights violation on the part of an 
African State.”755 In other words, the Banjul Charter is trusting 
people, who themselves, are most likely to be violators of human 
rights (i.e., African Heads of State and Government), to be the 
guardians of human rights in the continent. 
 
 
752 Id. at 34. 
753 See id. at 32. 
754 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 59(1) (emphasis added). 
755 Udombana, supra note 494, at 69. 
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Claude E. Welch, Jr., argues, for example, that “[w]idespread 
abuses of human rights have occurred, and continue to occur” in 
Africa and many presidents have been found complicit in these 
human rights violations.756 Historically, slavery, in particular, and 
the atrocities of colonialism, in general, have been two of the most 
important forms of assault on human and peoples’ rights in 
Africa.757 Nevertheless, the abuse of “individual and collective 
rights” in the continent continue to this day; and, as argued by 
Welch, the “[h]armful effects of the periods of slavery, partition, and 
colonial rule have yet to be totally overcome.”758 In addition to the 
fact that post-colonial governments in Africa, “unchecked by civil 
society,”759 have become major threats to human rights, some of 
them (e.g., the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda in 1994; 
Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Sudan) have waged war “on groups of 
their citizens, based on ethnic or ideological differences, or on 
simple lusts for power.”760 In fact, throughout the continent, 
“[c]orrupt, power-hungry leaders remain intransigently in office, 
having hijacked or ignored popular pressures for free, competitive, 
and democratic elections.”761 Unfortunately, it is these 
opportunistic, corrupt, and recalcitrant heads of state that the Banjul 
 
 
756 See WELCH, supra note 123, at 3. 
757 See id. For a discussion on slavery in African, see PAUL E. 
LOVEJOY, TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN 
AFRICA 1 (examining, inter alia, the role of Islam in slavery in Africa from 
the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries). See also SLAVERY IN AFRICA: 
HISTORICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Suzanne Miers & Igor 
Kopytoff eds., 1977) (presenting a series of essays that examine slavery in 
Africa as instrument of marginalization and the degradation of the welfare 
of Africans). For a discussion on atrocities of colonialism, see ADAM 
HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND 
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998) (examining King Leopold’s atrocities 
against Congolese peoples during the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth 
Centuries). 
758 See WELCH, supra note 123, at 3 
759 See id. 
760 See id. 
761 See id. at 3–4. 
2019 PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 137 
 
Charter has entrusted with the job of promoting and enhancing the 
protection of human rights on the continent.762 
According to Article 58(1) of the Banjul Charter, the African 
Commission need not consult the OAU Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government unless it has determined that the complaint in 
question has revealed “the existence of a series of serious or massive 
violations of human and peoples’ rights.”763 If Articles 59(1) and 
58(1) are read together, the extremely restrictive nature of these 
provisions becomes quite evident. In fact, according to Article 
58(1), it is only after the Commission has determined that there is 
“a serious or massive violations of human and peoples’ rights” that 
the Commission “may then request the [African] Commission to 
undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report, 
accompanied by its findings and recommendations.”764 
Since its inauguration on November 2, 1987 in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, the African Commission has interpreted Article 59 of the 
Banjul Charter in an extremely restrictive manner and, as a result, it 
has conducted most of its business “in secret, insulated from public 
scrutiny and awareness.”765 In fact, it was not until 1994 that the 
African Commission first made public its communications and 
decisions.766 As argued by Odinkalu and Christensen, “[t]he 
decision of the [African] Commission in 1994 to [finally] publicize 
the outcome of its consideration of non-state communications, 
including its views and recommendations following such 
consideration, was a watershed in its development.”767 It was only 
 
 
762 These individuals are expected to supervise the institutions, such 
as the African Commission, charged with protecting human and peoples’ 
rights on the continent through their membership in the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government. In addition to the fact that all members of the 
African Commission are to be elected by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, the Commission must perform any task “entrusted to it by 
the Assembly.” See Banjul Charter, supra note 93. 
763 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 58(1). 
764 Id. at art. 58(2). 
765 Udombana, supra note 494, at 70. 
766 See Chidi Anselm Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of Its Non-
State Communication Procedures, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 235, 238 (1998). 
767 Id. at 278. 
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at this time that scholars and other interested parties were able to 
examine and critique the “quality of the [African] Commission’s 
reasoning and decision making” with respect to substantive and 
procedural issues.768 
The inability of the African Commission to carry out its 
operations in an open and transparent manner did not go unnoticed 
by stakeholders, including NGOs, human rights activists, and other 
Africans. For example, during her campaign for President of the 
Republic of Liberia in 1997, candidate Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, “spoke 
the minds of countless Africans”769 when she declared as follows: 
[The Commission] is generally unknown and invisible; it 
is regarded with suspicion by those who do not know of it; 
and ‘as seen from the eyes of a casual observer,’ it is not 
performing. I don’t know of any cases that you [the 
Commission] have resolved related to any of the major 
human rights problems recently affecting our continent.770 
Then candidate for President of Liberia, Sirleaf’s proclamation 
speaks to the failure of the African Commission to maintain an open 
and transparent approach to its activities and to keep the public fully 
informed of its proceedings. It has been argued that “[p]ublicity and 
freedom of information play an important role in the effective 
promotion and protection of human rights.”771 In order to improve 
the political environment for the protection of human rights in the 
continent, “[i]ndividuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and inter-governmental organizations need reliable information to 
 
 
768 Id. See also Seventh Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission, 1993–1994, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, 13th-15th June, 1994 
Tunis, Tunisia, U. OF MINN. HUM. RIGHTS LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/ 
africa/ACHPR2.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
769 See Udombana, supra note 494, at 70. 
770 See FUND FOR PEACE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE 
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, JUNE 24–26, 1991, 
27 (1991). 
771 Magnus Killander, Confidentiality Versus Publicity: Interpreting 
Article 59 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 6 AFR. 
HUM. RIGHTS L.J. 572, 572 (2006). 
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put pressures on [their] governments,”772 as well as inform 
international human rights activists of the state of human rights in 
the continent. With respect to the African Commission, publicity, 
which can be enhanced significantly by openness and transparency 
in the African Commission’s operations, can help significantly 
improve the visibility of the Commission and its activities. 
According to Article 45(1)(a) of the Banjul Charter, one of the 
functions of the African Commission is to “disseminate 
information” through organizing “seminars, symposia and 
conferences,”773 as well as provide the public with the results of its 
activities, especially those involving the violation of human rights. 
Nevertheless, since Sirleaf, who went on to become President of the 
Republic of Liberia, made that statement about opacity in the 
African Commission, the latter has made significant efforts to make 
the results of its proceedings more accessible to the public.774 
For example, in the African Commission’s Second Activity 
Report, the African Commission indicated that it had so far settled 
ten cases but went on to state that “[t]he decisions for the time being, 
remain confidential in conformity with Article 59 of the Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.”775 In the African Commission’s Sixth 
Annual Activity Report, which was adopted by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government in 1993, the African Commission 
mentioned that “[i]n accordance with [A]rticle 59 of the African 
[Banjul] Charter, the details of . . . communications [on Protective 
Activities] are contained in a confidential Annex.”776 Nevertheless, 
after several NGOs that had been meeting prior to the Commission’s 
14th session in December 1993, made a request to the African 




773 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 45(1)(a). 
774 See Killander, supra note 771, at 578. 
775 Second Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, June 13–14, 
1989, ¶ J(b)(31), http://www.achpr.org/activity-reports/2/ (last visited on 
Dec. 26, 2018). 
776 Chapter Six: Sixth Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission 1992–1993, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, ¶ 29, 
https://www.achpr.org/activityreports/viewall?id=6. 
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were given to the NGOs.777 Henceforth, and starting with the 
African Commission’s Seventh Annual Report, which was adopted 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1994,778 the 
African Commission has included, in all its annual reports, the 
decisions that it has taken with regard to communications, a process 
that has significantly improved its outreach to the publics that it 
serves.779 
Nevertheless, when the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government adopted the Twentieth Report of the African 
Commission in June 2006, the Executive Council authorized 
publication of the Report and the Annexes, however, with the 
exception of the Commission’s decision on Zimbabwe. Specifically, 
the Executive Council declared as follows: 
1. ADOPTS and, in conformity with Article 59 [of] the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter), AUTHORIZES the publication of the 20th 
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the Annexes with the 
exception of decision 245 on Zimbabwe; 
2. INVITES Zimbabwe to communicate to the ACHPR, 
within two (2) months following the adoption of this 
decision, its observations on the said decision, and ACHPR 
to submit a report thereon at the next Ordinary Session of 
the Executive Council; 
3. ALSO INVITES Member States to communicate within 
two (2) months following the reception of ACHPR 
notification, their observations on the decisions that 
 
 
777 See Killander, supra note 771, at 578. 
778 Chapter Seven: Seventh Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission 1993–1994, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, 
https://www.achpr.org/activityreports/viewall?id=7. 
779 Id. at Annex VI. 
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ACHPR is to submit to the Executive Council and /or the 
Assembly . . . .780 
At least one scholar questions why the Executive Council of the 
AU is talking of a right to respond, given the fact that States “are 
encouraged to participate [with the African Commission] in the 
process leading up to a decision and their position on admissibility 
and merits are recorded in the decision taken by the 
Commission.”781 
In adopting the 19th Activity Report of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government authorized the publication of the Report and its 
annexes, but exempted the publication of “Resolutions on Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, the Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.”782 The Assembly also 
called upon the African Commission “to ensure that in the future it 
enlists the responses of all States to its Resolutions and Decisions 
before submitting them to the Executive Council and/or the 
Assembly for consideration.”783 
As a consequence of the decision taken by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government on the African Commission’s 
Nineteenth Activity Report, the Commission included, in its next 
activity report (i.e., the Twentieth Activity Report), “resolutions on 
 
 
780 DECISION ON THE ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (ACHPR), AFR. UNION, 2006, Doc. 
EX.CL/Dec. 310(IX), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/ 
4885/EX%20CL%20Dec%20310%20(IX)%20_E.PDF?sequence=1. 
781 See Killander, supra note 771, at 579. 
782 Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the 19th Activity 
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jan. 24, 
2006 ¶ 1. See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, 
No. 245/02, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (May 15, 2006). 
783 Assembly of the African Union, supra note 782, ¶ 3. 
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Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe together with . . . lengthy 
responses from these states.”784 
In Annex II, titled “Report of the Brainstorming Meeting on the 
African Commission,”785 a report was made of discussions on “the 
status, the mandate and independence of the [African 
Commission].”786 The discussions produced the following 
challenges: 
a) incompatibility of Members of the [African 
Commission] in the context of Articles 31 and 38 of the 
African Charter; 
b) Some current Members of the [African Commission] 
hold official positions in their respective State, thereby 
creating a perception of lack of independence. 
c) The effect of Assembly/AU/Decision 101(VI) on the 
preparation and publication of the Annual Activity reports 
under [A]rticles 59 (1) and (3) in relation to the mandate of 
the [African Commission] under Article 45.787 
The discussions also produced the following additional 
challenges to the functioning of the African Commission: 
• Constraints arising out of the insufficiency of 
resources that the African Union provides to the 
[African Commission] for the discharging of its 
mandate under Article 41 of the Charter.  
 
 
784 Killander, supra note 771, at 580. See also EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
OF THE AFRICAN UNION, NINTH ORDINARY SESSION, JUNE 25–29, 2006, 
BANJUL, THE GAMBIA, REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, AFR. UNION, Doc. EX.CL/279(IX), 
https://www.achpr.org/activityreports/viewall?id=20. 
785 Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, supra note 782, at 23 (Annex II). 
786 Id. at 26 (Item 1). 
787 Id. at 26 (Item 1(13)(a)–(c)). 
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• Some State[s] Parties have accused the [African 
Commission] of being too dependent on donor 
funds thereby affecting its independence and 
credibility. 
• The [African Commission] considers that the 
decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the AU during the 
Khartoum Summit needs to be revisited, bearing 
in mind its impact on the publication of its 
decisions and resolutions under the terms of 
Article 59(1) of the Charter, and the independence 
of the [African Commission]. 
• The current number of Members of the [African 
Commission] is insufficient to adequately 
implement its mandate.788 
The Report then went on to make recommendations on how to 
improve and “safeguard the independence and impartiality of [the] 
[African Commission].”789 The following recommendations were 
made: 
a) In order to safeguard the independence and impartiality 
of ACHPR [African Commission], State Parties should 
comply strictly to the AU Eligibility criteria on the 
nomination of candidates and election of members of the 
ACHPR, and not elect candidates holding portfolios and 
positions that might impede their independence as 
Members of the ACHPR. 
b) The AU criteria shall apply to members of the ACHPR, 
whose status shall change after their election. 
 
 
788 Id. at 26. 
789 Id. at 27. 
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c) The AU should provide adequate funding to the ACHPR 
for it to successfully discharge its mandate. 
d) Extra budgetary resources allocated to the ACHPR for 
its activities should be channeled through the African 
Union Commission. 
e) The number of members of the ACHPR should be 
increased from 11 to between 15 or 18 in order to enable 
the institution efficiently discharge its mandate. 
f) The ACHPR should attend the budgetary meetings of the 
AU in order to present and defend its budget. 
g) The AU Commission should ensure that the ACHPR 
takes part effectively in the meetings of the policy organs 
of the AU bearing in mind the AHG/AU 2003 decision in 
Maputo recognized its status as an organ of the AU. 
h) The ACHPR should submit to the AU Commission its 
opinion on the interpretation of Article 59(1) of the Charter 
concerning the publications of its reports. 
i) The ACHPR requests that the Executive Council of 
Ministers recommends the AHG/AU to revisit its decision 
adopted in Khartoum as far as it concerns activities of the 
ACHPR that do not fall within the scope of protection 
mandate of the ACHPR.790 
In the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in 
Africa (Declaration of Principles), adopted by the African 
Commission at its 32nd Session, in October 2002, in Banjul, The 
Gambia,791 it was stated that “[p]ublic bodies hold information not 
 
 
790 Id. at 27 (Annex II). 
791 See Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in 
Africa, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 32nd Session, 
October 17–23, 2002: Banjul, The Gambia, U. OF MINN. HUM. RIGHTS 
LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/achpr/expressionfreedomdec.html. 
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for themselves but as custodians of the public good and everyone 
has a right to access this information, subject only to clearly defined 
rules established by law.”792 Although the expression “public 
bodies” is not defined, it is apparent from the way the expression is 
used throughout the text of the Declaration of Principles that it refers 
to entities that serve the public. Under such a definition, both the 
African Commission and States Parties to the Banjul Charters can 
be considered public bodies and hence, are “custodians of the public 
good”793—the public has the right to access the information that is 
in the possession of these public bodies, subject, of course, “to 
clearly defined rules established by law.”794 The public will need 
that information for at least two important and interrelated reasons: 
first, to check on the activities of those who serve in these public 
institutions, and second, to determine the services that are provided 
by these institutions and the quality of those services—that is, to 
determine the extent to which these institutions are performing their 
functions. The ability of citizens to check on the exercise of 
government and/or public power is “critical for the maintenance of 
the rule of law.”795 
Unfortunately, some States have been trying to weaken the 
African Commission, “curtail its powers,”796 and reduce its capacity 
to interpret the Banjul Charter, as well as promote and protect 
human and peoples’ rights in the continent. Since transitions toward 
democratic governance re-emerged in Africa in the early 1990s, 
many African countries have introduced new “freedom-of-
 
 
792 Id. ¶ IV. 
793 Id. 
794 Id. 
795 John Mukum Mbaku, Providing a Foundation for Wealth 
Creation and Development in Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 959, 995 (2013). As argued by Pina, Torres and Royo, 
“[m]ore information delivered in a more timely fashion to citizens is 
expected to increase the transparency of government and to empower 
citizens to monitor government performance more closely.” Vincente Pina, 
Lourdes Torres & Sonia Royo, Are ICTs Improving Transparency and 
Accountability in the EU Regional and Local Government? An Empirical 
Study, 85 PUB. ADMIN. 449, 450 (2007). 
796 See Killander, supra note 771, at 580. 
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information” laws.797 During the last several decades, as many 
countries in the continent have made efforts to transition to 
democratic governance systems, armed with separation of powers 
and an independent judiciary, it has become evident that the 
deepening and institutionalization of democracy in these countries 
requires openness and transparency in government communication. 
As mentioned earlier, openness and transparency in government 
communication implies that citizens are able to have effective 
access to government information, subject, of course, to necessary 
protections for the individual’s rights of privacy. 
As more African countries transition to democratic governance 
systems and adopt transparent and more open approaches to 
communication, Africans are not likely to expect any less from 
continental public institutions, such as the African Commission. In 
The Mauritius Plan of Action, 1996, the African Commission stated 
that “[t]he lack of informative documentation on the work of the 
African Commission is a problem which needs to be solved 
urgently.”798 Unfortunately, as of 2018, the situation has not 
 
 
797 For example, Nigeria enacted a Freedom of Information Act May 
28, 2011, which was signed as an expansion of Nigeria’s constitution. See 
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 39(1) (providing every person the right 
of freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart ideas and information without interference). See also 
Access to Information Act, 2005, GOV’T OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (July 
19, 2005). It is important to take cognizance of transitions to democratic 
governance that began in Africa during the colonial period when indigenous 
groups launched what, in some colonies, were violent demonstrations for 
the departure of the European colonizers and subsequently, the 
independence of their territories. As argued by Mbaku and Ihonvbere, “the 
popular agitations that began in the continent in the late 1980s and resulted 
in the collapse of many authoritarian regimes, were actually a continuation 
of the struggle started during the colonial period.” See John Mukum Mbaku 
& Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s Political Adjustment 
in the “New” Global Era, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1, 8 (John Mukum 
Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere eds. 2003). 
798 The Mauritius Plan of Action 1996, U. OF MINN. HUM. RIGHTS 
LIBR., http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/mauritius-plan.html. 
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significantly improved.799 Hence, it is important that as Africans 
engage in efforts to fight impunity and improve the environment for 
the protection of human rights, all public agencies and institutions, 
including those at the continental level, be fully clothed with 
openness and transparency, especially as relates to their activities on 
behalf of the public. 
VII. THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON  
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: HAS IT 
IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA? 
Since the early 1990s, there have been many developments in 
Africa that have significantly improved the environment for the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights. First, was 
the demise of the racially-based apartheid system in South Africa 
and the subsequent introduction of a non-racial dispensation in the 
country, undergirded by a progressive constitution.800 Second, many 
of the continent’s dictatorships were dismantled in favor of more 
 
 
799 See The Big Question: What Is the Biggest Impediment to 
Democratic Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa?, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR 
DEMOCRACY (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.ned.org/big-question-biggest-
impediment-democratic-governance-sub-saharan-africa/ (noting, inter alia, 
the demand, by Africans, for more transparency in their institutions). 
800 In addition to the fact that post-apartheid South Africa created, in 
1996, what “is considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the 
world,” the country also has a strong governing process, which is 
undergirded by separation of powers with checks and balances, including 
an independent judiciary and a very robust and politically active civil 
society. See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
55 (2018). See also HENDRICK J. KOTZÉ, THE WORKING DRAFT OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S 1996 CONSTITUTION: ELITE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE 
“OPTIONS” (1996) (providing, inter alia, an overview of the South Africa 
post-apartheid constitution). Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, contains the Bill of Rights. See S. AFR. CONST., First 
Amendment Act of 1997, ch. 2. 
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democratic political dispensations.801 Third, many countries 
adopted constitutions that either acknowledge or incorporate 
provisions of international human rights instruments.802 Fourth, 
when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”) was adopted on July 17, 1998 at Rome, Italy, a significant 
number of its supporters were African States.803 It has been argued 
that the impetus to the overwhelming support of the Rome Statute 
by African countries was the pervasiveness of impunity in the 
continent generally and the Rwandan Genocide, in particular.804 
 
 
801 For example, there were transitions from military dictatorships to 
electoral democracies in Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, and Bénin Republic. Note, 
however, the collapse of some authoritarian regimes was not accompanied 
by a transition to democracy. See Michael Bratton, Deciphering Africa’s 
Divergent Transitions, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 67, 69–93 (1997). For example, in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the collapse of Mobutu Sesse Seko’s 
authoritarian regime did not lead to a transition to a stable democratic 
system. In fact, since 1997, when Mobutu was ousted by Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila, the country has not been able to provide itself with a stable and fully 
functioning democratic system. See William Reno, Congo: From State 
Collapse to ‘Absolutism,’ to State Failure, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 43, 48–52 
(2006). 
802 For example, the Constitution of the Bénin Republic reaffirms the 
country’s “attachment to the principles of democracy and human rights as 
they have been defined by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 . . . .” CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN Dec. 2, 1990, pmbl. 
803 Kurt Mills, “Bashir Is Dividing Us”: Africa and the International 
Criminal Court, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 404, 405 (2012) (noting, inter alia, that 
the first country to sign the Rome Statute was Senegal and that shortly after 
that, many African countries also signed the Rome Statute). 
804 The genocide in Rwanda, which took place in the Spring of 1994, 
was orchestrated and carried out by the Hutu-dominated government and 
resulted in the deaths of nearly one million Tutsi and their Hutu 
sympathizers. See generally LINDA MELVERN, CONSPIRACY TO MURDER: 
THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006) (examining, inter alia, the events leading 
to the Rwandan Genocide and the genocide itself). 
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Fifth, the successful trial and conviction of former dictators 
Charles Taylor805 and Hissène Habré806 have given hope to victims 
of human rights violations that they too may one day be able to get 
justice and that those African leaders who commit atrocities against 
their fellow citizens will no longer be able to escape accountability. 
Finally, African States, working through the OAU, adopted the 
Banjul Charter at the OAU’s 18th Assembly in June 1981 in 
Nairobi, Kenya.807 The Banjul Charter came into effect on October 
21, 1986.808 The job of oversight and interpretation of the Banjul 
Charter was given to the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.809 Below, we take a look at how effective the 
Banjul Charter has been in creating a culture of respect for, and 
promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. 
The Banjul Charter, according to its Preamble, was designed 
“to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights and freedoms 
taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these 
rights and freedoms in Africa.”810 It has been argued, however, that 
the Banjul Charter has some “normative flaws” that make it difficult 
for the Charter to function effectively as a legal instrument for the 
protection of human rights in the continent.811 Patrick-Patel argues 
that while the Banjul Charter has a “strong emphasis on social, 
 
 
805 See THE LAW REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: 
VOL. III: PROSECUTOR V. CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR (THE TAYLOR CASE) 
(Charles Chernor Jalloh & Simon Meisenberg eds. 2015) (examining, inter 
alia, the trial and conviction of former Liberian dictator Charles Taylor by 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
806 See generally CELESTE HICKS, THE TRIAL OF HISSÈNE HABRÉ: 
HOW THE PEOPLE OF CHAD BROUGHT A TYRANT TO JUSTICE (2018) (detailing 
the trial and conviction of former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré by 
Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of Senegal). 
807 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93. 
808 See id. 
809 See id. 
810 Id. at pmbl. 
811 Lucinda Patrick-Patel, The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: How Effective Is This Legal Instrument in Shaping a 
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economic and cultural rights,” its coverage of “civil and political 
rights” is “inadequate.”812 Heyns states that “[t]he civil and political 
rights recognized in the African [Banjul] Charter are in many ways 
similar to those recognized in other international [human rights] 
instruments, and these rights have in practical terms received most 
of the attention of the African Commission.”813 
The Banjul Charter recognizes a series of rights as “individual 
rights” and these are: equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law;814 freedom from discrimination;815 inviolability of the 
human person and the right to life;816 dignity of the human being 
and prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment;817 right to liberty and to the security of his person;818 
the right to a fair trial;819 freedom of conscience;820 right to receive 
information and to express and disseminate one’s opinion;821 
freedom of association;822 right to assemble freely with others;823 
freedom of movement;824 right to freely participate in the political 
system;825 and right to property.826 
Heyns notes that the Banjul Charter makes “no explicit 
reference in the Charter to a right to privacy; the right against forced 
labor is not mentioned by name; and the right to a fair trial and the 




813 Heyns, supra note 630, at 686–87. 
814 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 3. 
815 Id. at art. 2. 
816 Id. at art. 4. 
817 Id. at art. 5. 
818 Id. at art. 6. 
819 Id. at art. 7. 
820 Id. at art. 8. 
821 Id. at art. 9. 
822 Id. at art. 10. 
823 Id. at art. 11. 
824 Id. at art. 12. 
825 Id. at art. 13. 
826 Id. at art. 14. 
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comparison to international standards.”827 The Banjul Charter’s 
coverage of gender issues has also come under attack as wholly 
inadequate and not likely to contribute significantly, especially to 
the protection of women and children.828 For example, no article is 
devoted entirely to the protection of women or children.829 Instead, 
the protection of the rights of women and children is inserted into 
an article that deals with the family.830 According to Article 18(3), 
“[t]he State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination 
against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the 
woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and 
conventions.”831 
Lumping together the protection of the rights of women and 
children “in an article that deals with the family,” argues Heyns, “re-
enforces outdated stereotypes about the proper place and role of 
women in society and has been partially responsible for the drive to 
adopt the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women 
in Africa.”832 In addition, the Banjul Charter does not provide 
“general guidelines on how Charter rights should be limited”833 and 
this is a serious shortcoming because “[a] society in which rights 
cannot be limited will be ungovernable, but it is essential that 
appropriate human rights norms be set for the limitations.”834 
Finally, there is the problem with so-called “claw-back 
clauses.”835 As argued by Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, “[a] claw-back 
 
 
827 Heyns, supra note 630, at 687. Heyns notes that the Banjul 
Charter does not make explicit reference to “the right to a public hearing, 
the right to interpretation, the right against self-incrimination, and the right 
against double jeopardy.” The African Commission, nevertheless, has 
interpreted the Banjul Charter “protection to encompass some of these 
rights.” Id. at n.45. 
828 See generally id. 
829 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 18(1)–(4). 
830 Id. at art. 18(3). 
831 Id. 
832 Heyns, supra note 630, at 687–88. 
833 Id. at 688. 
834 Id. Heyns does note that some articles of the Banjul Charter, 
which set out “specific and political rights do contain limiting provisions 
applicable to those particular rights.” Id. at 688. 
835 Id. 
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clause is one which permits a state, in its almost unbounded 
discretion, to restrict its treaty obligations or rights guaranteed by 
[the] African Charter.”836 Claw-back clauses, argues Bondzie-
Simpson, must be distinguished from “derogation clauses which 
also permit the temporary suspension of treaty obligations.”837 
While derogation clauses are temporary and are usually invoked 
only in situations of public emergencies, “claw-back clauses may be 
applied even in normal [or non-emergency] situations, so long as 
national law is passed to that effect.”838 It is also important to note 
that while derogation clauses provide for the suspension of “only 
certain—but not all—obligations and rights,”839 claw-back clauses 
are not subjected to such limitations. 
Today, many African countries have not yet incorporated the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in various international 
human rights instruments into their constitutions and made them 
part of national law. As a consequence, the various international 
human rights instruments “do not automatically confer justiciable 
rights in national courts.”840 In these countries, national law 
continues to have primacy, even in situations that deal with the 
violation of human rights.841 Thus, it is possible for rights protected 
by international human rights instruments (including the African 
[Banjul] Charter) to be violated in an African country with impunity. 
As argued by Makau Matua, “the most serious flaw in the African 
Charter concerns its ‘clawback’ clauses, which permeate the African 
Charter and permit African states to restrict basic human rights to 
 
 
836 Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, A Critique of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 31 HOW. L. J. 643, 660 (1988). 
837 Id. 
838 Id. 
839 Id. at 660–61. 
840 Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and 
Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights 
Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 103, 108 (2002). 
841 Id. at 151–152. 
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the maximum extent allowed by domestic law.”842 In addition, 
argues Mutua, 
[t]hese clauses are especially significant because domestic 
laws in Africa date from the colonial period and are 
therefore highly repressive and draconian. The 
postcolonial state, like its predecessor, impermissibly and 
contrary to international human rights standards, restricts 
most civil and political rights, particularly those pertaining 
to political participation, free expression, association and 
assembly, movement, and conscience.843 
Consider, for example, the Banjul Charter’s Article 9(2), which 
states as follows: “Every individual shall have the right to express 
and disseminate his opinions within the law.”844 This is an example 
of a claw-back clause—the right in question is only recognized to 
the extent that “such a right is not infringed upon by national 
law.”845 Heyns has argued that if this interpretation is correct, then 
“the claw-back clauses would obviously undermine the whole idea 
of international supervision of domestic law and practices and 
render the [Banjul] Charter meaningless in respect to the rights 
involved.”846 In addition, argues Heyns, “[d]omestic law will, in 
those cases, have to be measured according to domestic standards—
a senseless exercise.”847 
The African Commission has held, in the context of claw-back 
clauses, that “provisions in articles that allow rights to be limited ‘in 
accordance with law,’ should be understood to require such 
limitations to be done in terms of domestic legal provisions, which 
comply with international human rights standards.”848 In 
 
 
842 Makau Mutua, The Construction of the African Human Rights 
System: Prospects and Pitfalls, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING 
FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 143, 146 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison 
eds., 2000). 
843 Id. at 146. 
844 Banjul Charter, supra note 93, at art. 9(2). 
845 Heyns, supra note 630, at 688. 
846 Id. 
847 Id. 
848 Id. at 689. 
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Communications 105/93–128/94–130/94–152/96: Media Rights 
Agenda, Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and 
Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, the African Commission 
held that 
[t]o allow national law to have precedent over the 
international law of the Charter would defeat the purpose 
of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter. 
International human rights standards must always prevail 
over contradictory national law. Any limitation on the 
rights of the Charter must be in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter.849 
It is argued that “[t]hrough this innovative interpretation, the 
Commission has gone a long way towards curing one of the most 
troublesome inherent deficiencies in the [Banjul] Charter.”850 
Nevertheless, to most of the Banjul Charter’s stakeholders, 
particularly those who have not had the opportunity to be exposed 
to the African Commission’s interpretive approach, the Charter 
“will continue to appear to condone infringements of human rights 
norms as long as it is done through domestic law.”851 
A lot still has to be done to improve the effectiveness of the 
system for the recognition and protection of human rights in Africa. 
First, the key to significantly improving the environment for the 
protection of human rights in Africa lies in making certain that 
“international human rights standards must always prevail over 
contradictory national law.”852 With respect to the African [Banjul] 
Charter, “[a]ny limitation on the rights of the Charter must be in 
 
 
849 105/93–128/94–130/94–152/96: Media Rights Agenda, 
Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional 
Rights Project v. Nigeria, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Oct. 
31, 1998) http://www.achpr.org/communications/decision/105.93-128.94-
130.94-152.96/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2018), at ¶ 66. 
850 Heyns, supra note 630, at 689. 
851 Id. 
852 African Human Rights System, GLOB. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
COLUM. UNIV., https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/law-
standards-2/african-human-rights-system/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2021). 
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conformity with the provisions of the Charter.”853 Second, the 
majority of countries in the continent must voluntarily accept and 
respect international human rights instruments and the role that they 
play in advancing the creation of a domestic institutional 
environment that respects and protects human rights. Third, a 
significant number of African countries must make certain that there 
exists, within their jurisdictions, “[a]n adequate level of compliance 
with human rights norms.”854 
Fourth, while a regional human rights system, such as the 
Banjul Charter, is very important and critical to the protection of 
human rights in Africa, the building blocks of an effective regional 
human rights system are actually “[w]orking national human rights 
systems.”855 Without a culture of respect for human rights norms 
within the majority of African countries, the national or domestic 
courts “are not effective in implementing these norms,”856 and it is 
unlikely that any regional or continental human rights system would 
succeed in protecting the rights of Africans. As has been argued by 
some human rights scholars, there must be political will within each 
African country to establish and maintain an effective domestic 
human rights system in order for the regional system to work.857 
Fifth, the regional human rights system as embodied in the 
African Charter, must be seen as the “primary body through which 
peer pressure”858 can be put on States Parties to live up to the ideals 
of the African Charter; especially regarding the protection of human 
rights. States Parties are responsible for selecting Commissioners to 
serve on the African Commission and judges to serve on the African 
Court.859 Thus, African countries must take this job seriously and 
make sure that the process is not politicized and that only individuals 
 
 
853 Id. ¶ 66. 
854 Heyns, supra note 630, at 700. 
855 Id. 
856 Id. 
857 See id. at 701. 
858 See id. 
859 See id. 
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who possess the necessary skills860 to perform the job of a 
commissioner or judge are selected. 
Sixth, availability of adequate financial resources is often a 
source of insecurity for many human rights organizations. Without 
financial independence, the entities—in the case of the African 
Commission, States Parties—that provide the necessary financial 
resources for the human rights organization can have significant 
influence on the organization and manipulate its activities and the 
outcome of its deliberations. 
Seventh, openness and transparency in the organization’s 
communication is very important for its effectiveness. For the 
African Commission, it is important that its “decisions and 
resolutions” be made available to all stakeholders.861 Although 
“[p]eer pressure can change behavior by inducing shame, or if that 
does not work, by mobilizing stronger forms of sanctions against 
states,”862 this is only possible when and if “there is sufficient 
publicity.”863 The responsibility to make certain that the African 
Commission operates in an open and transparent manner lies, not 
just with the Commission alone, but also with civil society and their 
organizations in all States Parties, as well as the governments of the 
States Parties.864 
Eighth, there must be an effective mechanism through which 
recalcitrant and non-performing States Parties—that is, those that do 
not adhere to the provisions of the Banjul Charter—can be 
disciplined. For example, in order for “shame or peer pressure” to 
be mobilized effectively against recalcitrant States Parties, there 
must exist proper links—for example, trade, travel, as well as 
cultural and educational exchanges, and diplomatic contacts and 
communication—between States Parties; otherwise, it would not be 
 
 
860 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, AFR. COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, at art. 11(1), (June 10, 
1998), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/protocol-africancourt.pdf. 
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possible to effectively and fully impose sanctions to force change in 
the behavior of States Parties.865 
Finally, “[t]he independence, creativity, and wisdom of those 
who run the [human rights] system are absolutely crucial”866 to the 
process of enhancing the protection of human rights on the 
continent. With respect to the African Commission, these 
individuals include the “Commissioners (and judges) and the staff 
of the Commission (and Court), as well as the officials of the 
regional organization.”867 
Heyns has argued that rather than continue to create additional 
organizations and mechanisms for the protection of human rights in 
the continent, efforts should be directed at “getting the mechanism 
created by the African Charter, the African Commission, to function 
properly.”868 Heyns states further that while “[i]n themselves all of 
these mechanisms could be a viable starting point [for bringing 
about an effective mechanism for the protection of human rights in 
the continent], . . . the current proliferation of mechanisms means 
that there is a lack of focus of resources and effort, with the result 
that none of them might be in a position to make any difference.”869 
Along these lines, those who are genuinely interested in promoting 
and protecting human rights in Africa should devote their efforts, 
not into creating new mechanisms, but into strengthening the 
African Charter, the African Commission, and the African Court, so 
that they can serve effectively as mechanisms for the promotion and 







869 Id. at 702. 
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VIII. IMMUNITY FOR AFRICAN LEADERS AND THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
IN THE CONTINENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An important and “fundamental tenet of modern 
constitutionalism and an offshoot of its core principle of 
constitutional supremacy is that nobody, regardless of his [or her] 
status, is above the law.”870 Fombad and Nwauche argue that the 
very concept of “constitutionalism proceeds from an assumption of 
human fallibility, the corrupting influence of power and the need to 
limit it.”871 This is the element of the rule of law generally referred 
to as the “supremacy of law.”872 Within such a legal and judicial 
system, “the law is superior, applies equally, is known and 
predictable, and is administered through a separation of powers.”873 
Most importantly, “[t]he law is superior to all members of society, 
including government officials vested with either executive, 
legislative, or judicial power.”874 Thus, the law treats all citizens, 
regardless of their political and economic standing as beings “who 
are bound to obey and act in accordance with the law.”875 
Due to the fact that the decolonization project in many colonies 
in Africa was “undertaken reluctantly and opportunistically,”876 
there was a failure to “fully and effectively transform the critical 
domains—that is, the political, administrative, and judicial 
foundations of the state”877 and produce more effective institutional 
 
 
870 Charles Manga Fombad & Enyinna Nwauche, Africa’s Imperial 
Presidents: Immunity, Impunity and Accountability, 5 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 
91, 93 (2012). 
871 Id. at 93. 
872 Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 293, 296 (2009). 
873 Id. at 301. 
874 Id. at 302. 
875 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93. 
876 JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
8 (2018). 
877 Id. 
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arrangements for post-independence governance. As a consequence, 
many of the new countries that emerged from European colonialism 
in the 1950s and 1960s in Africa failed to “design [and adopt] 
constitutions that promote constitutionalism by incorporating most 
of the core elements of modern constitutionalism such as separation 
of powers, judicial independence and Bill of Rights.”878 Since the 
early 1990s, many African countries have either revised their 
constitutions or adopted new ones in an effort to promote 
constitutionalism and constitutional government.879  
On December 17, 2010, Tunisian street vendor Tarek el-Tayeb 
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest his humiliation by 
government regulators.880 His self-immolation provided the impetus 
for the Tunisian Revolution that led to the ousting of dictator Zine 
el-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011.881 Bouazizi’s death also 
inspired the wider Arab Spring, which resulted in the ouster of many 
autocratic regimes in various countries in North Africa and the 
 
 
878 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93. 
879 New or revised constitutions were produced in Nigeria (1999, to 
introduce a new post-military government); Cameroon (1996, to introduce 
the separation of powers); Republic of South Africa (1996, to bring to an 
end the racially-based apartheid system and introduce a non-racial 
democratic system); Zambia (1991, to bring to an end one-party rule and 
introduce multi-party politics); Ghana (1992, to bring to an end military rule 
and introduce democratic governance); and Kenya (2010, to introduce 
separation of powers, with an independent judiciary, as well devolve powers 
to the regions); and Côte d’Ivoire (2016, to introduce a new citizenship law). 
880 See Mohamed Bouazizi, Tunisian Street Vendor and Protestor, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/ 
biography/Mohamed-Bouazizi. 
881 See id. 
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Middle East.882 By the end of 2011, autocratic leaders in Egypt,883 
Libya,884 and Tunisia885 had been ousted. 
During the last three decades, African countries have made 
efforts to improve their national governance systems. These 
institutional reforms have included the provision of new or revised 
constitutions. Unfortunately, many of these new or updated 
instruments, like Cameroon’s 1996 constitution,886 pay only “lip 
service to separation of powers.”887 As argued by Fombad and 
Nwauche, many of these new constitutions, especially in the 
Francophone African countries, have not been able to effectively 
constrain political elites, allowing them to continue to act above the 
 
 
882 See Thessa Lageman, Mohamed Bouazizi: Was the Arab Spring 
Worth Dying For?, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/ 
news/2015/12/mohamed-bouazizi-arab-spring-worth-dying-15122809374 
3375.html. 
883 See generally WAEL GHONIM, REVOLUTION 2.0: THE POWER OF 
THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN THE PEOPLE IN POWER: A MEMOIR (2012) 
(examining, inter alia, the revolution that ousted Egyptian dictator Hosni 
Mubarak in 2011). 
884 See generally ALISON PARGETER, LIBYA: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
QADAFFI (2012) (examining, inter alia, Qadaffi’s rise to power and his 
violent fall in 2011). 
885 See generally THE MAKING OF THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION: 
CONTEXTS, ARCHITECTS, PROSPECTS (Nouri Gana ed. 2013) (presenting a 
series of essays that examines the Tunisian Revolution and the demise of 
the regime of dictator Ben Ali). 
886 The Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1996 is officially 
known as “Law No. 96–06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution 
of 2 June 1972.” Although this constitution made allowance for the 
separation of powers, with an independent judiciary, Article 37(3) grants 
the President of the Republic the power to guarantee the independence of 
the judiciary. See id. at art. 37(3). Fombad argues that the reality in 
Cameroon is that the President of the Republic continues to “appoint, 
transfer, dismiss, suspend and can interfere with the so-called judicial power 
with no constitutional provisions to control and ensure that this is done in a 
fair, rational, objective and predictable manner.” Charles Manga Fombad, 
Judicial Power in Cameroon’s Amended Constitution of 18 January 1996, 
9 LESOTHO L.J. 1, 9 (1996). 
887 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93. 
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law.888 In addition to the fact that many African countries still have 
“overbearing and ‘imperial’ presidents [that] continue to reign and 
dominate the legislature as well as to control the judiciary,”889 
governance systems in these countries also do not have “traditional 
checks and balances,”890 such as strong, robust, and politically 
active civil societies, a free press, and truly independent 
judiciaries.891 
Despite the significant constitutional reforms that have taken 
place in many countries on the continent, “[t]he imbalance in power 
among the three branches of government”892 has emerged as a major 
challenge to governance, especially since it has a significant 
negative impact on the independence of the judiciary. Given the fact 
that the judiciary in these countries is often called upon to adjudicate 
disputes emanating from elections, as well as situations involving 
political and bureaucratic corruption, and various forms of abuse of 
power, it is very important that the judiciary be independent from 
the other branches of government. Fombad and Nwauche argue that 
“[e]xecutive lawlessness has become very common in countries 
such as Cameroon, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria[,] and 
Zimbabwe.”893 In these countries human rights are routinely 






891 See generally Constitutional Coups, supra note 72, at 181 
(arguing, inter alia, that “a robust civil society is critical for the maintenance 
of a fully functioning democratic system”). 
892 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 93. 
893 Id. 
894 For example, in Cameroon in late 2016, teachers and lawyers in 
the Anglophone Regions engaged in peaceful demonstrations against the 
Francophone-dominated central government because of the latter’s efforts 
to destroy Anglo-Saxon institutions, and then impose the French language 
and institutions (including French Civil law) on the Anglophones. The 
central government responded with extreme violence by killing 
Anglophones and burning down their villages. In fact, the international 
press has referred to the activities of government security forces in the 
Anglophone Regions as genocide. See, e.g., Zongo, supra note 279. 
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What has been the source of this executive political dominance 
and abuse of power? First, there is the “hegemonic influence of . . . 
dominant [political] parties, which are often effectively controlled 
by the president and a small inner circle of cohorts.”895 Second, 
throughout many countries in the continent national constitutions 
have not been able to effectively constrain political elites, including 
executives, making it possible for presidents to commit atrocities 
against citizens with impunity.896 Third, several African presidents 
have been granted immunity from prosecution for crimes committed 
while in office, allowing them to escape being held accountable for 
their crimes.897 For example, in 2008, Cameroon amended its 
constitution to allow incumbent President of the Republic, Paul 
Biya, to run for another term in office, and to grant him immunity 
from prosecution for crimes committed while in office.898 The 
relevant section of the constitution is Article 53(3) which states as 
follows: “Les actes accomplis par le président de la République . . . 
 
 
895 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94. For example, in 
Cameroon, the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement 
(CPDM), which came into being in 1966 as the Cameroon National Union 
(CNU) and changed its name to the CPDM in 1985, has dominated 
governance in Cameroon since 1966. Even after multiparty politics returned 
to the country in 1990 and many opposition parties emerged to challenge 
the CPDM’s hegemonic control of the political system, the CPDM, which 
is headed by President of the Republic, Paul Biya, has remained in firm 
control of the National Assembly. After the 2013 legislative elections, the 
distribution of seats in the 180-seat lower chamber of the Parliament of 
Cameroon—the National Assembly (l’Assemblée nationale) are as follows: 
CPDM (142); eight opposition parties (34); and 4 seats are vacant. The next 
legislative election is scheduled for 2019. See Republic of Cameroon, 
Election for Assemblée [n]ationale (Cameroonian National Assembly), 
ELECTION GUIDE: DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE & ELECTIONS NEWS (Sept. 30, 
2013), http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/557/. 
896 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94. 
897 Id.; see also H. Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in 
Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial Presidency 
in Post-authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 761 (2008). 
898 Constitutional Coups, supra note 72, at 157. 
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sont couverts par l’immunité et ne sauraient engager sa 
responsabilité à l’issue de son mandat.”899 
Finally, the constitutions of many African countries, 
particularly those of the Francophone countries, have conferred 
“extensive powers”900 on presidents, and in “the absence of effective 
checks on the exercise of these powers,”901 it has become extremely 
difficult for these countries to deepen their democracies and 
entrench a “culture of constitutionalism.”902 As a consequence, the 
violation of human rights remains a major governance challenge in 
many countries throughout the continent. 
Except for a few countries, such as South Africa and Ghana,903 
many of the constitutions that African countries adopted in the post-
 
 
899 Loi no 2008–1 du 14 avril 2008 modifiant et complétant certaines 
dispositions de la loi no 96–6 du 18 janvier 1996 portant révision de la 
Constitution du 2 juin 1972 (Law No. 2008–1 of 14 April 2008 to amend 
and supplement some provisions of Law No. 96–6 of 18 January 1996 to 
amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972), art. 53(3) (Apr. 21, 2008) 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_202302.pdf. The article says that 
“Acts committed by the President of the Republic . . . shall be covered by 
immunity and he shall not be held accountable for them after the end of his 
mandate.” Id. 
900 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94. 
901 Id. 
902 Id. 
903 Both the South African and Ghanaian governance systems have 
shown a significant level of resilience. With respect to South Africa, the 
courts have shown a significant level of independence, ruling against the 
government in several cases. For example, when the government of 
President Jacob Zuma withdrew the country from the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the North Gauteng High Court ruled 
that the withdrawal had been unconstitutional since it was undertaken 
without prior parliamentary approval. See South Africa Court Rules Against 
ICC Pullout Plan, FRANCE 24 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.france24. 
com/en/20170222-south-africa-court-rules-against-icc-pullout-plan. After 
the ruling, the government complied with the court decision and revoked 
their withdrawal from the ICC. See Norimitsu Onishi, South Africa Reverses 
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1990s period have not been able to fully constrain national leaders, 
especially Presidents. As a consequence, many Presidents in these 
countries “still consider themselves above the law”904 and act 
accordingly. Unless Africans can get rid of these presidential 
immunities and provide themselves with institutional arrangements 
that adequately constrain civil servants and political elites, impunity, 
and consequently the abuse of human rights, will remain a major 
problem for the continent. 
B. THE UNCONSTRAINED PRESIDENT  
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
In the early years of the American Republic, the founders 
considered the legislature as the most “dangerous branch” of 
government and the one most likely to trample on the rights of 
citizens.905 As a consequence, the founding fathers introduced 
bicameralism as one of the most important ways to check on the 
exercise of government power.906 At independence, many African 
 
 
Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/south-africa-icc-
withdrawal.html. With respect to Ghana, the country has enjoyed peaceful 
and constitutional regime changes since the end of military rule and the 
transition to democracy in 1993. For example, in the country’s presidential 
election in December 2016, incumbent President John Dramani Mahama 
lost to opposition candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo. Unlike presidential 
candidates in countries, such as Kenya and The Gambia, President Mahama 
accepted his loss and allowed the transition to proceed. Perhaps, more 
important is the fact that President Mahama asked his supporters not to 
engage in violent protest but to accept the loss and allow the transition to 
proceed smoothly and peacefully. See John Mukum Mbaku, The Ghanaian 
Elections: 2016, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.brookings. 
edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/12/15/the-ghanaian-elections-2016/. Of 
course, the governance situation in both Ghana and South Africa is not 
ideal—corruption remains a problem in both countries. Perhaps, more 
important is the fact that the abuse of human rights remains a major 
governance problem for both countries. 
904 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 94. 
905 Judith A. Best, Fundamental Rights and the Structure of 
Government, in THE FRAMERS & FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 37, 48 (1992). 
906 MBAKU, supra note 800, at 139. 
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countries adopted constitutions that created imperial 
presidencies.907 As argued by Mbaku, “these were executive 
branches with relatively unchecked power, which effectively turned 
the presidency into a monarchy—with relatively weak legislative 
assemblies.”908 Thus, in many African countries “the dangerous 
branch of government was the executive because it had absolute 
control over the legislature and the judiciary—some scholars call 
these presidencies ‘reinforced’ and they are characterized by 
extraordinary abuses of power.”909 
Since the early 1990s, many African countries have engaged in 
institutional reforms to improve their governance systems. These 
reforms have included revising or amending their constitutions or 
creating new ones. Many of these countries now have constitutions 
that provide for the separation of powers with three separate 
branches of government—executive, legislative and judicial. 
Nevertheless, as argued by Mbaku, “in many of these countries, the 
separation of powers is simply an abstract constitutional construct 
that does not have any practical application.”910 The reality in many 
of these countries is that “the executive dominates and controls the 
other two branches”911 of government. The institutional reforms that 
have taken place in the African countries since the early 1990s were 
supposed to deal with the continent’s extremely “powerful, 
domineering[,] and overbearing” presidencies.912 
In developed and advanced democracies,913 the constitution 
grants the president “the sole repository of executive power to 
ensure that there is no confusion as to who bears ultimate 
responsibility for executive decisions.”914 In these countries, there 
exist “strong checks and balances,” which are reinforced by “a 
history, culture, custom and tradition of constitutionalism[,] and 
 
 
907 See, e.g., Prempeh, supra note 897. 
908 MBAKU, supra note 800, at 139. 
909 Id.; see also LeVine, supra note 179. 
910 MBAKU, supra note 800, at 137. 
911 Id. 
912 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 95. 
913 For example, the United States and France. 
914 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 95. 
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respect for the rule of law.”915 Such an institutional setup ensures 
that the executive branch “does not overshadow and dominate other 
branches of government.”916 These advanced democracies 
developed checks and balances, as well as a culture of adherence to 
the rule of law, over many years.917 In addition to the fact that many 
African countries do not have “a history or long practice of 
constitutionalism to back the Constitution, the written text remains 
the basis for any form of control that needs to be exercised to check 
the abuse of the enormous powers that these constitutions confer on 
presidents.”918 
These extremely powerful African presidents “rule and reign 
supreme directly or indirectly through other members of the 
executive branch and the ruling party which they control, and 
sometimes, even express disdain for the Constitution.”919 As argued 
by LeVine, in many African countries a constitution “became 
simply another instrument of rule if not discarded altogether”920 and 
that “[m]any a replacement was simply octroyé, ‘handed down from 
on high,’ or cobbled together by a compliant constitution-making 
conference or convention, and then adopted by a ‘controlled 
plebiscite.’”921 
Although many of Africa’s constitutions currently provide 
some form of separation of powers, which, as in the Constitution of 
 
 
915 Id. Some of these checks include an independent judiciary, a 
bicameral legislature. In the United States, for example, the national 
legislature is made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives, with 
each chamber exercising an absolute veto over legislation enacted by the 
other. See Best, supra note 905. 




920 LeVine, supra note 179, at 188. 
921 Id. Fombad and Nwauche note that, in 2006, Jacob Zuma, who 
later became President of the Republic of South Africa (May 9, 2009 to Feb. 
14, 2018), declared that “the ANC [the ruling party] is more important than 
even the Constitution of the country.” See Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 
870, at 5 n.9. See also DA: Zille: The Retreat of Constitutionalism, POLITY 
(July 22, 2008), http://www.polity.org.za/article/da-zille-the-retreat-of-
constitutionalism-22072008-2008-07-22. 
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the Republic of Kenya 922 and the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa,923 allows for some level of check over executive abuse 
of power, most of the continent’s Francophone countries remain 
saddled with de Gaulle’s constitutional model—that of the French 
Fifth Republic.924 The Gaullist constitutional model, adopted by all 
former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, except Guinea, 
provides for “an overbearing president who dominates the 
legislature and controls the judiciary.”925 
An example of this executive control of the other branches of 
government can be found in the Constitution of the Republic of 
Cameroon, which states in Article 37(2) that “[j]udicial power shall 
be independent of the executive and legislative powers.”926 
Nevertheless, in paragraph 3 of the same Article, the President of 
the Republic is granted the power to guarantee the independence of 
the judiciary—“[t]he President of the Republic shall guarantee the 
independence of judicial power.”927 This indicates, without 
question, that the judiciary and the executive are not co-equal 
branches of government. Although the Francophone African 
countries also participated in the institutional and constitutional 
reform exercises that pervaded African countries in the aftermath of 
the Cold War and made efforts to reform their Gaullist constitutional 
model, the imperial presidency remains a critical part of the 
governance architecture of these countries. These imperial 
presidencies remain a threat to governance generally and to the 
protection of human rights in particular. 
 
 
922 See Hanibal Goitom, National Parliaments: Kenya, L. LIBR. OF 
CONG. 1 (Feb. 2017), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-parliaments 
/pdf/kenya.pdf. 
923 See Who We Are, PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/who-we-are (last visited Mar. 2, 2021); 
Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 95. 
924 See Who We Are, supra note 923; see also Fombad & Nwauche, 
supra note 870, at 95. 
925 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 96. 
926 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, Jan. 18, 1996, art. 
37(2) (amended 2008). 
927 Id. at art. 37(3). 
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1. Presidential Immunities and Human Rights Protection in 
Africa 
In modern Africa, the functions and powers of the president are 
defined and delineated by the constitution. As in other sovereign 
states, the African president is empowered by the constitution as the 
“sole repository of executive power.”928 It is argued that given the 
“huge and exacting nature of [presidential] responsibilities, most 
[African] constitutions have granted [the president] immunity in 
absolute or qualified form to enable him to discharge his duties with 
as much freedom as possible.”929 First, if a president is subject to 
being sued while he or she is in office, it is argued, the adjudication 
process can emerge as “a serious distraction of the president’s 
attention to his public duties.”930 Second, the “fear of attracting 
liability,”931 argue some legal and constitutional scholars, may force 
the president to shy away from fully exercising his or her discretion, 
and hence, he or she may not be able to perform his or her public 
duties fully and effectively.932 
Third, immunity is expected or intended to protect not just the 
president personally but also the “dignity of the office.”933 Fourth, 
given the fact that the president makes decisions “on matters that are 
far-reaching, sensitive and sometimes likely to arouse intense 
feelings,”934 it is “in the public interest”935 and to the benefit of the 
country as a whole that the president can act in “a confident, skillful 
and decisive manner without the fear that a disgruntled citizen may 
sue him.”936 But, can immunity allow the president to perform his 
official duties without being distracted by the fear of being sued and 
dragged to court and do so without placing the same president above 
the law? For, if the president considers himself or herself above the 
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law, he or she may engage in activities that violate the rights of 
citizens. In the following section, we shall examine some 
presidential immunities in African constitutions and see the extent 
to which these may be contributing to human rights violations in the 
continent. 
2. Absolute Immunity Provisions in African Constitutions 
and Human Rights 
The “absolute immunity clauses” in African constitutions grant 
the president or the country’s executive “absolute immunity from 
both civil and criminal proceedings.”937 Consider, for example, 
§50(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho: 
Whilst any person holds the office of King, he shall be 
entitled to immunity from suit and legal process in any civil 
cause in respect of all things done or omitted to be done by 
him in his private capacity and to immunity from criminal 
proceedings in respect of all things done or omitted to be 
done by him either in his official capacity or in his private 
capacity.938 
Under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the king 
cannot be held legally accountable for his acts or omissions, whether 
undertaken in his private or public capacity.939 The Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Swaziland also provides another example of 
absolute immunity.940 According to Article 11, “The King and 
iNgwenyama shall be immune from (a) suit or legal process in any 
cause in respect of all things done or omitted to be done by him; and 
 
 
937 Id. at 11. 
938 CONSTITUTION OF LESOTHO (1993), art. 50(1) (amended 2004). 
939 Id. at art. 50(1)–(5). 
940 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND (2005), art. 11. In 
2018, King Mswati III renamed the country “the Kingdom of eSwatini.” See 
BBC, Swaziland King Renames Country the Kingdom of eSwatini, BBC 
NEWS, April 19, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43821512. 
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(b) being summoned to appear as a witness in any civil or criminal 
proceeding.”941 
Fombad has argued that despite the constitutional reforms that 
took place in the Kingdom of Swaziland in 2005, which produced a 
new constitution that “contains many progressive ideas,”942 the 
same constitution has retained “many of the features that have drawn 
international attention to the excesses of the absolute and 
authoritarian powers of the Swazi King.”943 Thus, “[d]espite [the 
new constitution’s] veneer of constitutionalism and constitutional 
legitimacy, the new Constitution does little to protect the Swazis 
against the excesses of the authoritarian tendencies and practices of 
[the] King and his officials.”944 Contrary to popular expectations, 
the 2005 Constitution of Swaziland did not bring about a democratic 
order to the country, nor did it establish a “functioning constitutional 
monarchy;”945 instead, the kingdom remains saddled with a 
governance system in which the king retains absolute and 
unchecked power. Also, the Swazi constitution provides what 
appears to be a separation of powers.946 In reality, however, the king 
wields enormous powers and “clearly controls and dominates the 
executive, the legislature[,] and the judiciary.”947 For example, the 
constitution allows the king to appoint the prime minister and 
 
 
941 Id. The “iNgwenyama” is the title of the male ruler or King of 
Eswatini. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: 
CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 45 
(1996). 
942 Charles Manga Fombad, The Swaziland Constitution of 2005: 
Can Absolutism Be Reconciled with Modern Constitutionalism?, 23 S. AFR. 




946 Chapter VI (§§ 64–78) of the Swazi Constitution deals with 
executive powers; Chapter VII (§§ 79–131) deals with the legislature; and 
Chapter VIII (§§ 138–161) deals with judiciary power. See CONSTITUTION 
OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND (2005). 
947 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 105. 
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cabinet ministers,948 many of the members of parliament,949 officers 
of the judiciary,950 and other senior members of the bureaucracy.951 
Although the constitution requires that the king consult his 
advisory council before he appoints the prime minister, the 
constitution does not state his absolute power in clear and 
unambiguous terms. Instead, it states in § 65(4) that, “where the 
King is required by the Constitution to exercise any function after 
consultation with any person or authority, the King may or may not 
exercise that function following that consultation.”952 The king is, 
in reality, not under any obligation either to consult anybody or 
authority or, if he consults, to act on any advice received.953 
Unlike the Swazi Kingdom, the Kingdom of Lesotho is a 
constitutional monarchy. According to § 44(1) of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho constitution, “there shall be a King of Lesotho who shall be 
a constitutional monarch and Head of State.”954 As explained by 
Fombad and Nwauche, the King of Lesotho, as a constitutional 
monarch, is less likely than the Swazi King “to engage in any 
activities that could incur liability.”955 According to Human Rights 
Watch: 
Swaziland, ruled by absolute monarch King Mswati III 
since 1986, continued to repress political dissent and 
disregard human rights and rule of law principles in 2016. 
Political parties remain banned, as they have been since 
1973; the independence of the judiciary is severely 
compromised; and repressive laws continued to be used to 
 
 
948 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND (2005), art. 11. 
949 Id. at art. 4(3), 95(1)(b). 
950 Id. at art. 153(1). 
951 See id. (§ 188(2) for the appointment of ambassadors; § 191(5) 
for the appointment of the army commander and other commanders; 
§ 190(4) for the appointment of the commissioner of correctional services; 
§ 161(2) for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and 
§ 207(2) for the appointment of the Auditor-General). 
952 Id. at art. 65(4). 
953 Id. 
954 CONSTITUTION OF LESOTHO (1993), § 44(1). 
955 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 102. 
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target critics of the government and the king despite the 
2005 Swaziland Constitution guaranteeing basic rights.956 
3. Qualified Presidential Immunities 
Several African constitutions, particularly those of the 
continent’s Anglophone countries, contain clauses that provide 
qualified presidential immunities for criminal liability. An example 
can be found in the Constitution of Botswana: 
Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the 
office of President[,] no criminal proceedings shall be 
instituted or continued against him or her in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done by him or her[,] either 
in his or her official capacity or in his or her private 
capacity.957 
Legal and constitutional scholars have argued that this 
provision is so broad that it could allow a sitting president “to get 
away with serious crimes committed whilst in office,”958 including 
“crimes committed in order to prolong his stay in power.”959 This is 
a very important point, especially when one considers the fact that 
throughout the continent, in countries such as Algeria,960 
 
 
956 Swaziland: Events of 2016, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/swaziland (last 
visited on Jan. 2, 2018). 
957 CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966, § 41(1) (amended 
2006). 
958 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103. 
959 Id. 
960 In 2008, the Algerian parliament approved a constitutional 
amendment, which abolished presidential term limits and allowed President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run for a third term in office. See Algeria Deputies 
Scrap Term Limit, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2008, 3:07 PM), http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7724635.stm. 
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Burundi,961 Cameroon,962 Democratic Republic of Congo,963 
Republic of Congo,964 The Gambia,965 Rwanda,966 and Uganda,967 
 
 
961 In 2018, Burundians approved a new constitution that ushered in 
changes allowing President Pierre Nkurunziza to remain in office until 
2034. See Burundi Approves New Constitution Extending Presidential Term 
Limit, REUTERS (May 21, 2018, 11:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-burundi-politics/burundi-approves-new-constitution-extending-
presidential-term-limit-idUSKCN1IM1QG. 
962 In 2008, Cameroon’s National Assembly approved a 
constitutional amendment clearing the way for President Paul Biya to run 
for a third term in office. See Cameroon Assembly Clears Way for Biya 
Third Term, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2008, 1:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSL10840480. 
963 The president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joseph 
Kabila, was supposed to leave office at the end of his second term in 
December of 2016. However, he managed to postpone the elections that 
were supposed to choose a replacement for him. The elections were 
supposed to be held on November 27, 2016, but Kabila managed to 
postpone them until December 2018, allowing him to serve an 
unconstitutional term of two years. See generally John Mukum Mbaku, The 
Postponed DRC elections: Behind the Tumultuous Politics, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/ 
2016/11/18/the-postponed-drc-elections-behind-the-tumultuous-politics/; 
John Mukum Mbaku, What Is at Stake in the DRC Presidential Election?, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-
in-focus/2018/08/29/what-is-at-stake-for-the-drc-presidential-election/. 
The postponed elections were finally held on December 30, 2018 without 
the participation of Kabila as a candidate for the presidency. See William 
Clowes & Ignatius Ssuuna, Congo Votes for Successor to Kabila in Long-
Delayed Election, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 30, 2018, 2:09 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-30/congo-votes-for-
successor-to-kabila-in-long-delayed-election. 
964 In 2015, Congolese voters approved a constitutional amendment 
that cleared the way for President Denis Sassou Nguesso to run for a third 
consecutive term in office. See Philon Bondenga, Congo Votes by Landslide 
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incumbent presidents have gone to extraordinary lengths to prolong 
their stay in power. 
In some African constitutions, presidents are constitutionally 
shielded from criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, these 
immunities are usually not broad-based, but qualified to exempt 
certain criminal activities. For example, Article 127(1) of the 
Constitution of Angola states that “[t]he President of the Republic 
shall not be liable for actions [taken] in the exercise of his functions, 
except in the event of subordination, treason, and the crimes defined 
in this Constitution as imprescriptible and ineligible for amnesty.”968 
Thus, while the president is granted immunity for crimes committed 
while in office, that immunity does not extend to impeachable 
offenses.969 Similarly, Chapter Nine of Kenya’s 2010 
 
 
965 After he lost the presidential election in December of 2016, 
incumbent President Yahya Jammeh refused to leave office. See Alpha 
Kamara, Gambian President Creates Crisis of Democracy by Refusing to 
Step Down After Election Defeat, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/dec/13/yahya-jammeh-
gambia-president-refuses-to-leave-aft/. He was eventually chased out by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). See Kevin 
Seiff, Gambia’s President Agrees to Step Down, Following Threat of 




966 In 2015, the people of Rwanda approved a constitutional 
amendment allowing incumbent president, Paul Kagame, to run for a third 
term; he will most likely remain in office until 2034. See Rwandan 
President Paul Kagame to Run for Third Term in 2017, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 
2016, 4:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwanda-
paul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes. 
967 In 2017, the Ugandan Parliament passed a law changing the 
constitution, allowing President Yoweri Museveni to extend his rule. See 
Elias Biryabarema, Ugandan Parliament Passes Law Allowing Museveni to 
Seek Reelection, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2017, 5:47 AM), https://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-uganda-politics/ugandan-parliament-passes-law-allowing-
museveni-to-seek-re-election-idUSKBN1EE17D. 
968 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010, art. 
127 (1). 
969 See Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103. 
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constitution,970 which deals with “The Executive,” provides 
protections for the president from legal proceedings. However, 
§143(4) of Chapter Nine states: “The immunity of the President 
under this Article shall not extend to a crime for which the President 
may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and 
which prohibits such immunity.”971 
Kenya’s qualified presidential immunity is important, 
especially for understanding the extent to which a Kenyan president 
can shield himself or herself from criminal prosecution for 
violations of rights protected under international human rights 
treaties, such as the ICCPR972 and the ICESCR.973 Within the 
qualified presidential immunities provided by the Kenyan 
constitution, a Kenyan president who violates a right protected by 
an international human rights instrument, such as the ICCPR or the 
ICESCR, can still be prosecuted and brought to justice for those 
crimes.974 Thus, in the case of Kenya’s presidential immunities, the 
key to ensuring the protection of human rights is to make sure that 
the country accedes to and becomes a State Party to the various 
international human rights instruments. 
While the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia grants the 
President immunity from criminal prosecution for any crimes 
committed while in office, it also grants the National Assembly the 
authority to lift that immunity if it determines that it is in the 
“interests of the State” to do so.975 Although the Zambian Parliament 
 
 
970 CONSTITUTION art.129–58, 4 (2010) (Kenya). 
971 Id.at art. 143(4). 
972 Kenya ratified the ICCPR on May 1, 1972. See UN TREATY BODY 
DATABASE, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/ 
Treaty.aspx?CountryID=90&Lang=EN. 
973 Kenya ratified the ICESPR on May 1, 1972. Id. 
974 CONSTITUTION art. 143(4) (2010) (Kenya). 
975 CONST. OF ZAMBIA (1996) § 43(2)–(3). On July 16, 2002, the 
Zambian Parliament voted to lift the presidential immunity granted to 
former president Frederick Chiluba so that he could be prosecuted for 
corruption. A Zambian court later ruled that Parliament had acted within its 
powers when it voted to strip Chiluba of the presidential immunity, which 
he had enjoyed during his ten years in office. See Chiluba Stripped of 
Presidential Immunity, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2002), https://mg.co.za/ 
article/2002-01-01-chiluba-stripped-of-presidential-immunity. 
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was able to lift the immunity of their ex-president, Frederick 
Chiluba, so that he could be prosecuted for corruption, the problem 
with these types of qualified immunities is that in countries, such as 
Cameroon, where the president’s party controls parliament, such 
immunity may not be lifted to allow the prosecution of either a 
sitting or ex-president.976 Of course, a president who is afraid that 
his immunity would be lifted after he leaves office might do 
everything in his power to remain in power.977 
Although the Constitution of Angola grants qualified immunity 
to presidents and ex-presidents, that immunity does not apply to 
former presidents “who have been removed from office for reasons 
of criminal liability.”978 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 
only allows an ex-president to be subjected to criminal or civil 
proceedings for crimes committed while in office within three years 
after the person ceases to be President of the country.979 
 
 
976 In Cameroon, President Paul Biya’s party, the Cameroon People’s 
Democratic Movement (CPDM), has controlled the National Assembly 
since it came into existence in 1966. See Ibrahim Mouiche, Multipartyism 
and ‘Big Man’ Democracy in Cameroon, 1990–2011, in FRACTURES AND 
RECONNECTIONS: CIVIC ACTION AND THE REDEFINITION OF AFRICAN 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPACES: STUDIES IN HONOR OF PIET J. J. KONINGS 
217, 221 (J. Abbink ed., 2012). 
977 It has been argued that incumbent African presidents, such as Paul 
Biya of Cameroon, are afraid to leave office for fear of being prosecuted for 
their past criminal activities. See Is There Life after the Presidency?, BBC 
NEWS (June 3, 2005, 3:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
4607269.stm. 
978 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010, 
§ 133(3). The conditions under which a president can be removed from 
office are listed and elaborated in § 129. 
979 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (1992) (amended 
1996), § 57(6). This limited window ignores the fact that many African 
countries may not have the necessary resources and the capacity to fully 
investigate and uncover the full range of the former president’s criminal 
activities. In fact, many former presidents may still continue to have 
significant impact on the political system. Hence, many victims of the 
president’s crimes may be afraid to come forward and report his criminal 
activities for fear of retribution. 
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Although many African constitutions clearly elaborate the 
terms under which a president may be prosecuted for crimes 
committed while in office, these terms are still subject to 
interpretation by the courts. Such judicial interpretation, illustrated 
by the Nigerian case of Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of 
Police,980 can create or provoke significant levels of controversy. In 
Fawehinmi, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the immunity 
provided by § 308(1)(a) of the Constitution of Nigeria to the 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and other specified 
officials did not prevent or preclude the investigation made against 
the president or any other official.981 The Supreme Court made 
clear, however, that in investigating such a complaint, individuals 
who are protected by the constitution’s immunity provisions could 
not be questioned until they had left office.982 
4. Presidential Immunities and Human Rights 
Although one can argue that it is reasonable to shield a sitting 
president from the vexations of politically motivated legal actions, 
all of which may interfere with his or her ability to perform 
constitutionally mandated or assigned functions, there may be 
serious problems with presidential immunities, especially when they 
relate to violations of human rights. First, it is argued that an 
individual who is directly involved or complicit in the commission 
of atrocities against his own people should not be allowed to remain 
in office; furthermore, if the individual left office, the individual 
should not be allowed to escape prosecution for his criminal 
activities.983 After all, supremacy of law should be the defining 
characteristic of the legal architecture of a civilized society. Within 
such a system, no one, not even the president, the head of state and 
government, or other high-ranking officials should be above the law. 
Without such an approach to presidential immunity, there is a very 
high likelihood that many African presidents, granted immunity by 
their national constitutions, will commit atrocities against their 
citizens and escape being held accountable for these crimes. Within 
 
 
980 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 102. 
981 Id. 
982 Id. 
983 See generally id. 
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such a legal architecture, the violations of human rights will 
continue unabated. 
Second, a president who was a criminal before he came to office 
is likely to continue his criminal activities; especially if the 
constitution grants him immunity from prosecution. In addition, he 
may not be interested in using his time in office to deepen, 
strengthen, and institutionalize the country’s democracy. In fact, 
such an immunized president may seek ways984 to remain in office 
indefinitely so that he could either continue to benefit from the 
immunity granted by the constitution or effectively change the law 
to escape all liability from prosecution. 
For example, in 2008, Paul Biya, who has been the President of 
the Republic of Cameroon since 1982 and whose party—the 
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM)—controls the 
National Assembly, had the constitution changed to immunize 
himself from all crimes committed by himself while in office.985 
 
 
984 For example, he may change the constitution in order to prolong 
his tenure in office. See id. at 103. 
985 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996, 
§ 53. This section states that “[a]cts committed by the President of the 
Republic . . . shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be accountable 
for them after the exercise of his functions.” Thus, as far as the national law 
in Cameroon is concerned, Biya will never be held accountable for the 
atrocities that he and his security forces committed against the people of the 
country’s Anglophone Regions, especially given the Amended African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights Statute’s immunity clause, which states 
that “[n]o charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court 
against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or 
entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their 
functions, during their tenure of office.” Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
AFR. UNION (June 27, 2014), at art. 46(A) (bis Immunities), https://au.int/ 
en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justice-
and-human-rights. According to Article 11 of the Amended African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights Statute, the “[p]rotocol and the [s]tatute 
annexed to it shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of 
instruments of ratification by fifteen (15) [m]ember [s]tates.” See id. at art. 
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Then, there is Jacob Zuma, former president of South Africa who 
was elected in May 2009. Before he became president, there were 
allegations of corruption labelled against him; however, those 
charges were “withdrawn by the National Prosecuting Authority 
under dubious circumstances.”986 As president, Zuma was 
embroiled in corruption scandals involving the Nkandla987 and 
Gupta affairs.988 Ultimately, Zuma was forced out of power on 
February 14, 2018.989 His regime was pervaded by high levels of 
corruption and is said to have cost the South African economy an 
 
 
11(1). As of January 3, 2019, only eleven states had signed the Protocol but 
none had yet ratified and deposited their instruments; hence, the Protocol 
has not yet entered into force. Thus, a president like Paul Biya, whose 
national constitution has granted him immunity from criminal prosecution 
for crimes committed during his tenure in office and who is not likely to be 
prosecuted by the African Court of Justice and Human Rights because the 
Article 46A immunity clause, would have to be prosecuted by the 
International Criminal Court or a specially constituted court, as was the case 
with Chad’s former president, Hissène Habré. 
986 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103. 
987 The Nkandla case involved allegations that then President Zuma 
had corruptly used state funds to refurbish his private home outside the 
municipality of Nkandla. See Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Others, CCT 143/15, Judgment (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2016); Democratic Alliance v. Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Others, CCT 171/15, Judgment (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2016). 
988 The Gupta Affair involved accusations that the South African 
state, under President Zuma, had been captured by the powerful Gupta 
family business empire. The allegations of state capture were investigated 
by South Africa’s Public Protector, Thuli Madonseli. Her report was 
released in 2016. PUBLIC PROTECTOR SOUTH AFRICA, STATE OF CAPTURE 
(Rep. No. 6 of 2016/17, 2016); See also John Mukum Mbaku, Rule of Law, 
State Capture, and Human Development in Africa, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
771 (2018). 
989 South Africa's Jacob Zuma Resigns After Pressure from Party, 
BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
43066443. 
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estimated one trillion South African Rand (about U.S. $83 
billion).990 
Finally, a president who considers himself above the law 
because of the immunities granted to him by the constitution may 
use his time in office and the absolute power granted to him to make 
it extremely difficult for him to be prosecuted after he leaves office. 
For example, he may bribe, intimidate, or use security forces to kill 
potential witnesses against them. In addition, the president may use 
the power granted him to change the constitution and remain in 
power indefinitely. This action would effectively foreclose any 
chance that he would be held accountable for his criminal activities. 
Even if a president does not die in office and eventually retires, it 
might be impossible to effectively prosecute him for his crimes.991 
In addition to the fact that many of the people who could possibly 
testify against him may have died or left the jurisdiction, either 
through voluntary or involuntary exile, they may no longer have an 
accurate and reliable account of the events as they unfolded many 
years ago. While records, especially those accumulated by NGOs 
and private citizens during the president’s tenure, may help 
prosecutors reconstruct events as they occurred when the crimes 
were committed, they would not be enough to fully eliminate the 
doubts created by the lack of accurate and reliable eye-witness 
testimony; memory lapses, which are bound to occur in the case of 
crimes committed during a tenure of many decades in power, are 
likely to complicate or even frustrate post-tenure prosecutions. 
 
 
990 See Lisa Steyn, Budget 2018 Is Zuma’s Costly Legacy, MAIL & 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2018), https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-23-budget-
2018-is-zumas-costly-legacy. 
991 Paul Biya of Cameroon has been in power since 1982 and just 
recently secured another seven-year term in office. Cameroon held another 
presidential election on October 7, 2018, despite the fact that the 
international community declared that the elections were neither free nor 
fair, the country’s Constitutional Council declared incumbent Paul Biya as 
the winner. That “win” extended his 36-year rule over Cameroon by seven 
years. See Neil Munshi, Paul Biya Declared Winner of Cameroon’s 
Disputed Presidential Poll, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/81903ce8-d5d6-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8. 
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Presidential immunities limit the scope of accountability of 
presidents and frustrate the promotion and protection of human 
rights in Africa; but, can the courts intervene and minimize or curb 
presidential impunity? In most African countries, it is often the case 
that “finding presidents liable for wrongful acts or omissions 
committed in office is not something that African judges will easily 
do.”992 Evidence shows that this problem exists, even in countries 
such as Botswana, that are considered to have fully effective 
democratic systems undergirded by independent judiciaries.993 
Take, for example, the case Motswaledi v. Botswana 
Democratic Party and Others.994 A split in the ruling–Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) led to Ian Khama, the President of the BDP 
and President of Botswana, suspending the membership of the 
BDP’s Secretary-General.995 The President’s decision to suspend 
the party’s Secretary-General effectively prevented the latter from 
running for a position in Parliament; a process that “tilted the 
balance between competing factions within the party in favor of the 
President’s faction.”996 When the Secretary-General challenged the 
legality of the action taken by the President to suspend the Secretary-
General of the BDP, the President successfully relied on § 41(1) of 
the Constitution of Botswana, which states that: 
Whilst any person holds or performs the functions of the 
office of President no criminal proceedings shall be 
instituted or continued against him or her in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done by him or her either in 
his or her official capacity or in his or her private capacity 
and no civil proceedings shall be instituted or continued in 
respect of which relief is claimed against him or her in 
 
 
992 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 103. 
993 See id. 
994 See Motswaledi v. Botswana Democratic Party and Others, 
(2009) 2 BLR 284 (CA). 
995 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 13. 
996 Id. 
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respect of anything done or omitted to be done in his or her 
private capacity.997 
In this case, the President of Botswana was using the immunity 
granted him by the constitution to “unfairly neutrali[z]e political 
opponents and violate the spirit of the Constitution which all 
presidents take an oath to defend and protect.”998 Fombad and 
Nwauche argue that this practice is quite common in the 
continent.999 As indicated by the Botswana case, once the conduct 
of a president “comes within the scope of the immunity, whether it 
be absolute or qualified immunity, the president’s motive is 
irrelevant; the immunity operates as a complete bar to the 
action.”1000 These presidential immunities effectively “override the 
president’s permanent and fundamental duty as a citizen to act 
within the law”1001—that is, immunities place some officials above 
the law and allow them to act with impunity. 
In many countries, including those in Africa, the president is the 
chief law enforcer and the individual responsible for protecting and 
upholding the constitution. To successfully carry out this function, 
the president must lead by example; hence, he cannot and should not 
place himself above or outside the law. While it can be argued that 
the president should be forgiven in the case where he acted outside 
the law in an effort to protect national interests, he must bear the full 
force of the law if he acted in his personal capacity and was doing 
so to generate benefits for himself. Unfortunately, such an approach 
is not likely to be useful, especially given the fact that it may be 
difficult to determine with a significant level of certainty when the 
president is acting on behalf of the country and when he is acting in 
his personal capacity and for his own benefit. 
But, could the problem of presidential abuse of power be 
resolved through impeachment? The impeachment option is only 
available if it is made possible by the national constitution. First, 
many African constitutions, like that of Botswana, do not have 
 
 
997  CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966, § 41(1). 
998 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 104. 
999 See id. 
1000 Id. 
1001 Id. 
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impeachment provisions.1002 Second, even if the national 
constitution has impeachment provisions, it is not likely that the 
legislature would carry through with impeaching the president, 
especially considering the fact that in many of these countries, the 
president and his party control the legislature. Finally, the ground 
for impeaching the president as provided for in the constitution may 
be extremely narrow; for example, Article 53(1) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Cameroon limits the impeachment of the 
president to treason.1003 
5. Impeachment Proceedings Against African Heads of 
State as a Way to Deal with Presidential Abuse of Power 
It has been suggested that in the African countries in which 
national constitutions grant presidents immunity from criminal and 
civil prosecution for crimes they commit while in office, 
impeachment proceedings can be used to prevent such officials from 
abusing their powers. As argued by Fombad and Nwauche, 
“[i]mpeachment proceedings potentially provide the most potent 
method of punishing abuse of office under modern African 
constitutions.”1004 In most of the Francophone African constitutions, 
impeachment is the only way through which presidents can be held 
accountable for crimes they commit while in office. Nevertheless, 
in most of these constitutions a president can only be impeached for 
treason, and impeachment proceedings are usually undertaken by a 
special court of impeachment. Some of these countries refer to this 
special court as the High Court of Justice.1005 
 
 
1002 See generally CONSTITUTION OF BOTSWANA Sept. 30, 1966. 
1003 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996, at 
§ 53(1). 
1004 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 106. 
1005 According to Article 53(1) of the Cameroonian Constitution, 
“[t]he Court of Impeachment shall have jurisdiction, in respect of acts 
committed in the exercise of their functions, to try the President of the 
Republic for high treason. . . .” CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996, art. 53(1) (amended 2008). In Chad, the Court of 
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Unlike the constitutions of Gabon and Cameroon, those of other 
Francophone countries provide more elaborate provisions. For 
example, the Constitution of Burkina Faso provides that, in addition 
to treason, the president can also be removed from office for any 
violations of the constitution that involve misappropriating public 
funds.1006 The Constitution of the Republic of Chad also provides 
for the removal from office of the President of the Republic for 
treason.1007 Specifically, the constitution states that “The President 
is only responsible for acts accomplished in the exercise of his 
functions in case of high treason.”1008 The constitution then goes on 
to define those crimes that fall within the single crime of “high 
treason.”1009 These include acts “infringing the republican form, the 
uniqueness and secularity of the State, the sovereignty, the 
independence and the integrity of the national territory. . .”; the 
preceding acts are considered the crimes which collectively form the 
single crime of “treason.”1010 In addition, a president can be 
removed from office for “grave and blatant violations of the rights 
of Man, the misappropriation of public funds, bribery, extortion, 
drug trafficking and the introduction of toxic or dangerous wastes, 
 
 
Impeachment is called the High Court of Justice and consists of ten 
Deputies, two members of the Constitutional Council, and three members 
of the Supreme Court. See CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Apr. 
4, 1996, art. 171–72 (Chad). See also CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
GABONAISE Mar. 26, 1991, art. 78 (GABON). 
1006 According to Article 138 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso, 
“The High Court of Justice is competent to take cognizance of the acts 
committed by the President of Faso in the exercise of his functions and 
constituting high treason, of infringing the Constitution or of 
misappropriation of public funds.” The High Court of Justice is a specially 
constituted court to judge public officials and, according to Article 137, is 
“composed of Deputies that the National Assembly elects after each general 
renewal, as well as the magistrates designated by the President of the Court 
of Cassation.” See CONSTITUTION DU BURKINA FASO June 11, 1991, art. 
137–38. 
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for their transit, deposit or storage on the national territory”—these 
crimes are also associated with high treason.1011 
Impeachment proceedings in Anglophone and other non-
Francophone constitutions are usually more elaborate than those in 
Francophone constitutions. Acts for which a president can be 
impeached include: (1) “crimes of treason and espionage”;1012 (2) 
“crimes of subordination, fraudulent conversion of public money, 
and corruption”;1013 (3) abuse of office, willful violation of the oath 
of allegiance or the President’s oath of office, or willful violation of 
any provision of the constitution; (4) any conduct that “brings or is 
likely to bring the office of the President into contempt or 
disrepute”;1014 (5) the president conducts himself in a manner 
“prejudicial or inimical to the economy or the security of the 
State”;1015 (6) “where there are serious reasons for believing that the 
President has committed a crime under national or international 
law”;1016 and (7) “gross misconduct.”1017 
Note that the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, which was 
ratified in 2010, provides more generous grounds for impeaching 
and removing the president from office. First, the president can be 
impeached “where there are serious reasons for believing that” the 
president has committed a crime under national or international 
law.1018 Including acts that are crimes under international law is very 
important because a Kenyan president can be held accountable for 




1012 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Jan. 21, 2010, art. 
129. 
1013 Id. 
1014 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA Jan. 16, 1997, 
art. 67. 
1015 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (1992) (amended 
1996), art. 69(1)(b)(ii). 
1016 CONSTITUTION art. 145(1)(b) (2010) (Kenya). 
1017 Id. at art. 145(1)(c); see also S. AFR. CONST., First Amendment 
Act of 1997, art. 89(1)(b). 
1018 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, Aug. 27, 2010, art. 
145(1)(b). 
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Kenyan law but are violations of provisions of international human 
rights instruments. 
Under the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, it is 
an impeachable crime for the President of the United Republic to 
commit “acts which generally violate [the] Constitution or [the] law 
concerning the ethics of public leaders” or “acts which contravene 
the conditions concerning the registration of political parties 
specified in Article 20(2) of [the] Constitution.”1019 Once the 
National Assembly of the United Republic of Tanzania “passes the 
motion to constitute a Special Committee of Inquiry” to investigate 
“charges brought” against the President, “the President shall be 
deemed to be out of office.”1020 The Constitution of the Republic of 
Chad also requires that any president under impeachment 
proceedings should be temporarily suspended from performing his 
official functions. It states, at Article 175, that “The President of the 
Republic and the members of the Government are suspended from 
their functions in case of impeachment.”1021 In Tanzania, as is the 
case in several other Anglophone African countries, a supermajority 
of two thirds of all the members of Parliament is required for the 
impeachment of the President.1022 
Article 107 of the Ugandan constitution lists most of the crimes 
mentioned above as impeachable offenses which could result in the 
removal of a president from office.1023 In the last several years, 
Uganda’s president has been accused of a number of crimes covered 
under Article 107, such as embezzlement and frequent violations of 
the Constitution of Uganda. Some of these constitutional violations 
include changing the constitution to prolong his presidential term, 
regularly harassing opposition party members, and election rigging. 
 
 
1019 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA Apr. 26, 
1977, art. 46A(2)(a)–(b). 
1020 Id. at art. 46A(5). 
1021 CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD Apr. 4, 1996, art. 
175 (Chad). 
1022 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA Apr. 26, 
1977, art. 46A(3)(b). 
1023 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Oct. 8, 1995, art. 
107. 
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Despite all this, the president has yet to be impeached for any of the 
above offenses.1024 
Scholars of law and economics have identified several factors 
to explain why countries with elaborate impeachment provisions in 
their constitutions, such as Uganda, have failed to utilize them to 
remove from office recalcitrant and ineffective presidents. This 
includes those presidents who have clearly committed impeachable 
offenses. First, as is the case in other countries around the world, 
impeachment is a political process rather than a legal process. In 
Africa, where most political systems are poorly developed and are 
still in their embryonic stages, these countries are yet to provide 
themselves with the type of democratic institutions that can 
undertake a credible and effective impeachment process. Without 
legislatures that are fully independent of the executive and which 
are supported by a robust and politically active civil society, it is not 
likely that the impeachment provisions made possible by the 
constitution can be utilized to remove a president who has 
committed impeachable offenses from office. 
Fombad and Nwauche argue that “the progressive 
institutionalization of dominant parties”1025 make impeachment of 
presidents either very difficult or virtually impossible. Many of 
these constitutions previously imposed term limits as a way to 
 
 
1024 See, e.g., Emmanuel Mutaizibwa Uganda: Temples of Injustice, 
ALJAZEERA (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:42 AM), https://www.aljazeera.com/ 
programmes/africainvestigates/2014/12/uganda-temples-injustice-2014129 
13517224628.html; Ssemujju Ibrahim Nganda, Corruption Endemic in 
Uganda, GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2009, 8:48 AM), https://www.the 
guardian.com/katine/2009/mar/13/corruption-endemic-in-uganda; Uganda: 
Undermined, Global Witness, Briefing Paper (June 5, 2017) https://www. 
globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/uganda-undermined 
/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-6677Lbc3wIVxh6tBh1Z6whiEAMYASAAEg 
LWlPD_BwE; Uganda Is the Worst Place in East Africa for Bribery, 
ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 2012), http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid= 
1579517542&Country=Uganda&topic. 
1025 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108. 
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provide for the regular “alternation of power.”1026 However, most 
have since removed these limits and opened the way “for life 
presidents and impunity.” 1027 
Second, even where countries have not removed term limits 
through opportunistic constitutional amendments, a country’s 
political domination by a single, highly entrenched political party 
and its inability to provide viable opposition political parties means 
that the outgoing imperial president is likely to be replaced by 
another one.1028 Under such conditions, impunity will continue and 
there is no likelihood that impeachment proceedings will be used to 
remove a president who commits impeachable offenses. Nor will 
any effort be made to prosecute a former president for crimes 
committed while in office even if the constitution allows for such 
prosecutions to take place.1029 
Zambia and Malawi present rare exceptions—in these 
countries, incoming presidents from the same political party as the 
outgoing presidents have attempted “to hold their predecessor 
 
 
1026 Id. During the last few years, presidents have successfully carried 
out constitutional amendments to eliminate term limits, ignored term limits, 
or have simply not held elections. Some countries, such as The Gambia, 
Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Morocco have never introduced presidential term 
limits. See Cheryl Hendricks & Gabriel Ngah Kiven, Presidential Term 
Limits: Slippery Slope Back to Authoritarianism in Africa, THE 
CONVERSATION (May 17, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://theconversation.com/ 
presidential-term-limits-slippery-slope-back-to-authoritarianism-in-africa-
96796. 
1027 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108. 
1028 Id. Consider the fact that in Cameroon, for example, the ruling 
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) has dominated politics 
in the country since 1966; in Uganda, the National Resistance Movement 
has dominated politics in the country since 1986; in Rwanda, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front has dominated national politics since 1994, just to name a 
few. 
1029 See Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108. 
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accountable for their misdeeds in power.”1030 However, the 
continent has tended towards incoming presidents not holding their 
predecessors accountable for their crimes in office out of fear that 
they too might have to be dragged into court under similar 
circumstances when they eventually leave office. Some scholars 
have termed this a culture of “scratch my back, I scratch your back,” 
which they believe will ensure that “present and future African 
strong men can continue to be as tyrannical, corrupt, repressive[,] 
and incompetent as ever and can expect to get away with it.”1031 Two 
important developments make this gloomy assessment not as 
gloomy as it appears: The first one is the expanding reach of 
international law, as embodied in the ICC’s efforts to prosecute 
individuals, including African officials, who commit international 
crimes; the embrace by the international community, including the 
AU of the R2P doctrine; and the successful efforts by many African 
States to either incorporate provisions of international human rights 
instruments directly into their constitutions or require that domestic 
courts must recognize or consider international law (including 
international human rights law) when interpreting the domestic 
constitution.1032 In fact, the successful prosecution of the former 
 
 
1030 Id.; see also David Smith, Former Zambian President Faces Jail 
in Unprecedented Corruption Trial, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2009, 10:24 AM) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/13/zambia-frederick-
chiluba-corruption-trial (stating that Frederick Chiluba is believed to be the 
first African leader prosecuted in his own country for embezzling public 
funds); Malawi Ex-President, Joyce Banda, Wanted by Police over $250m 
Corruption Case, AFRICANEWS (July 31, 2017) http://www.africanews.com/ 
2017/07/31/malawi-ex-president-joyce-banda-wanted-by-police-over-
250m-corruption/ (indicating the investigation of former president, Joyce 
Banda, for alleged involvement in corruption schemes while in office). 
1031 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108. 
1032 Id. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996, states that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum—(b) must consider international law.” S. AFR. CONST., First 
Amendment Act of 1997, art. 39(1)(b). In the Constitution of Bénin 
Republic, it is stated as follows: “WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE Reaffirm 
our attachment to the principles of democracy and human rights as they 
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presidents of Liberia1033 and Chad 1034 proved to Africans that it is 
possible to overcome various institutional impediments and bring 
 
 
have been defined by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, by the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the Organization of African 
Unity and ratified by Bénin on January 20, 1986 and whose provisions make 
up an integral part of this present Constitution and of Bénisese law and have 
a value superior to the internal law . . . .” Bénin, hence, has created, from 
various international human rights instruments, rights that are justiciable in 
Béninese courts. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BÉNIN Dec. 2, 
1990, pmbl. 
1033 Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia, was tried before the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and convicted on eleven charges arising from 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, committed from November 30, 1998, to 
January 18, 2002, during the course of the civil war in Sierra Leone. See 
Owen Bowcott & Monica Mark, Charles Taylor Found Guilty of Abetting 
Sierra Leone War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2012/apr/26/charles-taylor-guilty-war-crimes. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in 2002 as the result of a 
request to the UN in 2000 by the Government of Sierra Leone, which was 
seeking a special court to address the atrocities and serious crimes against 
civilians and UN peacekeepers committed during the country’s civil war, 
which lasted from 1991 to 2002. See The Residual Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the SCSL Public Archives, Freetown and the Hague, RESIDUAL 
SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited on Feb. 
21, 2021). See also Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, U.N. SCOR, U.N. DOC. S/2002/246 (Jan. 16, 2002). 
1034 The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegal Court 
System tried and convicted Hissène Habré, former president of the Republic 
of Chad, for international crimes committed between June 7, 1982, and 
December 1, 1990, the period during which he was in office as president of 
Chad. Habré was found guilty of crimes against humanity, summary 
execution, torture, and rape. Ruth Maclean, Chad’s Hissène Habré Found 
Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2016, 1:22 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/30/chad-hissene-habre-
guilty-crimes-against-humanity-senegal. Habré’s trial started on July 20, 
2015, and a verdict was delivered on May 30, 2016. The Extraordinary 
African Chambers was a tribunal established under an agreement between 
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presidents and other public officials who abuse their powers to 
justice. 
The second development is that robust and politically active 
civil societies are emerging in many countries throughout the 
continent and functioning as important checks on the exercise of 
government power. In countries such as Burkina Faso and South 
Africa, civil societies and their organizations have become 
important constraints to government impunity. For example, it was 
protests by civil society groups that prevented former Burkinabè 
president, Blaise Compaoré, from unconstitutionally extending his 
tenure.1035 With respect to post-apartheid South Africa, when the 
government of President Jacob Zuma took unilateral action without 
parliamentary approval—as required by the constitution—to 
withdraw from the ICC, it was a civil society organization1036 that 
 
 
the AU and Senegal to adjudicate international crimes that were committed 
in Chad from June 7, 1982, to December 1, 1990. Id. This is the period 
during which Hissène Habré was president of the Republic of Chad. The 
court was authorized by the Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers. 
See Relatif au Statut des Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires pour la 
Poursuite des Crimes Internationaux Commis au Tchad durant la Periode 
du 7 Juin 1982 au 1er décembre 1990 [Statute of the Extraordinary African 
Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system for the prosecution of 
international crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of Chad 
during the period from 7 June 1982 to 1 December 1990], http://www. 
chambresafricaines.org/pdf/Avenant-Statut%20CAE-Habre.pdf. 
1035 See John Mukum Mbaku, Burkina Faso Protests Extending 
Presidential Term Limits, BROOKINGS INST., (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www. 
brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/10/30/burkina-faso-protests-
extending-presidential-term-limits/. 
1036 The legal action was initiated in 2016 by the Democratic Alliance 
(DA), an opposition political party, after the African National Congress 
(ANC)-led government under Zuma moved to withdraw the country from 
the Rome Statute. The DA argued that the action to withdraw the country 
from the Rome Statute was not constitutional because the South African 
Parliament was not consulted as required by the country’s constitution. See 
Christopher Torchia, South African Court Blocks Government’s 
International Criminal Court Withdrawal Bid, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 22, 
2017, 7:45 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa 
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brought legal action which eventually forced the government to 
abandon the effort to take the country out of the Rome Statute.1037 
C.  ENDING IMPUNITY FOR THE ABUSE AND  
MISUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS IN AFRICA 
In virtually all the African colonies, the people and their leaders 
approached decolonization and independence “without taking 
cognizance of the dangers posed by unconstrained government.”1038 
Two particular areas of the decolonization process not given 
appropriate consideration were constitution making and the 
transformation of the critical domains—specifically, the political, 
administrative, and judicial foundations of the state. Constitution 
making was top-down, elite driven, and nonparticipatory. Hence, it 
produced institutional arrangements that failed to fully and 
effectively constrain civil servants and political elites and prevent 
them from acting with impunity.1039 Among the political elites not 
adequately constrained by the laws and institutions that African 
countries adopted upon independence was the president. In fact, in 
the Francophone countries, independence and post-independence 
laws and institutions established imperial presidencies with 
significant powers. These presidencies would eventually come to 
dominate the other branches of government and allow those who 
served in them to commit atrocities against their fellow citizens with 
impunity.1040 
Without effective mechanisms to check the exercise of 
presidential power, the individuals who captured the presidency in 




zuma-president-a7594346.html. See Democratic All. v. Minister of Int’l 
Rels. & Cooperation, 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP), (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii. 
org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/53.html. 
1037 Robbie Gramer, South African Court Tells Government It Can’t 
Withdraw from the ICC, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2017, 2:47 PM), https:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/22/south-african-court-tells-government-it-
cant-withdraw-from-the-icc/. 
1038 MBAKU, supra note 41, at 9. 
1039 See, e.g., id. at 8–14. 
1040 See, e.g., id. at 9–14; see also Prempeh, supra note 897. 
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corruption) to enrich themselves, their families, and their 
benefactors.1041 They proceeded to strengthen their political 
positions by destroying their opposition and manipulating the 
constitution and electoral laws to remain in power indefinitely.1042 
There was fear that, if they lost their political positions, the political 
elite would not only lose the wealth they had illegally accumulated 
over the years, but could also lose their lives. Thus, in countries such 
 
 
1041 See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 734 (examining, inter alia, the 
pervasiveness of corruption in African countries). 
1042 For example, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, first president of Côte 
d’Ivoire, remained in office from independence in 1960 until his death on 
December 7, 1993. See, e.g., FRÉDÉRIC GRAH MEL, FÉLIX HOUPHOUËT-
BOIGNY: LA FIN ET LA SUITE (2010). Mobutu Sese Seko seized control of the 
government of the then Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1965 
and established a totalitarian regime until he was forced out of office in May 
1997 by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (Alliance des Forces démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo-Zaire). See, e.g., JEAN-LOUIS PETA IKAMBANA, 
MOBUTU’S TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN AFROCENTRIC ANALYSIS 
(2007). Paul Biya took over as President of the Republic of Cameroon from 
Ahmadou Ahidjo, the country’s first president, in November 1982, and 
remains the country’s executive to this day. See, e.g., POST-COLONIAL 
CAMEROON: POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY (Joseph Takougang & 
Julius A. Amin eds., 2018). 
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as Cameroon,1043 Uganda,1044 and Burundi,1045 these imperial 
presidents not only became increasingly “paranoid and 
 
 
1043 In Cameroon, incumbent President of the Republic, Paul Biya, 
who has been in power since 1982, has used extreme violence to deal with 
anyone who has attempted to change the status quo, including even 
individuals who have used peaceful means to challenge his hegemonic 
control of the political system. Julius Agbor & John Mukum Mbaku, The 
Problem of Political Transitions in Africa: The Cameroon Question, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-
problem-of-political-transitions-in-africa-the-cameroon-question/. In fact, 
in late 2016, when Anglophone teachers and lawyers took to the streets to 
peacefully protest the marginalization of the Anglophones by the 
Francophone-dominated central government, Biya responded with extreme 
violence—his security forces invaded the Anglophone Regions and killed 
many protesters and burned their villages. See Siobhán O’Grady, Cameroon 
Is Spiraling Further into Violence, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018, 12:59 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/26/cameroon-is-
spiraling-further-into-violence/?utm_term=.694ff7332d7b. 
1044 In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power 
since 1986, has used violence, intimidation and oppression of opposition 
politicians, corruption, and manipulation of constitutional amendment 
processes, to remain in power indefinitely. See Justin Willis, Gabrielle 
Lynch, & Nic Cheeseman, After Mugabe, All Eyes Are on Uganda’s 
Museveni: How Long Can He Cling to Power?, QUARTZ AFR. (Nov. 23, 
2017), https://qz.com/africa/1136979/after-mugabe-all-eyes-are-on-
ugandas-museveni-how-long-can-he-cling-to-power/. 
1045 In Burundi in 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza, who had been 
president since 2005, was nominated by his political party, the National 
Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of 
Democracy (CNDD-FDD), for a third term in office. There was wide 
agreement throughout Burundi that President Nkurunziza had served his 
mandate and was constitutionally barred from standing for another term in 
office. Protests followed the announcement of his intention to run for 
president again. Many people were killed by government forces and amidst 
a boycott of the election by the opposition; Nkurunziza won the July 2015 
presidential election. Burundi Elections: Pierre Nkurunziza Wins Third 
Term, BBC NEWS (July 24, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-33658796. On May 21, 2018, a new constitution was approved, 
effectively allowing Nkurunziza to remain in office until 2034. Eric Oteng, 
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oppressive,”1046 but they also began to devote virtually all of their 
time and their countries’ national resources to regime survival while 
neglecting critical issues (e.g., poverty alleviation and economic 
development).1047 
In order to deal with presidential impunity and greatly enhance 
the protection of human rights, each African country must provide 
itself with institutional arrangements undergirded by the rule of law. 
These are institutional mechanisms that can adequately constrain 
civil servants and political elites, prevent the elites from committing 
crimes with impunity, and further make it much more difficult for 
elites to entrench themselves once they are in power. First, each 
country must establish a governing process characterized by “a 
separation of powers, with effective checks and balances.”1048 
 
 
Burundi’s Controversial Referendum Set for May 17, AFR. NEWS (Mar. 18, 
2018), https://www.africanews.com/2018/03/18/burundi-s-controversial-
referendum-to-take-place-on-may-17/. Nevertheless, Nkurunziza 
announced on June 7, 2018 that he will leave office after the 2020 election. 
Desire Nimubona, Burundi President Pierre Nkurunziza Pledges to Step 
Down in 2020, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2018, 8:44 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-07/burundi-president-
pierre-nkurunziza-pledges-to-step-down-in-2020. It is possible, of course, 
that he might follow Joseph Kabila’s example and postpone the elections 
indefinitely to allow him to remain in power. Kabila was supposed to leave 
office as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo after presidential 
elections at the end of 2016. Joseph Kabila Says He Will Not Run Again in 
Congo, ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.economist.com/middle-
east-and-africa/2018/08/09/joseph-kabila-says-he-will-not-run-again-in-
congo. However, he postponed the elections for two years and was able to 
unconstitutionally remain in office for that period of time. Id. 
1046 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108. 
1047 As argued by John Mukum Mbaku, “[p]re-occupation with crisis 
management and political survival at all cost has made it very difficult for 
many post-independence governments in Africa to place appropriate 
emphasis on economic and human development, the elimination of poverty 
and deprivation, protection of the environment and the nation’s 
environmental resources, and the improvement of the quality of life for 
historically marginalized groups and communities, especially women and 
children, as well as rural peasants.” JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 96–97 (2004). 
1048 See MBAKU, supra note 800, at 60. 
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Within such a governing process, the structure of government must 
reflect that division of labor. For example, there should be “a strong 
bicameral legislature to counter the powers of the presidency”1049—
this should prevent the eventual emergence of an imperial 
presidency, which could become a significant threat to peace and 
security. Specifically, the people should use the national constitution 
to create separate branches of government—executive, legislative, 
and judicial—define each branch’s powers, and impose limits on the 
exercise of those powers.1050 
Given the tendency of many African presidents to use the 
judiciary as a tool to undermine their political opponents and 
enhance their ability to remain in power indefinitely, it is critical that 
the judiciary be truly independent of the other branches of the 
government. The judiciary must be independent enough to be able 
to “confront other branches of the federal government or the 
states”1051 and adjudicate cases without undue political influence. At 
the very minimum, the judiciary must have “security of tenure,” 
financial security free from “arbitrary interference by the Executive 
in a manner that could affect judicial independence,” “institutional 
independence with respect to the judicial function . . . ,” and 
“judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear directly 
and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function.”1052 
Second, there must be a robust civil society—one that is 
politically active and capable of effectively checking the exercise of 
presidential power. For example, a politically active civil society 
that works with the country’s independent judiciary can frustrate 
 
 
1049 See id. 
1050 See id. at 61. 
1051 Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France 
and the United States, 49 ME. L. REV. 21, 44 (1997). 
1052 Valente v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 675–76, 712 (Can.). 
This is the Canadian Supreme Court case that set the minimum requirements 
for judicial independence in Canada. South Africa’s highest court, the 
Constitutional Court, in its ruling in De Lange v. Smuts, adopted the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s standard for judicial independence. See De 
Lange v. Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also Van Rooyen v. 
The State 2002 (5) SA 24 (CC), at ¶ 18 (S. Afr.) (emphasizing the 
independence of the courts). 
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efforts by a president to entrench himself or engage in activities that 
violate human and peoples’ rights.1053 In South Africa, for example, 
the media was very important in making possible the investigation 
of the Zuma government for the possibility that it had been corruptly 
captured by business interests.1054 
Fourth, the scope of presidential powers and presidential 
immunities must be severely limited constitutionally. Legal scholars 
have argued that in order to effectively “curb the pervasive abuse of 
[presidential] powers that has continued under the post 1990 
constitutional dispensations,”1055 each African country needs to 
reexamine at least three aspects of presidential powers. The first one 
is to regulate the power of presidential appointments.1056 As argued 
by Fombad and Nwauche, “[s]pecific criteria must be laid down to 
ensure that all presidential appointments, especially for senior 
positions in the military, the public service and the judiciary are 
informed by clearly defined objective criteria based on experience, 
expertise and qualifications . . . .”1057 In addition to the fact that such 
constraints will limit the ability of the president to entrench himself, 
they will also minimize the ability of the president to bring into 
government individuals who are likely to help him violate the rights 
of citizens with impunity. Along these lines, public or semi-public 
commissions, whose job it is to recommend candidates for 
 
 
1053 For example, it was civil society and one of its organizations—
the political party called the Democratic Alliance (DA)—that brought legal 
action against the Jacob Zuma government when the latter acted 
unconstitutionally to withdraw the country from the Rome Statute. Through 
this process, the DA was able to stop efforts by Zuma and his government 
to act outside the law. See, e.g., Merrit Kennedy, Court Blocks South 
Africa’s Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, NPR (Feb. 22, 
2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/ 
516620190/court-blocks-south-africas-withdrawal-from-international-
criminal-court. 
1054 See, e.g., Tshidi Madia, State Capture Inquiry: How We Got 
Here, NEWS24 (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.news24.com/Analysis/state-
capture-inquiry-how-we-got-to-this-point-20180820. 
1055 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 106. 
1056 Id. 
1057 Id. 
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appointment by the president to positions in the government,1058 
must be sufficiently independent to minimize manipulation by the 
president.1059 The president must be effectively prevented from 
politicizing the appointment process and putting into office his 
political supporters instead of individuals who are qualified to 
perform the jobs or functions in question. 
The second aspect of presidential power that must be curbed is 
to rid the country of the imperial presidency. The excessive 
concentration of power in the presidency is antithetical to the 
practice of constitutionalism and constitutional government and 
must not be allowed to continue. Each country must use the 
constitutional design process to decentralize power away from the 
center, and instead, favor sub-national units by establishing some 
form of federalism. The latter form of government is very important, 
especially in complex multiethnic countries, such as Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Africa.1060 In addition, 
the Francophone countries, virtually all of which accepted de 
Gaulle’s constitution,1061 and hence, must overcome the Gallic 
preoccupation with centralization of political powers and establish 
sub-national governments that provide local communities with the 
opportunity and wherewithal to choose their own leaders and 
manage their own affairs.  
The third issue that these countries must deal with is to prevent 
presidents from manipulating the constitution to extend their 
constitutional mandates. In the post-1990 period, many countries in 
Africa adopted new constitutions that imposed term limits on the 
presidency.1062 This constitutional innovation was supposed to help 
 
 
1058 Id. For example, Higher Council of Magistracy in and the 
Francophone countries and the Judicial Service Commission in the 
Anglophone countries. 
1059 Id. 
1060 See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 800; see also MWANGI S. KIMENYI, 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY, LIBERTY AND THE STATE: THE AFRICAN DILEMMA 
(1997) (arguing, inter alia, that federalism can more effectively manage and 
accommodate ethnocultural diversity in the African countries). 
1061 That is, the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic or French 
Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958. 
1062 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 107. 
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these countries deepen and institutionalize their democracies. 
Unfortunately, because of relatively weak amendment procedures in 
the constitutions of many of these countries, their presidents were 
able to easily amend national constitutions to eliminate term limits 
and prolong their mandates.1063 The problem in many African 
countries today is that the mechanism provided for amending the 
constitution is one which can easily be manipulated by the president 
to eliminate any constraints on him, including term limits. As argued 
by constitutional scholar, Jon Elster, there needs to be a balance 
struck between “rigidity and flexibility.”1064 This can be achieved 
through many ways—the constitutional drafters can impose on the 
people the condition that the constitution can only be changed by a 
given qualified majority.1065 For example, South Africa’s post-
apartheid constitution mandates that any bill put forth to amend the 
constitution must be supported by at least 75% of the National 
Assembly and at least six of the country’s nine provinces.1066 In 
Cameroon, on the other hand, the constitution can be amended by 
 
 
1063 For example, presidents in Algeria, Cameroon, Burundi, Republic 
of Congo, Tunisia, Uganda, and several other countries were able to change 
their constitutions to get rid of term limits and continue to remain in power. 
See generally Takudzwa Hillary Chiwanza, African Presidents and Their 
Love for Changing the Constitutions, AFR. EXPONENT (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8604-african-presdidents-are-
always-chaging-their-constitutions; Isaac Mufumba, Presidents Who 
Amended Constitution to Stay in Power, DAILY MONITOR (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Presidents-who-
amended-constitution-to-stay-in-power/689844-4099104-qj5n58z/ 
index.html; Tonny Onyulo, How these African Leaders Subvert Democracy 




1064 Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 470 (1991). 
1065 Id. 
1066 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74(a)–(b). 
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Parliament alone.1067 This is why Paul Biya, the country’s president, 
was able to easily convince a National Assembly controlled by his 
political party—the CPDM—to amend the constitution in 2008 and 
grant him a third term in office, as well as immunity for any crimes 
that he might commit while in office.1068 
Constitutional drafters could impose what Elster refers to as a 
“cooling device” or period, which would require that two successive 
legislatures or parliaments approve any amendments to the 
constitution.1069 According to Elster, “delays [in the amendment 
process] protect society against itself, by forcing passionate 
majorities, whether simple or qualified, to cool down and 
reconsider.”1070 In addition, as provided in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, all bills put forth to amend the constitution 
can only be considered successful if they have been approved by the 
Parliament and also by the assemblies of the states or provinces.1071 
Drafters may also choose to place the responsibility to amend the 
constitution in the hands of specially constituted or convened 
assemblies, such as the Sovereign National Conference that was 
common in West Africa during the prodemocracy uprisings of the 
late-to-mid-1990s.1072 
With respect to presidential immunity, one can argue that this 
is a necessary constitutional tool to enhance the ability of the 
president to perform his or her public functions without fear of being 
dragged to court, either while they are in office or afterwards. 
Supporters of immunity for presidents in Africa argue that 
 
 
1067 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON Jan. 18, 1996, 
art. 63(1)–(2) (amended 2008). According to Article 63(1), “[a]mendments 
to the Constitution may be proposed either by the President of the Republic 
or by Parliament” and according to Article 63(2), “[t]he amendment shall 
be adopted by an absolute majority of the members of Parliament.” 
1068 See id. at art. 6(2) & 53(3). 
1069 Elster, supra note 1064, at 470. 
1070 Id. 
1071 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74. 
1072 See generally Pearl T. Robinson, The National Conference 
Phenomenon in Francophone Africa, 36 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 
575, 575–610 (1994). 
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“[p]rosecuting sitting heads of state . . . undermines stability.”1073 
Nevertheless, those who argue that African presidents should be 
granted immunity with respect to both civil and criminal 
proceedings, also say that that immunity should not be allowed to 
“become a license for abuse of powers”1074 and engagement in 
behaviors or acts that violate human rights. Supporters of 
presidential immunities further add that certain exemptions should 
be made and these include: 
i) Crimes or wrongs committed before the president 
assumed office. To reduce the risk of corrupt leadership, 
the presidential office should be reserved [only] for those 
who have a clean record and not those who want to use the 
office to escape liability for their past misdeeds. 
ii) Any private act that amounts to abuse of the official 
position for private ends as well as any act that violates the 
spirit of the Constitution. 
iii) Immunity should be limited only to those acts, whether 
private or official that are in bona fide exercise of the 
presidential duties. Courts should have the discretion to 
deny immunity where they come to the conclusion that the 
action will not materially affect the president’s ability to 
defend his interests, nor significantly harm national 




1073 Sofia Christensen, Should African Presidents Have Immunity 
from Prosecution?, VOA NEWS (June 1, 2017, 11:30 PM), https://www. 
voanews.com/a/african-president-immunity-from-prosecution/3883794.html. 
1074 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 107. 
1075 Id. at 18. Fombad and Nwauche argue that had these principles 
been followed in Botswana, the country’s Court of Appeal would not have 
ruled in favor of the President of Botswana and allowed him to use 
presidential immunity to oust his political rivals. See Motswaledi v. 
Botswana Democratic Party and Others, 2 BLR 284 CA (2009). 
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It has also been suggested that “civil recovery action,”1076 such 
as that which was used to recover the public funds illegally 
appropriated by former African presidents, such as Nigerian 
dictator, Sani Abacha, and Zambian president, Frederick Chiluba, 
could be a solution.1077 In addition to the fact that this approach 
allows the country to recover funds that have been looted by the 
president and, hence, deprive him of the opportunity to enjoy the 
fruits of his illegal activities, it can also serve to deter presidential 
corruption. Given the fact that this is not a criminal process, the 
burden of proof is lower and hence, may be much easier to 
accomplish. Nevertheless, success will require the cooperation of 
the international community, especially since most African 
presidents who rob their state treasuries usually hide their ill-gotten 
gains in foreign banks.1078 Successful recovery of public funds 
stolen by former African presidents should contribute, not just to 
development in the continent, as these funds can be used to invest in 
growth-supporting infrastructures, but can also help in the 
continent’s fight against corruption.1079 
In the post-independence period, many African presidents have 
used the “principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of states, enshrined in both the Charter of the United 
Nations and that of the OAU,”1080 to abuse the power of their public 
positions with impunity. Nevertheless, beginning with the UDHR 
on December 10, 1948, the international community has imposed 
constraints on the ability of States and national governments to act 
 
 
1076 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 108. 
1077 See John Hatchard, Strengthening Presidential Accountability: 
Attorney General of Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai & Others, 5 J. 
COMMONWEALTH L. & LEGAL EDU. 69 (2007). 
1078 See John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and the Fight 
Against Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
661, 750 (2016) (emphasizing, inter alia, the importance of international 
cooperation to the fight against corruption in Africa). 
1079 See id. (examining, inter alia, the importance of recovering of 
Africa’s stolen assets to poverty alleviation efforts and development in the 
continent). 
1080 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 111. 
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without regard to the rights of their citizens.1081 What the UDHR 
and subsequent international human rights instruments1082 did was 
to lay down minimum standards of human rights protection. 
International human rights instruments have been supplemented by 
regional instruments, which deal with human rights protection in 
specific regions of the world.1083 The Banjul Charter was adopted 
on June 27, 1981 and entered into force on October 21, 1986.1084 
The Banjul Charter established the African Commission and 
charged the commission with protecting and promoting human and 
peoples’ rights in Africa, in addition to interpreting the Banjul 
Charter. 
Many African countries have voluntarily signed and ratified 
various international human rights treaties. By doing so, they have 
accepted certain obligations with respect to the protection and 
promotion of human rights. In addition, during the last several 
decades many regional and international frameworks have emerged 
to pressure African political leaders to “conform to certain 
constitutional standards of governance,”1085 which include 
“[d]emocracy, good governance, respect for the rule of law and 
respect for human rights.”1086 
Unlike its predecessor, the OAU, the AU can intervene in 
member states under Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act in respect 
to “grave circumstances,” which include “war crimes, genocide[,] 
and crimes against humanity.”1087 In addition, Article 4(o) of the 
Constitutive Act rejects “impunity and political assassination.”1088 
Article 4(p) also condemns and rejects “unconstitutional changes of 
governments.”1089 These provisions give the AU the legal authority 
to prevent abuse of presidential power, for example, through 
 
 
1081 See G.A Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
1082 For example, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
1083 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 109. 
1084 See Banjul Charter, supra note 93. 
1085 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 112. 
1086 Id. 
1087 AU Constitutive Act, art. 4(h). 
1088 Id. at art. 4(o). 
1089 Id. at art. 4(p). 
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attempts by presidents to use violence, including the commission of 
atrocities against their fellow citizens, to prolong the president’s stay 
in power.1090 Unfortunately, in the past, the AU has not been as 
eager to intervene or condemn powerful countries such as Egypt, as 
it has smaller countries like The Gambia1091 and Comoros,1092 which 
have inferior militaries. In 2008, the AU ordered intervention in the 
Comoros to restore democracy after a coup d’état but refrained from 
taking action in Egypt after the military overthrew the 
democratically elected Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013.1093 
Although the AU suspended Egypt’s membership in the 
organization and treated Morsi’s overthrow as an unconstitutional 
change of government, no effort was made to ensure the return of 
the country’s democratically elected president to power.1094 In fact, 
the AU-imposed suspension was lifted after general elections to 
 
 
1090 See Solomon Ayele Dersso, The AU on Egypt: Between a Rock 
and a Hard Place?, INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (June 6, 2014), 
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-au-on-egypt-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-
place (examining, inter alia, the AU’s inability to pursue, in Egypt, a policy 
consistent with its principles, as outlined in its Constitutive Act). 
1091 When then President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh lost the Dec. 
1, 2016, presidential election to opposition candidate, Adama Barrow. 
Jammeh refused to leave office and allow for a peaceful transition. Local, 
regional, and international organizations condemned President Jammeh’s 
actions. The AU did not just condemn Jammeh’s decision not to relinquish 
power but supported the decision of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) to use all means necessary, including military 
force, to respect the will of the people of The Gambia. See Constitutional 
Coups, supra note 72, at 167–74. 
1092 See Simon Massey & Bruce Baker, Comoros: External 
Involvement in a Small Island State, Chatham House, Programme Paper 
AFP 2009/1, July 2009, (examining, inter alia, AU intervention in the 
Comoros); Paul D. Williams, The African Union’s Peace Operations: A 
Comparative Analysis, 2 AFR. SEC. 97, 105 (2009) (examining, inter alia, 
the AU’s intervention efforts to restore democracy in the Comoros). 
1093 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi 
Is Taken into Military Custody, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), https://www.ny 
times.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html. 
1094 See Dersso, supra note 1090. 
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elect a new government in Egypt.1095 The AU never applied Article 
25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance, which mandates that “the perpetrators of 
unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to 
participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold 
any position of responsibility in political institutions of their 
State.”1096 General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the president Egyptians 
elected in the aftermath of the military coup was actually involved 
in the military overthrow of Mohamed Morsi.1097 The el-Sisi regime 
should have been sanctioned and seen as an illegitimate government 
according to the principles adopted by the AU to guard against 
unconstitutional changes of government.1098 
When the AU adopted Article 4(h), it “became the first 
international organization to formally recognize the principle that 
the international community has a responsibility to intervene in 
crisis situations if the state is failing to protect its population.”1099 It 
was not until 2005 that the Member States of the UN accepted the 
R2P principle as a norm of international law.1100 In 2006, the UN 
Security Council, in Resolution S/RES/1674, reaffirmed the 
provisions of key paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document, which deals with and defines the 
scope of the R2P principle.1101 As discussed earlier, the primary 
purpose of and impetus to intervention, including military 
intervention, without the consent and acquiescence of the State, is 
considered “legitimate in extreme cases when major harm to 
civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended and the state in 
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm or is itself the 
 
 
1095 See AU Ends Egypt, Guinea Bissau Suspension After Elections, 
REUTERS (June 17, 2014, 12:58 PM), https://af.reuters.com/article/ 
guineaBissauNews/idAFL5N0OY55720140617. 
1096 AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND 
GOVERNANCE, art. 25(7) (2007), http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf. 
1097 See AU Ends Egypt, supra note 1095. 
1098 See Constitutional Coups, supra note 72, at 161. 
1099 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 113. The Constitutive 
Act of the African Union was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 
2001. 
1100 See G.A. Res. 60/1, at 30 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
1101 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
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perpetrator of the harm.”1102 Additional legal support for this type 
of intervention is evident in several other international legal 
documents, including, provisions of various human rights 
instruments, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UDHR, Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, and The Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and their Additional Protocols on 
International Humanitarian Law.1103 
It is important that the R2P principle is seen as an effort by 
international law to ensure the practice of good governance; the 
protection of human rights in every State; the accountability of each 
government to its people and its constitution; the minimization of 
government impunity; and the promotion and facilitation of human 
development. Within R2P, a president can no longer violate the 
human rights of his fellow citizens and expect to escape liability for 
the abuse of power.1104 
African judiciaries, particularly those in Kenya and South 
Africa, are gradually asserting their independence and making 
judicial rulings that challenge the hegemony of their imperial 
presidencies. However, many judiciaries across the continent are 
still very weak and subservient to the executive. In these countries, 
it is unlikely that national courts would prosecute a sitting president 
for any crimes that he commits. Nevertheless, there is growing 
interest within the international community to bring to justice any 
political leaders whose abuse of power constitutes international 
crimes.1105 
Generally, it is argued that international customary law 
“accords serving presidents absolute immunity from any civil or 
criminal liability for public or private acts done while they are in 
office.”1106 For example, in the case concerning Arrest Warrant of 
11 April, 2000, (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) 
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(Merits),1107 the ICJ held that the Kingdom of Belgium had violated 
its legal obligation towards the Democratic Republic of Congo “in 
that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo enjoyed under 
international law.”1108 
Nevertheless, international law may make exceptions in certain 
circumstances. If a president has committed what constitutes 
international crimes—specifically, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes—international law may provide avenues 
for the trial of such an individual. First, a president who has 
committed an international crime may be prosecuted and brought to 
justice in an international tribunal if “the text of the treaty 
establishing the international tribunal so provides.”1109 This was the 
case with former Liberian President, Charles Taylor, who was 
accused of committing international crimes in Sierra Leone during 
the country’s civil war. He was subsequently prosecuted by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).1110 The SCSL was 
established by the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,1111 
which was an agreement between the UN and the Government of 
Sierra Leone pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1315 of 
August 14, 2000.1112 Article 1 of the Statute defines the competence 
of the SCSL: 
The Special Court shall, except as provided in 
subparagraph (2), have the power to prosecute persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
 
 
1107 Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, Case No. I.C.J. 2002 
I.C.J. 3; 41 I.L.M. 536, Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 11, 2000). 
1108 Id. 
1109 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 114. 
1110 Id. 
1111 See The Trial of Charles Taylor Before the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone: The Appeal Judgment, OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE (Sept. 
2013), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/4faa81cc-80b2-4444-817 
b-31b3c47f0530/charles-taylor-appeal-brief-20130924_0.pdf [hereinafter 
The Trial of Charles Taylor]. 
1112 S.C. Res. 1315, (Aug. 14, 2000), https://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/3b00f27814.html. 
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international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law 
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 
November 1996, including those leaders who, in 
committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment 
of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra 
Leone.1113 
Second, a president can be tried by the domestic courts of a 
foreign country if that court has quasi-universal or universal 
jurisdiction over “such international crimes making it unlikely that 
a claim to absolute immunity will suffice.”1114 These two important 
international legal processes can help minimize “impunity [in 
Africa] and promote good governance and respect for the rule of law 
in [the continent].”1115 The SCSL was a special court designed 
specifically to prosecute international crimes committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone during the period of November 30, 1996 to 
January 18, 2002.1116 Nevertheless, the ICC, which was established 
by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,1117 is a 
permanent court and is the appropriate tribunal to prosecute 
individuals, including presidents, who commit international crimes. 
According to Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute: 
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
 
 
1113 STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE art. 1(1) 
(Aug. 14, 2000), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf. 
1114 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 115. 
1115 Id. 
1116 See, e.g., The Trial of Charles Taylor, supra note 1111. 
1117 The Rome Statute was adopted at a diplomatic conference in 
Rome, Italy, on July 17, 1998, and entered into force on July 1, 2002. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court., July 17,1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/COMF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome 
Statute]. 
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and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence.1118 
In addition, Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute also deals with 
the issue of immunities. It states as follows: “Immunities or special 
procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the 
Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”1119 Thus, 
immunities granted African presidents and other officials by their 
constitutions will not prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction 
over them should they commit or be involved in the commission of 
international crimes. 
Nevertheless, we have already seen, in the indictment by the 
ICC of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir,1120 that the ICC 
does not have independent arrest powers. Instead, it must rely on the 
cooperation of States Parties to effect the arrest of indicted 
individuals and send them to the ICC. The ICC’s prosecutor has 
accused several States Parties, including Jordan, Uganda, and Chad, 
“of undermining the tribunal’s ‘reputation and credibility’ by 
refusing to arrest Sudan’s president to face charges of genocide in 
his county’s Darfur region.”1121 When President al-Bashir made a 
special visit to South Africa in 2015 to attend the AU summit, the 
ICC asked the government of South Africa to arrest him and send 
 
 
1118 Id. at art. 27(1). 
1119 Id. at art. 27(2). 
1120 The ICC issued the first warrant for the arrest of President al-
Bashir on Mar. 4, 2009 and the second one on July 12, 2010. He was 
charged with various crimes associated with his military’s activities in the 
Darfur Region of Sudan between 2003 and 2008. See The Prosecutor v. 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, ICC–02/05–01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, (Mar. 4, 2009), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF. 
1121 International Court: Failure to Arrest Sudan’s President 
Undermines Us, TIMES OF ISRAEL, ¶ 1, (Dec. 13, 2017, 8:28AM), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/international-court-failure-to-arrest-
sudans-president-undermines-us/. President al-Bashir has travelled to these 
countries, but none of them has made any efforts to arrest him and send him 
to the ICC to face justice. 
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him to The Hague to stand trial.1122 Nevertheless, South African 
authorities refused to effect the arrest and argued that “international 
law granting immunity for sitting heads of state prevented it from 
arresting al-Bashir and conflicted with the Rome Statute’s 
obligations to arrest and surrender him to the ICC.”1123 The ICC, 
however, held that South Africa was wrong and stated that the 
“customary international law provision of immunity that South 
Africa [had] relied on has been superseded by the UNSC Resolution 
1593 (2005) that referred Darfur to the ICC.”1124 In addition, the 
ICC judges argued that Resolution 1593 has “effectively place[d] 
Sudan in the same legal position as a [S]tate [P]arty to the Rome 
Statute,”1125 and hence, as a sitting head of state under the Rome 
Statute, al-Bashir could be held responsible for crimes committed in 
his individual capacity.1126 
Of course, the ICC process is supposed to supplement and not 
replace national legal systems, and hence, it is expected to operate 
based on or “pursuant to the principle of complementarity.”1127 
Thus, if an African country’s legal system has the will and the 
capacity to fully and effectively prosecute individuals accused of 
committing international crimes, the ICC should not move to take 
jurisdiction over the situations.1128 As of 2019, thirty-three African 
States have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute, and hence, have 
 
 
1122 See Adam Taylor, Why So Many African Leaders Hate the 




1123 Allan Ngari, The Real Problem Behind South Africa’s Refusal to 
Arrest al-Bashir, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., ¶ 6, (July 10, 2017), https://issafrica. 
org/iss-today/the-real-problem-behind-south-africas-refusal-to-arrest-al-
bashir. 
1124 Id. ¶ 7. 
1125 Id. 
1126 Id. 
1127 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 115. 
1128 Id. 
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consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC.1129 Burundi, which ratified 
the Rome Statute on September 21, 2004, notified the UN of its 
intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute on October 27, 2016, 
and its withdrawal became effective on October 27, 2017.1130 Both 
South Africa and The Gambia also notified the UN of their intention 
to withdraw from the Rome Statute, but have since rescinded their 
notices, and hence, are still States Parties to the ICC.1131 
Despite the fact that the relationship between the ICC, AU, and 
several African countries has soured significantly because of the 
indictment, by the ICC, of African leaders, such as al-Bashir of 
Sudan, Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, and his then Vice President, 
William Ruto, the international tribunal remains an important legal 
mechanism for the fight against impunity in Africa. As argued by 
some legal scholars, “the possibility of ICC proceedings for gross 
human rights violations remains a formidable threat that African 
politicians can no longer ignore.”1132 With respect to the 
complementarity principle, the ICC is expected to act only in 
situations where national courts are either unable or unwilling to 
hold accountable those individuals who are alleged to have 
committed international crimes or engaged in serious violations of 
human rights.1133 
The employment of what has come to be known as universal 
jurisdiction can “dispense[] with the need to establish any territorial 
or physical link between the accused and the state asserting 
jurisdiction.”1134 The AU has acknowledged that universal 
jurisdiction is a principle of international law. In the Decision on the 
 
 
1129 See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., 
https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%
20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx. 
1130 See Burundi: Situation in the Republic of Burundi, INT’L CRIM. 
CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi. 
1131 See, e.g., Franck Kuwonu, ICC: Beyond the Threats of 
Withdrawal, AFR. RENEWAL (May–July 2017), https://www.un.org/africa 
renewal/magazine/may-july-2017/icc-beyond-threats-withdrawal. 
1132 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 116. 
1133 Id. 
1134 Id. 
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Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction, the AU states that 
[t]he Assembly, RECOGNIZING that universal 
jurisdiction is a principle of International Law whose 
purpose is to ensure that individuals who commit grave 
offenses such as war crimes and crimes against humanity 
do not do so with impunity and are brought to justice, 
which is in line with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union.1135 
The AU concludes that “[t]he abuse and misuse of indictments 
against African leaders have a destabilizing effect that will 
negatively impact on the political, social and economic development 
of States and their ability to conduct international relations.”1136 The 
Assembly requested that a moratorium should be imposed “on the 
execution of those warrants until all the legal and political issues 
have been exhaustively discussed between the African Union, the 
European Union and the United Nations.”1137 
Some scholars have argued that, although there is potential for 
abuse of universal jurisdiction, they question the AU’s decision to 
intervene, especially given the fact that universal jurisdiction is 
actually based on various international treaties, which many African 
countries have voluntarily signed and ratified.1138 These include, for 
example, the Geneva Conventions (which establish the standards of 
international law for humanitarian treatment in war); the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.1139 
Many African countries overwhelmingly supported the 
establishment of the ICC because they believed that government 
impunity had become a major constraint to peace and security in the 
 
 
1135 AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 199(XI), (June 30–July 1, 2008). 
1136 Id. ¶¶ 3 & 5(iii). 
1137 Id. ¶. 8. 
1138 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 117. 
1139 Id. 
2019 PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 213 
 
continent.1140 In fact, in the aftermath of the failure of OAU to 
prevent the atrocities that comprised the Rwandan Genocide, many 
Africans, especially human rights activists, recognized the need to 
support the establishment of an international criminal court with 
jurisdiction over international crimes committed in the continent.1141 
The inclusion of Article 4(h) in the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union supports the argument that the AU recognizes the problem of 
impunity and is interested in dealing with it.1142 Hence, it is argued 
that the only possible explanation for the AU’s attack of universal 
jurisdiction and its opposition to the ICC is that both the ICC and 
universal jurisdiction represent a major threat to many of the 
continent’s entrenched dictators.1143 
IX. CONCLUSION AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the demise of 
apartheid in South Africa, there arose, throughout many African 
countries, grassroots efforts to fight the violation of human rights, 
presidential abuse of power, and government impunity. These 
efforts, including those by the international community, have made 
it much more difficult for African leaders, including presidents, to 
hide “behind sovereignty, non-intervention or constitutional 
immunities to abuse the exorbitant powers that they often arrogate 
to themselves”1144 and violate the rights of their fellow citizens. 
Nevertheless, African countries and the international community 
need to take concrete steps to eliminate government impunity and 
put in place institutional and legal structures that can effectively 




1141 Claire Felter, The Role of the International Criminal Court, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. BACKGROUNDER, https://www.cfr.org/ 
backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court (last updated Feb. 23, 
2021). 
1142 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 117. 
1143 See generally Constitutional Coups, supra note 72. 
1144 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 117. 
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activities that violate human rights and threaten international peace 
and security. 
First, all African countries must revisit the issue of presidential 
immunities. Granted, “[p]residential immunities of a clearly defined 
and limited scope are necessary for the proper discharge of the 
onerous duties that are bestowed on [African] leaders.”1145 
Nevertheless, such grant of immunity must be balanced well enough 
to minimize impunity and ensure that presidents are accountable to 
the constitution and the people. Of course, in countries with poorly 
drafted constitutions, or those whose institutional arrangements do 
not provide for effective checks on the exercise of government 
power, presidential abuse of power is likely to remain rampant. This 
brings us to the second issue that virtually all African countries have 
to revisit—constitution making and state reconstruction. Through a 
participatory and inclusive constitution-making process, each 
African country can provide itself with institutional arrangements 
characterized by true separation of powers with checks and 
balances, including an independent judiciary and a “strong 
bicameral legislature to counter the powers of the presidency.”1146 
A robust and politically active civil society, as well as strong civil 
society organizations, such as a free press and viable opposition 
political parties, can also help check on the exercise of government 
power and minimize impunity and the abuse of presidential 
privileges. 
Third, national judiciaries, which are gradually rising up to 
assert their independence, should use the powers granted to them by 
their constitutions to interpret the constitution, as well as to 
determine the constitutionality of laws, including customary law, to 
strike down laws (and this includes customary laws) that are not in 
conformity with provisions of international human rights and 
international humanitarian law. Independent and progressive 
judiciaries, such as the Tanzanian High Court and the Supreme 




1146 JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH 
60 (2018). 
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impact the promotion and protection of human rights in the 
continent.1147 
Fourth, international law has an important role to play in the 
fight against impunity and human rights abuses in Africa. The 
international community has established many systems to combat 
impunity and significantly improve government accountability in 
countries, such as those in Africa, which have relatively weak 
institutions. In addition to the adoption of the principle of R2P, the 
international community has also established an international 
tribunal—the ICC—and empowered it to prosecute all persons, 
including those in Africa, alleged to have committed international 
crimes.1148 Despite the ICC’s rocky start with respect to Africa, it 
remains an important international legal mechanism for the fight 
against impunity in the African continent and other parts of the 
world. As argued by Fombad and Nwauche, “[i]n spite of the 
contradictory and sometimes confusing position taken both by the 
AU and individual African states with respect to the ICC, the latter 
remains a formidable tool to combat abuse of presidential power and 
impunity in Africa.”1149 
Fifth, the AU’s framework for promoting democracy and 
protecting human rights in Africa allows the organization to 
intervene in member states where international crimes are 
committed. Unlike the OAU, which turned a blind eye to atrocities 
committed against citizens in many countries throughout the 
continent, the AU is expected to be more proactive and act with 
“vigor and determination”1150 in order to prevent presidential 
excesses. Hopefully, with pressure from grassroots organizations in 
the continent, as well as from the international community, the AU 
can meet the obligations imposed on it by its Constitutive Act. 
Sixth, there is growing interest throughout the continent to 
institutionalize human rights constitutionalism. At the minimum, 
this process involves four important issues, which include the 
 
 
1147 See Ephrahim v. Pastory, 87 I.L.R. 106 (Tanz. High Ct. 1990); 
see also Catholic Comm’n for Justice and Peace (Zim. Sup. Ct. 1993). 
1148 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1117. 
1149 Fombad & Nwauche, supra note 870, at 118. 
1150 Id. 
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centrality of human rights—their recognition, promotion, and 
protection—in the structure of each African country’s constitution; 
each country must have a Bill of Rights which recognizes and 
provides effective protections for the rights of citizens and 
incorporates provisions of international human rights instruments; 
each African constitution must provide for a truly independent 
judiciary and empower it to enforce the Bill of Rights; and each 
African country must educate its citizens on human rights and help 
create, within the country, a culture of respect for human rights. 
Finally, the additional pro-human rights structures that are 
being created, especially in Africa, represent warnings to Africa’s 
political leaders that they will be held accountable for all the crimes 
that they commit while in office. Within the continent, institutions 
such as the African Commission and the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, are expected to serve as important constraints to 
impunity and the abuse of presidential powers. While these 
structures may never totally eliminate “presidential abuse of powers, 
especially in the form of corruption and violence against political 
opponents,”1151 African presidents and other political leaders have 
been put on notice that there is a very strong likelihood, that should 
they engage in human rights abuses or commit other atrocities 
against their fellow citizens, they will be held accountable. 
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